UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION CASE NO. 23-CV-21377-DPG

PRESIDENT DONALD J. TE	RUMP,)	PAGES: 1 - 113
)	
PLAINT	TIFF,)	
)	DATE OF PROCEEDINGS
)	AUGUST 17, 2023
)	
vs.)	10TH FLOOR
)	JAMES LAWRENCE KING
)	FEDERAL JUSTICE
MICHAEL D. COHEN,)	BUILDING.
)	
DEFENDANT.		

TRANSCRIPT OF OFFICIAL ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING
OF THE DISCOVERY HEARING BEFORE EDWIN G. TORRES,
UNITED STATES CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE,
AT 99 N.E. FOURTH STREET,
MIAMI, FLORIDA, 33132.

APPEARANCE OF COUNSELS

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ALEJANDRO BRITO, ESQ.,

BRITO, PLLC

2121 PONCE DE LEON BOULEVARD

SUITE 650

CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33134

FOR THE DEFENDANT: BENJAMIN HENRY BRODSKY, ESQ., (VIA ZOOM)

MAX AARON EICHENBLATT, ESQ., BRODSKY FOTIU-WOJTOWICZ, PLLC

200 SE 1ST STREET

SUITE 400

MIAMI, FLORIDA 33131

<u>Transcribed By:</u>

Quanincia S. Hill, Registered Professional Reporter Federal Official Court Reporter 400 North Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 APPEARANCES-CONTD. FOR THE DEFENDANT

E. DANYA PERRY, ESQ.
LILIAN MARGARITA TIMMERMANN, ESQ.
E. DANYA PERRY PLLC
157 EAST 86TH STREET, 4TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10028

Transcribed By:

Quanincia S. Hill, Registered Professional Reporter Federal Official Court Reporter 400 North Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33128

1 (Whereupon, this commences the transcription of the 2 electronic recording of the above-styled proceedings.) 3 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Calling case President Donald J. Trump versus Michael Cohen, case number 23-21377, civil, Judge 4 5 Gayles. 6 Counsel, please state your appearances for the record, 7 starting with the plaintiff. ATTORNEY BRITO: Good morning, Your Honor. Alejandro 8 9 Brito on behalf of the plaintiff. 10 ATTORNEY PERRY: Good morning, Your Honor. Danya Perry 11 on behalf of Mr. Cohen. 12 ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Good morning, Your Honor. Max Eichenblatt on behalf of Mr. Cohen. 13 14 THE COURT: Good morning. Everybody. ATTORNEY BRODSKY: And good morning, Your Honor. 15 16 THE COURT: Oh, I forgot. 17 ATTORNEY BRODSKY: Ben Brodsky by telephone. Thank you 18 for allowing me to appear remotely today. 19 THE COURT: All right. Good morning. 20 This is a discovery hearing in the case which you requested by that plaintiff, or no, by the defendant. Okay. 21 22 know that there's a pending issue from last time having to do with the motions for the request for protective order. The 23 24 parties have briefed the issue and I'll be issuing an order 25 soon on that. I found that the plaintiff's proposal was too

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restrictive and the defendant's proposal was too permissive. So I'm trying to bridge the gap between the two. And of course, once we enter the confidentiality order, that will govern the case, it will -- it can be modified based upon circumstances. So we'll have to address that. Okay. Turning then over to the counsel for the defendant, what's the issue you wish to raise today? ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor, may I remain seated. think it's going to be a slog through a number of discovery requests. So Your Honor, we're here today because having brought a broad sweeping \$500 million action against my client, the plaintiff in this case has put up any number of roadblocks to discovery that we wish to take, both with respect to document discovery and with respect to his upcoming deposition that he's currently scheduled for for September the 6th. September the 6th. Okay. THE COURT: ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Three weeks from today. ATTORNEY PERRY: The first issue before Your Honor today relates to its resistance to our reasonable proportionment discovery requests for documents. We have, I believe, some agreement with respect to a number of them, but

having met and conferred, weren't able to come to terms with

respect to the bulk of them. And I'm certain we'll go through

many of them, if not all of them, point by point. But generally speaking, our discovery is relevant to explore four key issues in the case and Your Honor will hear this I'm sure time and time again as we go through the specific requests.

But first, confidentiality. What information's really confidential and at what time.

Our theory of the case, theory of defense, is that many of the things or all of the things that Mr. Cohen said really cannot be confidential because they were broadly and publicly known.

THE COURT: But I don't understand the -- if the -- does this relate to the protective order issue?

ATTORNEY PERRY: No, Your Honor. Thank you for making a distinction.

No. What we're talking about are the allegations in the case, some of them relate to Mr. Trump's claim that Mr. Cohen breached his duty of confidentiality and his fiduciary obligations as his attorney. And so what we're arguing, one of our defenses here is that nothing that Mr. Cohen said breaches any obligations because everything was widely and publicly known. So there are specific examples, I mean, about specific incidents that happened while Mr. Cohen was working for the Trump Organization, and that is discussed in Mr. Cohen's book. And there's an allegation that this constitutes a breach of privilege; whereas our defense will be,

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actually, no, that was reported else where and it's publicly
       So that's just a one broad defense. But it does come
in time and again with respect to specific requests.
        THE COURT: Okay. Give me an example. Let me pull up
the materials here.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor, it might be more simple to
go through. I think there's just about 25 specific requests
were better in context.
        THE COURT: Right. Let's do this.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: And so may be I'm wasting my breath
and your time by giving the overview because of course it's
really the questions will be in the weeds here.
        THE COURT: Right. Let me pull it up. I know I saw
them. Hold on one second. I'm sorry.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: Of course.
        THE COURT: Oh, I know what's happening.
        Okay. Here we are.
        Okay. All right. So which request am I looking for,
request for production?
        ATTORNEY PERRY: So, let's see, we have agreement on a
number of them. So I believe the first group of documents that
-- where we had disagreement --
        THE COURT: Okay.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: -- are, let's see, Requests 2 through
4 where we are seeking documents reflecting Mr. Cohen's
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purported attorney-client and employment relationships with Mr. Trump and two entities, the organization and the campaign.

THE COURT: All contracts, agreements from 2006 to the present reflecting existence of an attorney-client and/or employment relationship.

Is that the first one you're talking about?

ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And what was the objection?

ATTORNEY PERRY: I'm not certain that it -- Mr. Brito did produce a purported confidentiality agreement, an NDA, that were the subject, no doubt, of further discussion. But that's all that they've produced. And I believe that's all they plan to produce.

Just to be clear, we've gotten one production of five documents, most of which consist of pages taken -- of from Mr. Cohen's books of photos that were taken with an iPhone or something. So there's really not been much to date.

We've been told that we would get additional documents on a rolling basis, but have been given no deadline or no date certain why which we will receive those. And so some of the relief that we will -- we seek from Your Honor is a deadline so that we can have those in advance of the deposition scheduled scheduled for September 6th.

But we have met and conferred about Requests 2 through
4. And I don't want to misstate the nature of the objection.

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     I'm not certain what it is. So...
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             THE COURT: Okay. Have all documents been produced for
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     2 through 4? Is it just that one document?
             ATTORNEY BRITO: No, Your Honor. It is the contention
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     that they're not clear as to my objection. It's to line about
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     the fact that Mr. Brodsky wrote an e-mail summarizing where he
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     we confer or he articulates exactly what was discussed --
             THE COURT: Okay. Do I have that e-mail? It is
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     something I can work off of?
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: It is, Your Honor. It is -- I think
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     it's number 3. I don't necessarily agree with the totality of
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     the e-mails, but they understand the nature of the objection
     because it was discussed with Mr. Brodsky. I have three in my
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    materials that were submitted by the defendant. It's the
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     e-mail dated July 18th.
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             THE COURT: All right. I can look at your material.
     This is the defendant's materials.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Yada, yada, yada.
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             Okay. While I look that up, tell me what the nature of
     the issue is.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: The issue here is, as it relates to
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     number 2, is they've asked for a contract that would establish
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     the existence of an attorney-client or employee relationship
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    between Mr. Cohen and Mr. Trump --
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THE COURT: Right.

ATTORNEY BRITO: -- fair game with respect to the contract that's been produced. We believe they've had it all along. But nevertheless, we produced the confidentiality agreement that was signed by both parties. The objection, as it relates to the balance of request number 2, is that it asks for all contracts, agreements of four other documents from 2006 to the present reflecting the existence of any attorney-client relationship. So that would be all communications from my read of the way that this is worded, just any communication between the two of them that would stem from an attorney-client relationship would be other documents establishing that relationship.

So what I communicated to Mr. Brodsky is there's no dispute that Mr. Cohen, I don't believe there ought to be a the dispute that Mr. Cohen was the attorney. And there is a written employment agreement separate and apart from him serving as counsel, which has been produced. What other documents do you need to establish what I believe to be a non-controversial fact that is essentially an undisputed fact, Mr. Cohen was Mr. Trump's attorney. What else do we need to establish as it relates -- there's other document requests that are going to talk about specifics.

THE COURT: Well, as to -- but as to the -- I understand your point as to the broader point. But as to the

creation, modification or termination had of an attorney-client relationship between Cohen and the three entities identified, have you produced all of those?

ATTORNEY BRITO: Creation, yes, because it's one agreement. There is no separate retention letter concerning his employee. Mr. Cohen resigned. So there is no termination letter or termination agreement. And is it was more termination, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Modification, was there.

ATTORNEY BRITO: I don't believe there's any modification. We have Mr. Cohen's personnel file. And that is going -- to the extent that that captures not just the attorney-client but also the employment relationship, again, that's at a step -- that's a separate request.

THE COURT: Was that produced?

ATTORNEY BRITO: It has not yet been produced. I'm in the process of obtaining it. We did not object to that request. So that's -- that's where we stand. But --

THE COURT: Okay. So from your vantage point, it's the other documents at issue?

ATTORNEY BRITO: That's my -- that's articulated in Mr. Brodsky's e-mail that that's exactly what I told him my issue was. At the bottom of page one of the e-mail that he crafted on July 18th, it says, "plaintiff does not object to providing contracts or agreements reflecting the existence of

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an attorney-client or employment relationship between the
parties. But it does object to a request for, quote, other
documents. That's overbroad.
        THE COURT: Okay. Turning back to the plaintiff.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: I don't believe that actually --
        THE COURT: Is that the issue?
        ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. I don't believe we
did receive an employment agreement. So if such a thing
exists, we --
        ATTORNEY BRITO: Wholeheartedly, I have produced the
employment agreement. It's the employment agreement,
non-confidentiality agreement. And then I've produced,
contrary to what every counsel stated, at least 50-something
odd pages, because one of the requests that they asked for was
identify where in the book Mr. Cohen made statements that would
be in violation of the rights that my client has by contract or
otherwise. So we sent them those specific pages after
Mr. Brodsky and I spoke.
        So they do have the employment agreement. And it's not
-- I have a copy of it in front of me right now. I'm happy to
give them another one. But again, I think they had it all
along, Mr. Cohen, I'm sorry, had it all along and we had to
produce it.
        THE COURT:
                    Okay.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: May be this is just a labelling
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problem. We do have an agreement. We believe it's just a
confidentiality agreement. If that's all it is, then that
works.
        ATTORNEY BRITO: It's just for purposes of candor,
Judge, the document's entitled Employment Agreement of
Confidentiality. It's the same document we're speaking about.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: But it's not the terms of employment.
It's the terms of confidentiality. But in any event, it's --
if that's all there is.
        So we would -- I think there's -- there's -- what we're
asking for in this request or request number 2 is -- are
documents with respect to relationship between Mr. Cohen and
Mr. Trump. What they have for you is just an agreement between
Mr. Cohen and the Trump Organization. So that is an important
distinction here. And so we do stand on our request for
anything that reflects a relationship between Mr. Cohen and
Mr. Trump, who is the only plaintiff here.
        THE COURT: He's saying there's nothing else?
        ATTORNEY PERRY: So if he's saying that, I mean, we --
        THE COURT: He that in his e-mail. So there's nothing
else. Obviously, you could verify that. You're not obviously
seeking to compel the other documents part because that would
be overbroad, wouldn't it?
        ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor, no. We're not. We will
accept that representation.
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THE COURT: Okay.

ATTORNEY PERRY: And I do think a lot of the other requests would capture the information.

THE COURT: I believe you can verify that because number one, you're going to depose Mr. Trump; number two, you're going to depose the person with the most knowledge probably in the organization, you know, or somebody in HR or somebody. So if that turns out to be incorrect, then you're also going to get a copy of the entire personnel files. So you would think if there was anything else, it would be there too.

So subject to verification, if that's all he has, that's all he has. Now, that may if that may help your case, it doesn't matter. I'll accept the representation that there's no other agreement that follows. My categorization of these requests is any documents that created, modify, or terminate an employee relationship between the parties. So it's a much more of a formal document. And then obviously, you have a lot of other requests to deal with the issues with the case itself. So that's 2 through 4. I'm fine with that representation.

What's the next issue?

ATTORNEY PERRY: So the next one is number 5 and 6.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTORNEY PERRY: These relate to contracts and agreements between Mr. Trump, Trump Organization, campaign and Cohen and Associates. So this is just --

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THE COURT: Now, in fairness, I don't -- do I have in
your materials, er Mr. Brito, that you include your response?
        ATTORNEY BRITO: What we did, Your Honor is we --
        THE COURT: Did you formally respond or did we have an
ambiguous response?
        ATTORNEY BRITO: No.
                              No. There there's a formal
response that's that was served timely. And that was included
in the materials that defendant's counsel was charged with the
responsibility of sending over to you. So it was a packet of
materials that that were forwarded to the Court which included
our response and the cases that we relied upon.
        ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: It's in Defendant's 2, Your
Honor, in our response materials.
        THE COURT: I see it now. Okay.
        Well, I guess I should go back a step to 2 to 4. I get
there's -- one could interpret that as being an objection.
let me go back to 2 to 4.
        As to number 4, I guess there's an objection there that
you -- your request defined it as Trump Campaign. Is that --
is that -- should I worry about that particular request? Did
you mean the Trump -- cause obviously -- did he have an
arrangement -- is the Trump Campaign an actual entity?
        ATTORNEY PERRY:
                         It is. And --
        THE COURT: And it's defined as an entity?
        ATTORNEY PERRY: It is an entity.
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THE COURT: Okay.

ATTORNEY PERRY: And is there are allegations with respect to the campaign. And so that's what we've requested. And what I understood Mr. Brito to be saying is that there are no responsive documents.

THE COURT: But as to number 4, I guess you objected on that basis.

ATTORNEY BRITO: I did, because it's a bit different than what I just heard. And I'll read to you from the actual request for production of the documents, definition number 21, which says the term, quote, Trump Campaign, closed quote, refers to the Trump Campaign For President For the United States and Donald J. Trump For President, Inc. I don't understand what the Trump Campaign For President of the United States is, if that's a distinction, if that a long term for an entity. I understand the Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. to be an entity. But not the Trump Campaign For President of United States, I can't even and don't understand what that would refer to, who that would capture, hence the reason for my objection because it's not limited to just this request, Your Honor. There are, I believe, other requests to this Trump Campaign.

THE COURT: As to this request though, the issue is does any entity that relates to a campaign have an agreement with Mr. Cohen of any kind?

1 ATTORNEY BRITO: No, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 ATTORNEY BRITO: It's only one. But again, in the interest of making sure they didn't waive any positions --4 5 THE COURT: That's fine. Okay. So number 4 needs to 6 be -- I'll just object to the objections. I'll object. 7 I'll just overrule the objection so you can make clear that there is no other document as it relates to the 'Inc.' 8 9 that you referred to or any other organization under which 10 Mr. Trump ran a presidential campaign. How's that? 11 ATTORNEY BRITO: And Your Honor, that's fine, Your 12 Honor. And for purposes of context, just so you're familiar, each response that you're reviewing, were before, I believe we 13 14 came before you on the confidentiality issue. Hence the reason 15 why you're also going to see objection with respect to 16 confidentiality. We had not yet teed that up or received a from you. 17 18 THE COURT: I got you. 19 Okay. All right. Now. We move on with that clarification. 20 21 So you've said the next one is 5 and 6. Is that the 22 one. 23 ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 ATTORNEY PERRY: So that's just meant to capture, I

1 mean, you know, the objection here is --2 THE COURT: Is that any different though, I mean, 3 fundamentally? ATTORNEY PERRY: Fundamentally, no. So I trust that 4 5 their representation will be the same. 6 THE COURT: Right. Next one. 7 ATTORNEY PERRY: The next one we get to jump all the 8 way to 18. 9 THE COURT: Excellent. ATTORNEY PERRY: And this relates to any 10 11 confidentiality agreements prepared by Mr. Cohen in the course 12 of his employment. And here is --THE COURT: So any -- just so I understand, the way I 13 read it is you're requesting of any -- if Mr. Cohen drafted 14 15 any non-disclosure agreement for somebody, you're asking for 16 that? 17 ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. 18 THE COURT: How is that relevant? 19 ATTORNEY PERRY: Our argument is that --20 THE COURT: My understanding is that they're reliable. 21 There are a lot of nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements 22 that may have been used by the plaintiff. So then -- as 23 opposed to just a one. So now that we have -- so understanding 24 that, along with the many that he may have entered into, why 25 would they need to produce all of them?

ATTORNEY PERRY: We are going to be questioning the authenticity of the NDA that plaintiff has produced. And is --

THE COURT: But how would they document that Mr. Cohen drafted help in that regard --

ATTORNEY PERRY: It --

THE COURT: -- involving another person.

ATTORNEY PERRY: It tends to show that he was the drafter of these NDAs. And there's certain formats to them. And he, as the person responsible for getting them done and getting them signed, we believe that it's, of course, our position that he did not sign his own. He was the person ultimately responsible for these things and so would, you know, be in charge of not just drafting them but providing them to the employee, making sure they get signed, putting them in the file. And so if there are --

THE COURT: He's going to deny that he entered into a non-disclosure agreement is what you're saying.

attornery perry: He certainly does not remember doing so and believes that he did not. And so this was part of his job. And he was pretty mindful of that when he was presented, or he was asked to sign one. And in his memory, this is a long time ago, he resisted.

THE COURT: Because when did he enter into a relationship with the Trump Organization to begin with?

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             ATTORNEY PERRY: I believe it was 2007 or so.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: I think that's right.
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             THE COURT: And what's the day that he.
             ATTORNEY PERRY: Maybe 2006, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: I don't have it in front of me.
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             THE COURT: What's the date of the agreement,
    Mr. Brito?
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: January '07.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: June 7th, 2007.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: So, I mean, that's really it.
     shows this was part of his responsibilities.
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             THE COURT: I guess I'm not understanding. So if he's
     -- had starts working for the guy in 2007, they're saying that
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     then it would have been his obligation on day one to draft the
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     agreement for himself. Is that what you're saying? Would
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     there have been a lawyer already working for Mr. Trump?
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: I'm not -- I think he was the only
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     game in town at that point.
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             THE COURT: Well, in other words, there's no dispute,
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     right, that Mr. Trump would have had many lawyers prior to
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     2007?
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: I'm not sure exactly what his initial
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     date of employment is. And again, I don't think the agreement
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we have reflects the terms of his employment or th start date
or anything else other than purportedly and NDA. So that's
just one of the issues that we're exploring. We're entitled to
-- to documents in support of our contention that this was not
an NDA that he signed and that it was, you know -- that's
something we really do need to explore. We're at this point,
it's difficult to prove that negative, but he did not signe it.
        THE COURT: Are you getting those or requesting by
signature?
        ATTORNEY BRITO: Requesting -- well, we do not have the
original. We've requested it.
        THE COURT:
                    They've not produced it.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: It's not yet produced.
                    That's not what this is talking about,
        THE COURT:
right, cause this is talking about documents prepared by him in
the scope of his employment.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor, of all the requests, I,
you know, don't --
        THE COURT: I'm not finding the relevance of it.
that doesn't mean that you won't be able to show me down the
road or you -- that doesn't mean that you might not be able to
identify in particular -- I mean, he might have a thousand
non-disclosure agreements. So you're not seriously asking him
to produce a thousand non-disclosure agreements for everybody
from the janitor up to the people at the highest level, right?
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ATTORNEY PERRY: So we'd be prepared to put this one on ice for now and see what develops.

THE COURT: As for now, I'll sustain the objection.

But you can come back to it once a showing is made that the objection should be revisited or that you want to narrow the request --

Okay. The next ones.

ATTORNEY PERRY: The next ones are 26 and 27.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTORNEY PERRY: Relating to documents with respect to

-- that -- that relate to or reference Mr. Cohen's involvement
in the criminal case brought by the District Attorney of

Manhattan.

For us, this really goes to the plaintiff's motive for bringing this lawsuit. A lot of these issues have been very public facing for years. And it was within a week or so approximately ten days, after the filing of the indictment in the Manhattan District Attorney's case that the plaintiff chose to bring this lawsuit against Mr. Cohen.

THE COURT: So your request is non-privilege correspondence or communications with others relating to or referencing Mr. Cohen's involvement and the criminal proceedings brought against you, right, by the Manhattan District Attorney from February 1, 2023 until the present.

Okay. So this would be sort of, for example, he has

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internal corporate communication with somebody in the Trump Organization about Mr. Cohen --ATTORNEY PERRY: Correct. Appearing as a witness --**THE COURT:** Appearing as a witness? ATTORNEY PERRY: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. ATTORNEY PERRY: And perhaps concocting ways to get back at him given that the judge in that case issued some sort of not a gag order per se but admonished him against intimidating witnesses. And so he then filed this lawsuit. So any communications reflecting his motives. THE COURT: And that would tend to show what? Referencing Mr. Cohen's involvement, that would tend to show what from your perspective? ATTORNEY PERRY: That he brought this lawsuit as retribution or retaliation for Mr. Cohen's involvement as a witness in that case is not because he has a legitimate gripe with him relating to the claims in the case. THE COURT: Okay. ATTORNEY PERRY: It's motive, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So then on that one, I'll ask for a response from them. ATTORNEY BRITO: Yes, Your Honor. With respect to these communications, as you may surmise, and I may confirm, Mr. Trump is obviously someone who

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has a lot of public statements and social media platforms as well just from a public standpoint. To the extent that he has been vocal about his defense in any of the proceedings brought against him, that is going to be captured by media outlets, social media platforms, whether set by you or otherwise, that would be captured by this. And I think the problem with this, the requests, as a starting point, is that the way that it's written is -- it's extremely broad. Because it talks about the request for any communications, which reference his involvement in the criminal proceedings. And the concern that we have is the breadth of that. And I don't want to get into --THE COURT: Why is that so broad? I don't understand. ATTORNEY BRITO: Because of the fact that it's --It's very limited in time. THE COURT: ATTORNEY BRITO: I don't take issue with the time. THE COURT: All right. ATTORNEY BRITO: I'm taking issue with --THE COURT: It requires a specific reference to Cohen himself, and is obviously a Twitter or whatever of social media thing is publicly available. But I guess what they're looking for is internal correspondence within the organization. ATTORNEY BRITO: My apologies. I didn't mean to interrupt. THE COURT: Internal e-mails or communications with a

non-privileged nature with somebody within his organization

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that identified Mr. Cohen and the Manhattan proceeding. guess that's specific enough, don't you think? ATTORNEY BRITO: As you worded it, it is. THE COURT: Okay. ATTORNEY BRITO: As I read the request, I differed as I communicated to the Court. THE COURT: Okay. ATTORNEY BRITO: If we're talking about simply internal as opposed to what's in the public eye, and the defendants have the ability to obtain it and utilize as they deem appropriate, with that refining of the request, I'm happy to respond to that request because my understanding is that the answer will be none. THE COURT: Okay. ATTORNEY BRITO: I will confirm that. But if there are documents, we will produce those internal communications that are non privileged. I'm just very sensitive to the fact that I don't engage in criminal defense work and I don't want to overstep the line in light of the fact that there are criminal proceedings. I've been asked to -- any waiver of Fifth Amendment right --THE COURT: Right. ATTORNEY BRITO: -- I need to be very mindful of that. THE COURT: If he sent an internal communication to the janitor about Mr. Cohen related to the Manhattan proceeding,

you can try to fight the privilege, but I don't think that would fall. But the bottom line is, at least you have to see if there is anything and then fight over whether or not it's privileged or not.

ATTORNEY BRITO: That would be above my pay grade in the first place to argue that that privileges; number 2 --

THE COURT: Right. So first identify the documents.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Fair. With the Court's refining of that request, I'm fine.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. This one would include obviously internal correspondence, e-mail. It would include actual correspondence between anybody of the non-privileged communications, so no attorney-client, obviously. It's not responsive and it further limits the time period. Why wouldn't it be the date of the filing of the lawsuit?

ATTORNEY PERRY: I mean, logically, he could continue to make the same types of statements about why he's pressing, continuing to prosecute this case.

THE COURT: Well, how about for a more -- we'll say when did the discovery period begin in the case? Like June 1, something like that. So June 1st. So for the February 1 through June 1, that will be -- I'll narrow the time period. But I think otherwise that may be, potentially, not relevant for impeachment purposes.

The other parts of the objection are overruled with

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respect to confidentiality because obviously, that will be --
     it may not be confidential. It may be a third-party
     communication. So again, I just don't know. So you will have
     to take it document by document. First, figure out what there
     is, if there's anything. If there's nothing, there's nothing.
           So I'll compel 26 with that caveat.
             ATTORNEY PERRY: And 27 is similar, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Okay.
             ATTORNEY PERRY: So then we go to 34 and 35, where we
     have requested --
             THE COURT: And just so I understand, what's the
     difference between 26 and 27?
             ATTORNEY PERRY: 26 relates to the District Attorney's
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     investigation. And 27 relates to the Attorney General's
     investigation in New York.
             THE COURT: Oh, okay. But I thought that was the same
     criminal proceeding. Am I right?
             ATTORNEY PERRY: No, Your Honor. There's a civil
     enforcement action brought by the Attorney General of New York,
     in which Mr. Cohen also is the witness.
             THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that. Okay. All
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            Same modifications.
     right.
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             And as to that one, the date is different, February of
     2019. Is that the date?
             ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. That's the date when
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Mr. Cohen began to cooperate with the Attorney General's
Office. It was earlier in time. It was -- it began in 2019.
        THE COURT: Okay. Okay.
        ATTORNEY BRITO: So, Your Honor, that date is okay per
the Court?
        THE COURT: It's fine with me. Is it fine with you?
quess I understand the logic of it because the logic would be
that after the filing of that action, there might be some
communication evidencing Mr. Trump's retaliatory motives
towards Mr. Cohen. So I guess the date of that would make
       It wouldn't be February 2023, right?
        To make it easier, how about I'll narrow it for
February 1 of 2019 to February 1 of 2023 for this one, right,
to make it easier for you?
        Okay. So the same modification. Was that change --
        ATTORNEY PERRY: Well, Your Honor, I can -- I feel --
it would make sense, in my mind at least, to have the outside
date be the same as the outside date for the --
        THE COURT: Remember, you're getting temporal -- the
temporal scope of it would be different, right?
        ATTORNEY BRITO: Correct. The starting date --
        THE COURT: I think the temporal scope would be
different. So...
        ATTORNEY PERRY: The starting date would be, obviously,
different, but they both would continue -- I mean, one could
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conceive of communications that would go through June 1st.
brought the lawsuit against Mr. Cohen in April. And so --
        THE COURT: Probably -- I understand that's your theory
of it, but from my point of view, after February 1st of 2023,
he's probably focussed now on the Manhattan criminal matter
more so than he would be on the Attorney's General proceedings.
So just for purposes of making it easier, respond to it. I
think that's the link. Okay.
        Okay. What's the next one?
        ATTORNEY PERRY: 34 and 35 are requests to pinpoint
where within the defendant's books and podcast --
        THE COURT: And why is that a request for production?
I assume you have an interrogatory that does this.
        ATTORNEY BRITO: No, Your Honor.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: We don't yet. This relates is --
        THE COURT: How do you deal with that from a production
point of view? What is it he's supposed to produce?
                        The specific pages. I mean, he did
        ATTORNEY PERRY:
produce some from the two books and specific, you know, you
know, either snippets or citations, you know, to where within a
particular podcast there are, you know, he bases his claims.
And so, I mean, he did it, to some extent, in response to
request 34.
        THE COURT:
                    Okay.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: But we don't have a verification that
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     this is it. And he specifically left it open ended that there
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     may be --
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             THE COURT: Like, he you refers to pages made -- pages
     of the book referenced in the complaint.
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             Is that correct or no?
             ATTORNEY PERRY: He does -- he has provided certain
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            But again, has left open that there may be, you know,
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     any number of other pages or the entirety of the book where,
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     you know, they also my client --
             THE COURT: Is that redacted as a request for
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     production as opposed to interrogatories?
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: A thousand suspenders, I suppose. But
     we will also be a issuing an interrogatory.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: But it's a bit odd that they've made
     some form of production in response to this request.
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             THE COURT: Well, what have they produced? Tell me
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     that.
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: Several pages from each book.
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             THE COURT: Okay. So you produced them?
             ATTORNEY BRITO: We did.
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             THE COURT: So is there -- all right.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: It wasn't worth the fight. But we
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     just --
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             THE COURT: Got it. It is easier to just take the
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1 pages --2 ATTORNEY BRITO: Because the pages are cited in the 3 complaint line and verse, quotes --THE COURT: Let me make it clear then: Other than what 4 5 you've now produced, is there anything else? 6 ATTORNEY BRITO: No, Your Honor, as to 34. 7 THE COURT: As to 34. 8 Okay. Next one. 9 ATTORNEY PERRY: And 35, we, you know, the plaintiff has objected, although has said they would consider producing 10 11 or identifying portions of the podcast. 12 We just don't have final --13 THE COURT: Okay. Hold on. Paragraph 109 relates to a 14 podcast, a podcast I quess Mr. Cohen participated in --15 ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. 16 THE COURT: -- that revealed confidential information about him. 17 18 ATTORNEY BRITO: And my position was, Your Honor, I'm 19 not sure how I can reproduce communications or correspondence 20 related to an oral interview given on a podcast. That was one 21 of the things I communicated to counsel. 22 Technically, of course, that would be a no, THE COURT: 23 right, none. But what if he wrote an e-mail to his sons, 24 saying, hey, did you hear that I think that's terrible, 25 whatever he would have said about that podcast to a

1 non-privileged source. 2 ATTORNEY BRITO: I'm sorry, I couldn't tell you if 3 those still exist. But I'm happy to see if there's no documents. The issue of the podcast is the one that I 4 5 corresponded with Mr. Brodsky, spoke to Mr. Brodsky and said, I 6 don't know how I can give you what you're asking for because of the nature of it. 7 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 Well, so I'll overall the substance of objection. if the answer's none, then it's none, right? 10 11 ATTORNEY BRITO: Right. The objection at the time was the confidentiality component. But if there is no answer, 12 13 there's no answer. 14 THE COURT: Right. And when you were talking about the privileged nature, 15 16 In other words, if he wrote an e-mail to you, right, I just 17 heard this podcast, I think it violates his NDA, right, that 18 would be privileged. 19 ATTORNEY BRITO: Right. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Other than that though, would there 21 be any privileged to it? 22 ATTORNEY BRITO: No, only to the extent I needed to 23 invoke. And I know I don't need to --24 THE COURT: Right. 25 ATTORNEY BRITO: -- invoke my attorney-client privilege

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     in response to it.
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             THE COURT: Right.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: Your Honor, due to the sensitivities
     of this case, I didn't want leave anything to chance so I
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     articulated the privilege. But short of that, it was really
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     the confidentiality component that we didn't want this in a
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     public forum.
             THE COURT: Okay. So with that understanding then,
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     I'll require a better response than 35 for production of
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     anything else that exists.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: It would probably be none, but, yes, I
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     understand.
             THE COURT: Okay. Next one.
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: Then we have a series of requests that
     relate to communications either with or with respect to
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     Stephanie Clifford. Those are 37 to 40, 44 to 46, 48 to 52.
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             THE COURT: And who is Stephanie Clifford? I'm sorry.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: That's Stormy Daniels.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: And that's, you know, all over the
     complaint. Yet, plaintiff --
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             THE COURT: Give me an example of what the complaint
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     alleges vis-a-vis with Daniels or with Clifford.
             ATTORNEY PERRY: There's -- get very specifically, but
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     there are paragraph after paragraph in which the plaintiff
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claims that Mr. Cohen lied about the relationship and about the payments to her. And then, for example, begins paragraph 28 in the complaint. Uh-huh. THE COURT: ATTORNEY PERRY: And then it's just kind of scattered throughout the complaint. And then there are also allegations about podcasts involving both Ms. Clifford and Mr. Cohen. THE COURT: Okay. And just so I understand, the relevance of it goes to the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Ιs that how he -- what he's saying in that paragraph? ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. Yes. It's directly relevant. mean, he's -- the plaintiff's claiming that you're -- Mr. Cohen breached his duty of confidentiality, his attorney-client privilege and also lied about the relationship with Ms. Clifford and that he's suffered what he calls vast reputational and other damage as a result. And so we're entitled -- I mean, he's put it squarely at issue. And so we're entitled to explore it and to defend ourselves against all those allegations, which again, are at the very center of this complaint. THE COURT: What paragraph is that again? I'm sorry. ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: 28 through 31 of the complaint, and also I believe paragraph 111. THE COURT: Okay. Let me actually pull it up so I can

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ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: All of which are incorporated by reference into each of the counts about breach of confidentiality and fiduciary duty. THE COURT: The motion to dismiss is still pending, right? ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: It is. ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: You said 28 through --ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: 28 through 31. 31. THE COURT: ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: And paragraph 111, Your Honor. Still reading through those, all are mention her more or less by name. And the paragraphs following 31 discuss Mr. Cohen's, the criminal investigation proceedings against him, which of course also involve Ms. Clifford. And those go on for three or four pages. THE COURT: Okay. ATTORNEY PERRY: So, Your Honor, the plaintiff is the individual who put these allegations at the heart of his complaint and has argued that effectively, he, the plaintiff, had nothing to do with these payments. It was all Mr. Cohen's idea, and that he made the payments and arranged them himself and did it to keep the payments, quote, a secret both from his own wife, oddly, and from Mr. Trump's wife as well. And it

goes on and on.

And so we're entitled -- and again, claimed vast damages result.

So we're entitled to explore the truth of that and the -- what Mr. Trump did and did not know and do with respect to that relationship and the payments and entitled to show that in fact these were not -- it is not as described, to put it mildly, in the complaint.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, any response?

ATTORNEY BRITO: Yes, Your Honor.

The request is framed or extremely broad in the context of request. For example, request number 37, all documents communications, and correspondence reflecting the existence of a relationship, keeping in mind the fact that there's previous litigation between Mr. Trump and Ms. Clifford, which, to my understanding, resulted in an award of attorney's fees being ordered to be paid by Ms. Clifford to Mr. Trump for a defamation claim. I understand, and I'm not a hundred percent certain but I was checking to confirm, I think that matter was ultimately settled and it would be subject to a confidentiality agreement in itself, that litigation regarding the alleged payments and so forth.

But at the end of the day, let's put this into context.

My client is alleging what he is alleging by virtue of the fact
that the defendant held a podcast where he had an ongoing

communication with Ms. Clifford about whatever they discussed. That podcasts says what it says with respect to revealing either confidential or privileged information or otherwise. To now require the broad scope of the documents that they are requesting, which would be all encompassing anything regarding maintaining a relationship whatsoever between Ms. Clifford and Mr. Trump I think is extremely broad.

THE COURT: How is that broad? In other words, did he deny that there was any relationship?

ATTORNEY BRITO: She did. He did. And now they're asking for documents which talk about any relationship whatsoever.

THE COURT: I guess I'm not understanding.

ATTORNEY BRITO: I don't think that there's any documents that are going to be generated by virtue of this particular request. But I feel compelled to have to object by virtue of the fact that they're asking for any document whatsoever.

THE COURT: But they're saying documents reflecting this personal relationship, including communications with Ms. Clifford. So how is that overbroad though? In other words, I don't understand why -- I don't understand the overbreadth objections. But you didn't objection on the basis of overbreadth.

ATTORNEY BRITO: No. I think that I objected on the

1 grounds of relevance. 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 ATTORNEY BRITO: Because I don't think this is relevant to the claims of the defense being raised nor proportional to 4 this case. 5 6 THE COURT: I don't know about proportionate. How is 7 it irrelevant given the references to Ms. Clifford that I've been reading in the complaint. 8 9 ATTORNEY BRITO: The references are more to what Mr. Cohen said about Ms. Clifford, not necessarily the 10 11 relationship that existed between or the lack thereof. 12 THE COURT: But he's saying that they're all lies. ATTORNEY BRITO: I understand. 13 14 THE COURT: Right. ATTORNEY BRITO: Well, not necessarily. I think what 15 he's saying is that the information that was disclosed was 16 either a lie or information that should not have been disclosed 17 18 with respect to how that matter was resolved. 19 THE COURT: Well, that's not what I read. In other 20 words, I was looking at I think the complaint, paragraph 130, 21 the defendant engaged in misconduct when he breached the duty 22 of confidentiality by disclosing confidential information, 23 misstatements and or misrepresentations likely to be 24 embarrassing or detrimental to the plaintiff.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Right. But that's just 130.

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1 That's --2 THE COURT: No. I'm just picking one example. 3 ATTORNEY BRITO: Right. But that's not related to --THE COURT: Paragraph 119: Plaintiff refutes the truth 4 5 of any and all disclosures made by defendant that are contained 6 in the podcast and other media appearances. 7 ATTORNEY BRITO: Correct. THE COURT: Defendant's improper, self serving and 8 9 malicious statements about his former client constituted 10 repeated and substantial violations of fiduciary obligations. 11 ATTORNEY BRITO: Right. That's not to limited to Stormy Daniels, I'm sorry, Ms. Clifford. The allegations 12 13 regarding Ms. Clifford, as we read earlier on in the complaint, 14 really relate to just reciting what it is that Mr. Cohen said 15 during the podcast or what he said Mr. Costello. 16 THE COURT: Do you want to amend the complaint? That's 17 not what they're saying now. 18 ATTORNEY BRITO: Okay. 19 THE COURT: I know what you're saying in response to 20 the discovery disputes. But there are a hundred and, 124 21 factual allegations in the complaint, many of which relate to 22 Ms. Daniels or Ms. Clifford, whatever her name is. 23 ATTORNEY BRITO: Right. 24 THE COURT: So I can't -- paragraph 99, plaintiff 25 refutes the truth of any and all disclosures made by defendant

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     that are contained in Revenge. Is Revenge the name of the
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     book.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO:
                              It is.
             THE COURT: But it's throughout here.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: And the book is -- talks about a lot
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     more than Ms. Daniels.
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             THE COURT: I understand. But this request is only
     talking about Ms. Daniels, right?
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: Right, as it relates to 37, Your
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     Honor.
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             THE COURT: In other words, I don't know how I can find
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     that the complaint hasn't given rise to the issue of
     Ms. Daniels. So now, if you look at 37, 37 is asking for
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     documents, communications reflecting the existence of a
     personal relationship with Ms. Clifford, including communicate
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     communications with Ms. Clifford.
             So I don't think it's overbroad.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: Well, the response will be because I
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     don't think there's going to be any documents. Again, like I
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     said, I've got to preserve privilege.
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             THE COURT: Sure. So I'm compelling 37.
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: And Your Honor, 38 is much the same.
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             THE COURT: 38, compelling. Those are communications
     with Mr. Cohen.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: Correct.
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1 THE COURT: Right, relating to Ms. Clifford. 2 **ATTORNEY PERRY:** 39. 3 ATTORNEY BRITO: Well, the issue with --THE COURT: 39. 4 ATTORNEY BRITO: The issue with regard to 38, Your 5 6 Honor, would be whether or not those documents remain 7 privileged. To the extent there are, you would take -- only there would be would they remain privileged by virtue of the 8 9 fact that there's communication between Mr. Trump and Mr. Cohen 10 during the time that Mr. Cohen was serving as counsel. 11 THE COURT: By filing the lawsuit about the privilege 12 issue though, that potentially is going to be admissible. ATTORNEY BRITO: We had that conversation with Your 13 14 Honor the last time. And I don't know if the Court had already fashioned the results of that other than, as we discussed, it 15 16 would be a document. 17 THE COURT: Right. But it has, for purposes of 18 compelling the identification of the documents or the 19 disclosure of the documents, clearly, that has to be done. 20 Whatever's left over for consideration is, A, will it ultimately be admissible, B, can it be disclosed. And that is 21 22 related to the -- I remember talking about that with you at the 23 confidentiality order issues. So I understand what your point 24 is on that. But in terms of producing them, as between the two

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parties here --

1 **ATTORNEY BRITO:** Okay. 2 THE COURT: -- not disclosing any third parties, 3 obviously, I think that has to be compelled. ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor, the next request are all 4 of the same thing, 38, 39 and 40. 5 6 THE COURT: All right. Do you want to argue any of 7 those? **ATTORNEY BRITO:** I do. 39 is communications between 8 9 Mr. Trump and Mrs. Trump discussing references relating to 10 Stephanie Clifford. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 ATTORNEY BRITO: And we objected not only on relevance and proportionality, but also invoked the husband-wife 13 14 privilege to the extent that there is any communication, which 15 again, I find to be highly unlikely. I just didn't want to 16 be --17 **THE COURT:** Is there a privilege though in that sense? 18 ATTORNEY BRITO: I would think so between husband and 19 wife. I would. 20 **THE COURT:** Cause that has -- the -- my understanding of the privilege under our federal rule, right, is that the 21 22 privilege protects a spouse from being compelled to testify 23 against somebody else, right, against a spouse? Does that 24 apply to production of a document? Is that your understanding 25 on the defense side?

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ATTORNEY PERRY: No, Your Honor. In any event, it's --Invoking a privilege, what's your THE COURT: understanding of what he's talking about? ATTORNEY PERRY: I don't know. I don't agree that 4 there is a privilege. But in any event, it would be incumbent 6 upon him to produce a privilege log and for us to then argue it page by page, document by document, not to just invoke some, you know, perhaps non-existent privilege ex ante. THE COURT: Okay. Comply then --ATTORNEY BRITO: I'm trying to find it in a case that Your Honor was asking me about with respect to --ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor, there also is crime fraud exception in New York, which I take it would cover any such 13 communications. And so this could be something --15 **THE COURT:** From a husband to a wife privilege? 16 ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. 17 Really? THE COURT: 18 ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. There is case law on that. haven't, obviously, briefed this because it hasn't been a live issue because he has not produced a privilege log. So I think it's pretty hard to argue something of this magnitude on the 22 fly, but that is my understanding of New York case law at 23 least. I mean, we could argue he's failed -- he's waived the privilege, and if any, by not having produced the log. Then --THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to do that at this

early stage.

ATTORNEY PERRY: I'm sort of saying this is a little a little difficult to do on the fly when we don't have anything specific in front of us.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Your Honor, if memory serves me correct, as it relates to the husband and wife privilege in the context of a civil matter, state law governs as opposed to federal law. I think from a criminal standpoint, I think Your Honor's recollection was correct with respect to federal law applying. You said that federal law applies, which I believe it does, that's Florida statute 90.504, which provides that a spouse has a privilege during or after a marital relationship to refuse to disclose or prevent another from disclosing communications which were intended to be made in confident between the spouses while they were husband and wife.

THE COURT: And why would Florida law apply?

ATTORNEY BRITO: By virtue of the fact that this privilege we're invoking is in a civil context as opposed to a criminal context.

THE COURT: And then, in other words, why would Florida law apply as opposed to New York?

ATTORNEY BRITO: Well, Mr. Trump is a citizen of the state of Florida.

 $\ensuremath{{\textbf{THE COURT:}}}$ But at the time the communications were made.

ATTORNEY BRITO: There's been -- I think it could be a blend. It could be New York as well as Florida, depending on the dates that we look at. But at a minimum, there is some Florida components to it. I just don't have the specific dates at the top of my mind.

ATTORNEY BRODSKY: Your Honor, this is Ben Brodsky.

Can I offer some brief argument on this?

THE COURT: Sure.

ATTORNEY BRODSKY: I would echo what my cocounsel said. First of all, maybe it's privileged. Maybe it's not. But he has to log it. Check's on the wall. He's put it squarely at issue, which is probably a waiver by virtue of paragraph 111 where he said that he paid off Stormy Daniels merely to protect his fan base. And so, you know, there are a couple of procedural problems with Mr. Trump's objections because he's not complying with his obligations to give us notice of what the log is -- what communications are. You don't just get to say it's privileged, so I don't need to tell you anything.

And number two, of course we're going to have the issue whether the log is produced whether he waived it by virtually of putting in square in issue at paragraph 111.

THE COURT: And just while we wait through the argument on 111, how would that be waived again, assuming there was something?

ATTORNEY BRODSKY: He says that he made -- the

allegation is that Mr. Cohen failed to make plain that
Mr. Trump -- relied on Mr. Trump's legal advice and that
Mr. Trump acted on that to protect his family from the
malicious and false claims made by Ms. Clifford. If Mr. Trump
had a communication with Mrs. Trump saying, 'I'm going to pay
her off so we can bury this and I can go on with the campaign'
as opposed to this, 'this never happened, I'm sorry, I'm going
to fix this and I'm only doing this for x-y-z reason,' then of
course that's all relevant to testing the veracity of his
allegations and his motivations as opposed to the fact that he
actually did it.

ATTORNEY BRITO: And Your Honor, just to give you the counter part, the New York state laws CPLR50-4502(b), which provides that there's a privileged for any confidential communications between spouses as follows, quote: A husband or wife should not be required or without the consent of the other living be allowed to disclose the confidential communication made by one to the other during the marriage.

THE COURT: So there's a general privilege.

ATTORNEY BRITO: There's a general privilege both in Florida and New York with respect to that divulging information. I think Your Honor was correct about what the federal rule is, but I think that only applies. I did this briefly. I can brief it Your Honor wants. I believe that only applies with the criminal context and not a civil context.

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THE COURT: Well, taking that at the face value that you're right on that, I guess their argument is that we need to know there is something that could be argued about it and we don't know that at this point. You can't just do a blanket privilege. How do you deal with that? ATTORNEY BRITO: Through a privilege log. THE COURT: Right. Okay. So I won't rule on the privilege yet, but I'll accept your proffer that it could be privileged. And so therefore, documents responsive to, what number was that? 39? ATTORNEY BRITO: 39. THE COURT: 39 may not be produced but those have to be logged if any responsive documents actually exists. Now, that was 39? ATTORNEY BRITO: It is, Your Honor. THE COURT: Now, the other thing would be there's no time limitation. Wouldn't there have to be a time limitation for the relevant time? Because when did this happen? 2016, right? So 2016 and '17? When did he allegedly breach the --ATTORNEY PERRY: Well. **THE COURT:** -- the confidentiality agreement? ATTORNEY PERRY: That's a great question. And is it's not -- it's really not specified in the complaint, which is part of the problem which is why this is so broad.

1 ATTORNEY BRITO: It's in paragraph 25, Your Honor. 2 April of 2008. 3 ATTORNEY PERRY: Is that the only incident where you're alleging that he breached? 4 5 ATTORNEY BRITO: That's paragraph 25, which that delves 6 into the specifics that the Court was looking for in relation 7 to paragraph 29, 30, and 31. It says that Mr. Costello met with the defendant in 8 9 April of 2018. And it goes into the conversation between the 10 defendant and Mr. Costello. 11 THE COURT: And is your allegation is that was the 12 first breach in terms of the disclosure of this topic? ATTORNEY BRITO: That would be what we came to find out 13 14 at the time that the statement was made. We didn't find out about it at that time. 15 16 THE COURT: No. 17 ATTORNEY BRITO: But we understand that it was made 18 back April of 2018. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 ATTORNEY PERRY: But then paragraph 111 goes into a 21 number of podcasts where these matters were discussed. And 22 then more generally, I mean, the complaint is rife with 23 allegations that Mr. Cohen made disclosures particularly with 24 respect to Ms. Daniels. And the --25 THE COURT: I quess my question though is: Just for

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timing, the time purposes of that, for example, are current
communications between Mr. Trump and Mrs. Trump may not be
responsive to the issue that you're raising.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: It may not be.
        THE COURT:
                    Right.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: But I think that's something that we
could -- we would have to handle on a case-by-case basis.
        The issue here is the affair, the alleged affair, was
in 2006.
        THE COURT: Right.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: And so there could be communications.
Look, if --
        THE COURT:
                    2016?
        ATTORNEY PERRY: No. The affair was in 2006.
        THE COURT: Okay.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: I believe. Perhaps a little later.
But I believe it was as early as that.
        THE COURT:
                    Okay.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: And I know it was when Mr. And
Mrs. Trump's child was months old. So I believe it would have
been in '06.
        And so responsive -- you know, there could be documents
responsive to this where Mrs. Trump was aware in relatively
real time about that affair. And that would obviate and give a
lie to all of these allegations that Mr. Trump do nothing about
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1 it. 2 THE COURT: I agree with you. But with respect to the 3 -- when was it publicly disclosed as opposed to the 2018 communication was an internal communication? When was it 4 5 publicly disclosed that -- that, for example, there had been an 6 allegation of a payoff? 7 ATTORNEY PERRY: That, I believe, was in 2016, shortly before the presidential election. 8 9 THE COURT: That was a publicly disclosed that... ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. Ms. Daniels came out and there 10 11 were -- it was -- I'm sorry. No. I take that back, Your 12 Honor. I apologize. I don't believe so. That's when there 13 were payments made or began to be made. So I don't believe it 14 came out at that time. I can't tell you off the top of my head 15 exactly when it --16 When was the -- when was the first Cohen THE COURT: 17 disclosure alleged in that complaint made, not to Mr. Costello, 18 but in terms of the --19 ATTORNEY PERRY: There were discussions in connection 20 with his plea allocution --21 THE COURT: Right. 22 **ATTORNEY PERRY:** -- in 2019. 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 ATTORNEY PERRY: It was already public by then. 25 **THE COURT:** And when was the publication of the book?

1 ATTORNEY PERRY: That was right before the 2020 2 presidential election. 3 ATTORNEY BRITO: September 8th, 2020 is when the book, Disloyal, was published. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 ATTORNEY PERRY: But that was not very far from the 7 first publication of these allegations. Again, it was -- it was already open and notorious by the time Mr. Cohen pled 8 9 quilty in 2019. 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 ATTORNEY PERRY: All right. And I think the Court --12 THE COURT: All right. For purposes of time, it is -there's no beginning time because if in fact the relationship 13 14 goes back to 2006 or '7, then the only limitations I'm placing is through December 31, 2020, which I think is a reasonable 15 16 period. And that has to be logged. 17 Okay. So I'll compel that one in that respect. 18 Anything else with respect to those, 39? 19 ATTORNEY PERRY: I don't know if Mr. Brito --20 ATTORNEY BRITO: That was 39, Your Honor. 21 **THE COURT:** That was 39? 22 ATTORNEY BRITO: Yes. 23 ATTORNEY PERRY: 40, documents with respect to the NDA 24 that was executed by Ms. Daniels. In light of Your Honor's 25 rulings, I would have to imagine that would be producible.

1 THE COURT: Right. That would be the same. 2 Okay. 3 ATTORNEY PERRY: And then the next one is a series from 44, 45, 46. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 ATTORNEY PERRY: Which relate to the Essential 7 Consultants, documents relating to Essential Consultants, which 8 is the entity set up by Mr. Cohen in order to make those 9 payments. So it's really kind of more of the same. 10 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I don't -- I lost you. 11 ATTORNEY PERRY: Yeah. Sorry, Your Honor. I sometimes 12 assume everyone has the in-the-weeds knowledge of this stuff 13 that I do. 14 The -- Mr. Cohen set up a -- essentially an entity 15 known as Essential Consultants in order to make payments to 16 Ms. Daniels. And then payments were made by Mr. Trump, I 17 believe, also to Essential Consultants. And so that was kind 18 of the middle-man entity in all of these dealings and what we 19 think is highly relevant. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Now, is the -- is anything in the complaint challenging the making of payments? 21 22 ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. It's part in parcel of the 23 allegations that this was all Mr. Cohen setting this up kind of 24 on the sly and on his own and without, you know, really sharing 25 it with Mr. Cohen. It was all his, quote, unquote, idea. And

he's the one who not only had the idea but then executed on it.

And given that that's the entity and that was the sole purpose for this entity.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTORNEY PERRY: It's kind of squarely in the middle of this whole issue.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Back to you.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Your Honor, they just contradicted what they just told you to the previous request, which is in relation to why they were asking for documents related to Mrs. Trump. And I'm trying to find a -- here. Paragraph 111.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm not following you.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Your Honor asked the question whether there's allegations in the complaint that he's denying making the payment --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

ATTORNEY BRITO: -- the plaintiff making the payment. And the allegation here is that in the face of these disclosures, the defendants ignoring the fact that the plaintiff relied on defendant's legal advice, the plaintiff acted out of a desire to protect his family from malicious and false claims made by Ms. Clifford. I'm not saying -- I'm not addressing the issue of whether the payment was made or not made. But I don't see the allegation that the defendant is relying upon that states that there's a denial of the payment

being made. And whether we see here if there was any conduct that was engaged in by the plaintiff, it was based upon the advice by the defendant.

Whether or not there was another entity created by the

defendant for purposes of what counsel has argued to you is not relevant to what we're talking about. What's the purpose?

What's the relevance of this entity and any communications with this entity? In short answer to Your Honor's question, I haven't seen it and I don't believe there is an allegation in here about a denial of payment. That's not at issue. It's not even an issue in this case as far as I understand it.

THE COURT: What about paragraphs 25 through 32?

Aren't those allegations about the payment, who's idea it was and that particular thing?

ATTORNEY BRITO: It reflects what it is that the defendant stated to Mr. Costello.

THE COURT: Okay. Why can't they impeach that?

ATTORNEY BRITO: Well, he's asking for documents, which presumably he always possesses. As I heard counsel state, Essential Consultants --

THE COURT: That's not a basis for denial of the request to produce that.

ATTORNEY BRITO: No. No. I understand that. I'm not saying it is. But I'm saying why can't he impeach him? He has the documents. If he's going to be able --

THE COURT: So what if you have the similar documents. You can't just say, well, you have documents related to that. You're the one who participated in it. But that doesn't necessarily mean, A, he has all of them; B, he doesn't know other documents that he didn't see that are responsive that further his point cause he's -- he's going to try and impeach these allegations in the complaint by saying that there was -- Mr. Trump was entirely aware and entirely participated in the -- in the use of that scheme, which is also, by the way, a violation of tax law. But that's another issue.

So as to one of the issues that is pending, so how do I prevent him from trying to impeach that by not compelling a request that goes to communications that are with Mr. Trump about that, those -- that entity?

ATTORNEY BRITO: What I'm trying to avoid, Your Honor, is really a dispute.

THE COURT: Yeah. How do I get around that? You're the one who draft these allegations.

ATTORNEY BRITO: I understand. But I don't think that that necessarily requires us to go through the entirety of the litigation involving the parties. What I'm trying to do is fine tune what it is specifically that they're looking for when they ask me for all documents, all communications referencing this entity not related to Ms. Daniels or any other entity. It's just this entity, period.

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If they want to refine it so that it's limited to -- if I resubmitted time a limited scope as it relates to the payment --Why? But why wouldn't that be even potentially relevant? Because if in fact that entity is an on go -- was at the time an entity that was being used for other purposes by the organization, why wouldn't that be a fact that the defendant can use to impeach the plaintiff? ATTORNEY BRITO: Well, at this point, all I've heard from counsel is that this is an entity that Mr. Cohen created, not that the organization created. And I want to make it clear. THE COURT: So that's for --ATTORNEY BRITO: I am also not into the weeds of the details of what transpired. THE COURT: So therefore, how would that jibe with your argument that it's overbroad because it's not limited in its scope by topic? ATTORNEY BRITO: Because for -- we don't make reference to Essential Consultants in the lawsuit at all. And so they injected this entity into their document request. THE COURT: Right. ATTORNEY BRITO: I'm asking why was the relevance of this company they're responsive to --They're saying that it was the company that THE COURT:

1 he --2 ATTORNEY BRITO: That was used for the payment --3 THE COURT: Right. ATTORNEY BRITO: -- of this -- if you want to limit it, 4 5 what I'm asking the Court is to require them to limit it to 6 whatever it is that they're claiming is relevant to this 7 particular case. And that's --THE COURT: But it's limited in time, right? 8 9 ATTORNEY BRITO: It's limited in time but un limited in 10 relation. If they want to limit it to communications 11 referencing Essential Consultants as it relates to Ms. Daniels. 12 THE COURT: That's my point. Let's assume that there's a communication that Trump is used an entity for catering 13 14 purposes, okay, and so there's an ongoing business relationship 15 between that entity, and that assumes, of course, it's a real 16 entity. His argument is that it's not a real entity. It was 17 just a fake thing. 18 So -- but let's assume that it's a real entity, right. 19 If they're in communication with a real entity that 20 related to catering during that period of time, that does --21 that's relevant, isn't it? Because at that point, that would 22 be either impeaching him on his defenses or impeaching the 23 plaintiff on the allegation that the plaintiff had nothing to 24 do with that entity. 25 ATTORNEY BRITO: But at this point, we don't even have

-- we don't have any basis to have an understanding as to what these defenses are that relate to Essential Consultants. I'm hearing this argument from counsel as to the relevance of that entity. And I don't know that Mr. Cohen is going to hang his hat on his defense that Essential Consultants was used for A reason or B reason. But at this point, I'm strained by the pleadings that if this is irrelevant broadly worded. If they want to ask for Essential Consultants during this time period as it relates to either a payment to Ms. Daniels or relation to Ms. Daniels period, I understand that request, which is now opening up. Because candidly, Judge, I don't know, if it's an entity that engaged in one transaction, multiple transactions or no transactions. I don't know.

THE COURT: But for purposes of a request for production, and since it's the limited in time, it would be different if they ask for 30 years worth of data, I mean, obviously, your argument would have more legs. But it's limited in time by definition. The complaint is alleging that this whole scheme had nothing to do with the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was not privy to any of that. That was all the machinations of this out-of-control lawyer who then is disclosing that to Mr. Costello that it was his idea, right. And so the plaintiff was going to use this Mr. Costello to support that idea. That's what was in the complaint.

So given all of the allegations, they're asking for

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documents and evidence and communications of payments made to
this entity for that period of time. So I don't see how,
because from the plaintiff's point of view, the answer may be
none, right, because it's not a real entity. He created it.
So you so see my point?
        ATTORNEY BRITO: Yes, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: And the answer to that and the answer to
the question may be very relevant either to impeach the
defendant or impeach the plaintiff. I just don't know.
                                                         Ι
don't know as I sit here today how useful it will be but it's
potentially relevant.
        So I'll overrule the objection on 44 and compel it.
        ATTORNEY BRITO: That was 45, Your Honor.
                    I thought it was 44. I'm sorry.
        THE COURT:
        ATTORNEY PERRY:
                        44, 45 and 46.
        THE COURT: Okay. What's the difference between 45 and
46?
        ATTORNEY PERRY: One, 40 -- I'm sorry, 40 -- well, 44
relates to payments made to Essential Consultants. 45 is
documents and correspondence referencing Essential Consultants.
        THE COURT:
                    I see.
        ATTORNEY BRITO: And 46 is a specific statement that
Mr. Trump made to reporters that he knew nothing about any NDA
between Ms. Clifford and Mr. Cohen and/or Essential
Consultants. That's quite specific.
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THE COURT:

Yeah.

In other words, so you're asking for THE COURT: Yeah. documents referring to his statement like what? A transcript of --ATTORNEY PERRY: No. Discussing. I mean, if there are non-privileged documents, in which he's discussing, let's say with a PR professional, you know, how he would address these, you know, the NDA, then that would be responsive. THE COURT: I'm not going to compel 46. So I'll compel 45 and 44 because that's an appropriate request. Okay. The next one. ATTORNEY PERRY: Can I have one moment, Your Honor? THE COURT: We have a half hour, by the way, for timing purposes. ATTORNEY PERRY: Thank you. Your Honor, I just want to check real quickly or my cocounsel's going to check if we have other document requests that will capture really what we're trying to get out with 46, which is Mr. Trump's, any communications or documents with respect to his knowledge, or not, of the NDA. And so this one is very specific. And -- but if we have a broader one, then I don't think we --THE COURT: I don't think you have a request for production relating to that NDA. ATTORNEY PERRY: Well, we would too.

1 ATTORNEY PERRY: And so I just wanted to check. 2 Your Honor. So I apologize and I'll withdraw. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Anything on the request for production? 4 5 ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. Just a few more. 6 48 to 52 are very much in the same vein as the one 7 we've just been discussing. It's all about, you know, Ms. Clifford and allegations that relate to her and to payments 8 9 and other --10 THE COURT: It's too broad though. 48 is too broad the 11 way it's written. There are plenty of requests that are 12 dealing with -- I've compelled plenty of documents dealing with Ms. Clifford. But here, you're asking very -- it's actually 13 14 more specific. But -- I don't know how I would reveal or 15 respond to that. 16 ATTORNEY PERRY: Well, I mean, it's his claim that he 17 relied on Mr. Cohen's legal advice. And so how is he 18 substantiating that? 19 THE COURT: But I've compelled tons of documents 20 dealing with Ms. Clifford. So you can ask him that, obviously. 21 But in other words, if I'm producing -- I don't know what I'm 22 producing that if I were the defendant, in this case because 23 I'm the plaintiff, if I'm the plaintiff, except for what I've 24 already compelled to be responsive to 48. 25 So it's cumulative because I've already compelled

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documents that would involve communications to and fro Ms. Clifford or about Ms. Clifford. So it's obviously subsumed within them. So beyond responding to that, I don't know how I would find that. Is there -- there is a broad request, isn't there? Communications with Mr. Cohen about Ms. Clifford was one of the ones he compelled, right? ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. THE COURT: Yeah. So let's assume then that I don't need to deal with that. Next one. ATTORNEY PERRY: Okay. Your Honor. 49 relates to documents that relate sort of more broadly to the same issues with respect to another woman who was part of this quote, unquote, 'catch-and-kill program,' Ms. McDougal. The what program? Catch and --THE COURT: ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. This is -- Mr. Packer, who was the head of I believe it was American Media, was, you know, at least the criminal indictment relates to a -- an agreement by -- amongst the plaintiff here, Mr. Pecker and others to find women who alleged affairs or other -- made other allegations against the plaintiff here and paid them money essentially in

And so this relates to kind of the broader program of

advance to not publicize their allegations.

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this one and not press it.

which Ms. Daniels was a part. THE COURT: In other words what you're saying is there were similar payments for a different person? Is that what 4 you're saying? ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. And was the other person a 7 Ms. McDougal? ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. THE COURT: And how would that be relevant? ATTORNEY PERRY: Well, part of the issue here is that we, you know, Mr. Trump has made very, very broad allegations and has not really pinpointed what they relate to. There are some that are very specific, and that's of course useful and 13 allows us to defend ourselves. But there are others that Mr. Cohen, you know, breached confidentiality. And it's therefore difficult for us to really mount a defense. 17 And so this is really aimed at, you know, trying to respond to the broader allegations of a breach of confidentiality and of a contract. THE COURT: I'm not following you. I'm sorry. In other words, how is --22 ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor, this may be proof -- I 23 mean, this is us with one of the other requests. We can kind 24 of wait and see how the case evolves. So we can put a pin in

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THE COURT: So just so -- you haven't waived the issue. So I'll sustain the relevant objection subject to your either narrowing or showing me that it is narrowed. How's that? Thank you, Your Honor. And that also ATTORNEY PERRY: has the benefit of, I think, moving this along so that we can get to the deposition. But so that would be the same for request 50 through 52. THE COURT: Right. Like what's Resolution Consultant? ATTORNEY PERRY: It relates, again, more broadly to another program. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So I'll sustain the objection for now. Okay. Next issue. **ATTORNEY PERRY:** Here, 53 through 55 generally relate to documents to defend ourselves against, you know, allegations that Mr. Cohen is lying about and revealing confidences about Mr. Trump in terms of whether he has used racial epithets or has made reference to a person's race or ethnic origin or national origin. **THE COURT:** Where is that in the complaint? ATTORNEY PERRY: There are numerous allegations that Mr. Trump breached his live, breached his confidentiality obligations and his contract by calling Mr. Trump, quote, unquote, a racist but not very specifically. One of the -- so one of them is in paragraph 92.

is in paragraph ninety, I'm sorry, 101. I believe there are others. But it's part of his more general allegation that Mr. Cohen has caused him reputational and other damage, which is still not specified. And we need to rebut.

Honor's considering our -- amongst our arguments are that this information, you know, quote, unquote, information is not confidential, that Mr. Trump himself has disclosed his -- his views, what are viewed as discriminatory and racist views to other people and in fact publicly. And that Mr. Cohen sharing his opinion or his view, that Mr. Trump is racist and bigoted, didn't actually hurt Mr. Trump's reputation because he already has a reputation for those -- for those things. And that he in fact, in a way, seeks to promote that as his reputation in any event.

THE COURT: Well, I guess since -- just so I understand, there is one allegation here that that refers to race, that Mr. Cohen wrongfully accused him that he's a racist in a podcast. Is that what you're referring to? Is that what 92 refers to.

ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Your Honor, for instance, paragraph 101 says, "defendant recycles his false attacks on plaintiff as a racist and bigot and attacks plaintiff as corrupt among other insults." And paragraph 92 says, "defendant repeatedly wrongfully calls plaintiff a racist."

THE COURT: But is there any count that that really relates to though?

ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Well, all of these counts are incorporated into the breach of fiduciary duty, breach of confidentiality agreement counts.

THE COURT: So what you're saying is that it would relate to damages because everybody else knows he's a racist?

Is that the idea?

ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Certainly. But he's also, apparently, making a claim that these are breaches of a fiduciary duty of confidentiality.

THE COURT: And how would -- and how would -- I think you broke -- this case was broken my computer. How would producing any allegations of racial discrimination against him relate to that?

ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: How would that further the issue?

ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Since he's arguing that sharing falsehoods about Trump constitutes a breach of confidentiality agreement, proving the truth of those statements is a core defense to the breach of contract claims. And the question of relevance is a good one. But, of course, these are incorporated directly into each of these counts. So if they're relevant enough to be considered material to each of these counts and incorporated by reference and listed repeatedly in

the factual allegations, we are entitled to discovery because the discovery's framed by the pleadings themselves.

THE COURT: Okay. Any response to that?

ATTORNEY BRITO: Your Honor, to the extent that the defendant has a belief that my client is a racist or bigot, as he published in his book, the reliance on that statement is on the defendant not my client to demonstrate what others believe or have accused him of being. To the extent that there's other complaint or allegations that were made by other parties not related to this case, that the defendant saw, never saw, heard about, never heard about, but never relied upon for making his conclusionary statement about my client. His belief about my client really has no relevance to this to the extent --

THE COURT: Why wouldn't it be relevant to damages, I quess?

ATTORNEY BRITO: It's not. We haven't even gotten that far. We're going to get to that over the next category of requests for production of documents. That's going to be more to discuss. But we haven't gotten into what the damage theory is in this case. They haven't -- you know, there's an allegation in the complaint of --

THE COURT: So you think -- you're thinking that damages may not encompass that type of issue? Is that what you're saying?

ATTORNEY BRITO: It would be a function of -- if we get

into that, it's going to be a function of reputational damage. And how we get into dealing with reputational damage is going to be a challenge from an evidentiary standpoint by virtue of the fact that this is such a public individual, no different than --

THE COURT: But in other words, that's an issue from the get-go of the filing of the complaint, right?

attorney Brito: It is. It is. I welcome that and I understand that's part of what we're dealing with. But we have to be sensitive to that reality and no different than the -- than the defendant asking for complaints regarding racial discrimination charges would be that my client brings in a series of individual witnesses to come and testify to counter that he is not a racist. He is not only -- I don't want to -- again, I'm trying to avoid cases within the case for purposes of establishing this issue.

It really boils down to what is it the defendant relied upon to make the statement, not about what others have said about my client.

THE COURT: Yes. But you're seeking damages. So how is it that a jury would be able to assess that without knowing that?

ATTORNEY BRITO: How would other lawsuits, an I don't mean to question the Court, I'm not asking this question but I'm speaking out loud, how would the filing of other lawsuits

that charge racial animus, the lawsuits themselves, irrespective of how those things were resolved, how would that delve into the issue of reputational damage or otherwise? It wouldn't. It would really boil down to what is it that this gentleman relied upon in making that determination. He had to have some basis, whether just an out right belief without facts or if he had something to rely upon.

THE COURT: Well, what if he could proffer that he knows about -- I mean, this request is very broad, any and all allegations of racism. So I grant you that.

But what if he were to say, well, identify a particular case that he was knowledgeable about as a source of his conclusion, for example?

ATTORNEY BRITO: Then let's talk about. Let's see what the allegation was, what the issues are, how it was resolved if it was resolved. That's a little more of a practical approach to this. But just any and all, it's just -- it's really disproportionate in my mind. And we object on that basis.

THE COURT: Okay. On that topic, I guess I'm partly with the plaintiff on this that it may be -- the topic is not off limits. I'm making that clear. For purposes of request for production as it's currently worded, maybe it's overbroad. And so I'll sustain that objection for now. But for example, it could be narrowed, number one; number two, I'm not saying that the topic is off limits because I think the topic could

very much be relevant. But for purposes of producing that, that is a relevant and proportional issue. How proportionate with producing any allegation that was ever raised and his records of racism in anyway be proportionate to this relevant minor issue.

So for instance, if it comes out at deposition, for example, that Mr. Trump knows that he's been accused of racism in particular by this person, we now have a much more narrower subset to then get into document production about, if that makes sense.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The topic may be very, very relevant because it's in the complaint and it may go to damages. But I'm with Mr. Brito on this that to some extent, at least from an over breadth point of view, if not as a practical matter, it -- I can't compel the existing request.

So I'm with you on that.

ATTORNEY PERRY: I understood, Your Honor. So perhaps we can --

THE COURT: I'll --

ATTORNEY PERRY: -- meet and confer and come back to Your Honor with any concerns.

THE COURT: Or give me a new request. In other words, narrow the request. And obviously, Mr. Mr. Cohen, may know about a particular allegation that was one of the reasons that

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he said, right, oh, he's a racist, right? Or at least then we're not talking about any instances within the Trump Organization or somebody bringing an allegation of racism, which is very broad. But now we're talking about one situation. Well, that's a different animal. ATTORNEY PERRY: Sure, Your Honor. Okay. THE COURT: I'll deny the motion without prejudice. **ATTORNEY PERRY:** Okay. THE COURT: Go ahead. ATTORNEY PERRY: And then mindful of the clock, we do have a couple more requests we want to talk about and perhaps we can get a little more quickly because we did want to get into the issues of -- in the upcoming deposition. But I think hopefully we can do these quickly. And if not, we can do the same, put a pin in and meet and confer and come back to Your Honor. But the other requests we'll see if we can accomplish this quickly. But 59 through 60 and 64 relate to the issue that we've just been discussing to some extent, which is the question of damages. THE COURT: All right. Probably would stay the same. ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes. Gotcha.

Okay. 59 is all documents or other evidence showing how the disclosures alleged in the complaint caused you any damages. And the plaintiff's point, as Mr. Brito just made, is

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     that this is too soon and he hasn't fully calculated his
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     damages.
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             THE COURT: Put a pin on that one. You're entitled --
     what damages disclosure have you gotten, by the way, in the
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     26A?
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: We haven't gotten any disclosures.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
             ATTORNEY BRITO: Your Honor, I think the parties
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     glossed over that because we jumped into discovery so quickly.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's what 26A is for. So
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     you have a little time.
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             Okay. I'm not going to compel it to be due tomorrow,
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     but let's get to 26A disclosure so you can come up with a game
     plan for yourselves. And then we'll come back to damages,
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     discovery, once. But I need to have some baseline, and I would
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     like to give the plaintiff some opportunity to think that true.
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             Okay. So, yeah. I agree to put a pin on that, those
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     that relate to damages. You're entitled to that information.
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     It's just how you get it and when.
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             ATTORNEY PERRY: For sure, Your Honor. Okay.
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             So I think we can put this to the side.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Right. So just formally, for the
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     record, we're deferring. I'm going to defer on those.
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             Okay. So the issue with the deposition.
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             ATTORNEY BRITO: Right. Before we do that, just so
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it's clear, since you mentioned what you just said about being on the record, we'd like to just articulate so we're all clear as to what Your Honor is asking deferring on the questions. THE COURT: Right. ATTORNEY BRITO: I think counsel didn't bring up request numbers 54 and 55 either because they're no longer In the interest of time, we'll table that and proceeding. confer. And then the balance of the request was 59, 60, 61, 64, and 65 through 69. **THE COURT:** Is that correct? ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. ATTORNEY BRITO: Appreciate that. **THE COURT:** Anything else? ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor, just with respect to the upcoming deposition. So we are scheduled to proceed on September 6th, as I But Mr. Brito recently e-mailed us to request kind of a prescreening of the intended topics that we wish to pursue. And we've informed him that we intend to pursue all of them as relevant both to the claims and to impeachment and motive. And we just want to front this for Your Honor to avoid any further delay or game playing. We, of course, don't have to disclose our questions in

advance to Mr. Brito but we thought it was worthwhile to try

and confirm the scope of the deposition. We want to mitigate the risk of preparing for this deposition only to have

Mr. Trump fail to appear.

So I don't -- I believe Your Honor has those topics.

THE COURT: Why would he fail to appear?

ATTORNEY PERRY: Well, if this issue is unresolved.

I'm not assuming he would do that. I just -- I want to see if there's a way that we can come to an understanding in advance to avoid a last minute adjournment.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me turn to Mr. Brito. What's your understanding of what the issue is?

e-mail to Mr. Brodsky on August 2nd. And I didn't ask him to tell me the questions. That's obviously not -- would not be appropriate to do that. But what I did ask is for two things:

Number one, to deal with the issue of the location of the deposition given the security interests that exists. They had noticed the deposition for their office. I know that that's probably not the appropriate way to conduct the deposition.

We're still in a discussion about that in terms of where the deposition would be conducted. I had suggested even doing it by ZOOM. They said they would not agree to doing the deposition by ZOOM.

And as to the scope of the deposition, I said, I'd like to know whether you intend to ask the president any questions

related to the six topic: Number one, the events surrounding
January 6th, 2021; any -- the New York state charges alleged
payments made to Ms. Clifford; three, any allegations that
David Pecker was involved in any alleged transactions involving
Ms. Clifford which Your Honor just ruled on; any alleged
relationship between Mr. Trump and Karen McDougal, which Your
Honor addressed as well just a few minutes ago; the handling of
classified documents after Mr. Trump left the White House, and
is any issues related to any of the criminal and civil cases
involving Mr. Trump or the Trump Organization.

I just wanted to know before we get into that because I don't want like --

THE COURT: What's let's assume the answer's yes in part, now what?

ATTORNEY BRITO: Criminal counsel is going to get involved in and ask for some sort of relief or protective order or limitation, because again, these are all matters that I've identified that, two things: Number one, I'm not involved in; number two, I don't really think have a strong relationship to this case. And I didn't want the deposition, as much as I had told the Court, I don't want discovery to be fodder for the media and sensationalize what we're dealing with here by virtue of the asked questions, number one, that aren't related to this case; and number two, as Your Honor probably picked up, would have criminal implications.

My client doesn't have the -- doesn't have the obligation to testify regarding any of these aspects, being asked about any of these criminal aspects. I don't know whether he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right or not. But I don't think he should even be put in that situation in this case to have to do so by virtue of the fact that this case doesn't deal with January 6th, 2021 and any election insurrection. It doesn't deal with Mr. Packer or Ms. McDougal and to the extent even the classified documents for that matter.

THE COURT: I generally agree with you. However, the problem is that how do I do that in the abstract, right.

Because, for example, the -- one could come up with a question that might touch upon some of those topics that go to his -- his credibility, right. And remember: Credibility is always fair game for a plaintiff or defendant, but in this case, the plaintiff.

So in the abstract, I generally agree with you. You should just be talking about this case, right. But one could formulate a question that is -- that goes to a -- and that seeks an answer that may be relevant to the plaintiff's credibility, right?

ATTORNEY BRITO: I do understand that. But at the expense of the possibility of having the plaintiff have to testify about a subject matter of which he is now the subject

of a criminal defendant.

THE COURT: He has every right to -- he has every right to decline to answer that question.

ATTORNEY BRITO: I understand. But there is, as of right now, he is not being asked those questions. He's not being required to answer those questions. He is not even required to testify in his defense. And what I don't want is what --

THE COURT: But I just -- in other words, I don't understand. In other words, he has every right not to incriminate himself.

ATTORNEY BRITO: And there's a visceral reaction that jurors or people in the media, and just people in general have to someone invoking their right. As much as people in this room understand and respect it, I think lay people having a reaction to that when somebody invokes that privilege as opposed to simply answering the question yes or no.

THE COURT: He's invoked the privilege before.

ATTORNEY BRITO: On several separate matters, but nothing in relation to the January 20th -- the January 6th events, which clearly have nothing to do with this case.

THE COURT: Right.

ATTORNEY BRITO: And I tried to segregate that and trying to make it clear. I'm not trying to limit issues in this case. I'm trying to limit issues that clearly are not

issues in this case. The classified documents, not an issue in this case nor could it be, just from a temporal standpoint.

So what we're talking about in this case is what did

Mr. Cohen reveal that he should not have revealed, whether by

confidence or by privilege and is not in relation to whether my

client has a response to certain questions related to events

that post date them by months, if not years, just for purposes

of trying to establish credibility.

I think they're going to have a lot of opportunities to question my client about things that they believe would question his credibility that don't necessarily implicate his criminal rights. And that's what are very sensitive --

THE COURT: Well, how would you structure this though?

For purposes of the discovery limitations, how would you structure it.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Those topics that I've identified, and I tried to be as vanilla as I could about them, are not fair game for now. If, for example, charges are dismissed or may be trial ensues, and subsequent to that, they want to ask the plaintiff about that. Once the case is over, I would understand. But while this is pending, and is given the amount of attention that these criminal matters are attracting, I don't think that this is the right place for a -- a really a nonparty to get fodder for his continued media circus, cause he's still in the media just about every day that he gets an

opportunity to talk about the event -- the events of the day that are being spoken up about simply because he gets an opportunity to ask my client about them in this case that has nothing to do with what he's talk about in the media today, which is the criminal indictments that have been coming down over the past several months.

This is not a forum for that and it shouldn't be his ongoing breaches of the contract that we have, which is the reason why we're here, we would be seeking that continued harm because he's continually on CNN, he's continually on MSNBC talking about, well, what do you think about Mr. Trump's latest indictment. And I don't want what's going to be questioned about him in this case to feed that because it's not appropriate and it's not relevant.

And again, I just want to bring this because I want to avoid a fight at the -- not fight.

THE COURT: Well, I guess the premise of your question is that, obviously, he's going to get seven hours, right. So if he wants to waste his time getting none answers, that, to some extent, is his problem.

ATTORNEY BRITO: It is. But I'm not concerned about their problem. I'm concerned about my client's problem.

THE COURT: Right. So I that's what I'm saying. I guess I don't understand the -- to the extent they ask a question, for example, you know, is it true that you were

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hiding classified documents in your house, right. And he says, well, I'm declining to answer that because on Fifth Amendment grounds, right? ATTORNEY PERRY: Right. THE COURT: What I'm not understanding though is what is the problem doing that? ATTORNEY BRITO: There's a couple. Number one, to the extent that if my client were to answer a question that tangentially relates to any of these topics or any of the criminal indictments, and that answer serves as the basis for a future claim by one of the prosecutors that there was a waiver of that Fifth Amendment right, I don't want to be responsible for that. THE COURT: But how do I deal with that? In other words, if he decides to answer a question --ATTORNEY BRITO: No. THE COURT: -- what you're saying is if he decides to ignore you and he wants to answer a question just because, right? ATTORNEY BRITO: The question shouldn't be -- should not be posed as it relates to any of the criminal indictments because the criminal indictments all post date the events that

we're speaking about in relation to this case. There's just a

hard line. And these events are taking place after. You know,

we're talking about the election. We're talking about the

January 6th event. We're talking about the classified documents. All of these things are well past what we're dealing with in this matter.

So they shouldn't even be asked. And that's the line I'm asking the Court to draw is we should not be touching upon these topics.

And so, for now, I'm not saying forever, I'm saying for now.

THE COURT: You want him to be re-deposed later on? Is that necessary? Is that what you're saying?

ATTORNEY BRITO: No. I'm trying to take a reasonable position so that I'm not ignoring the fact that may be down the road, there is a possibility that the landscape changes. I don't want to say, hard no, ever, you can't ask that because I understand that the Court is probably not inclined to do that. But what I'm saying is for right now, given the sensitivity, I don't think they should be asking these questions because that implicates a lot of criminal aspects that are very problematic and potentially prejudicial to my client and has no probative value whatsoever for the defendant in this case other than to claim, well, we want to challenge his credibility on certain events.

There's a lot they can ask Mr. Trump to delve into his credibility that doesn't have to implicate the criminal aspects. And that's the balance that I'm asking the Court to

strike. And I understand Your Honor's concern about the -doing this in a vacuum. But I think it's not a vacuum.

I have been very clear. These are the topics that I have laid it out for them so they understood exactly what my concern was. And they said, we're going to ask. We're not taking anything off the table. And I don't think that's appropriate either.

THE COURT: Well, the -- well, I mean -- to some extent I understand there reasons why you're raising it. The issue I'm having a hard time figuring out is, well, how do I -- how do I say that an entire topic is off limits in a deposition? I don't do that for any other plaintiff or any other party, right. I don't, in other words, why wouldn't -- why would this party have the benefit of that as opposed to everybody else?

Because I don't -- I don't even do that for corporate depositions, in 30(b)6 designation, for example, because that's --

ATTORNEY BRITO: This isn't your normal plaintiff.

THE COURT: Yeah. No. But he is. He's suing somebody for damages. It's a civil action. All right.

ATTORNEY BRITO: And it should be -- it shouldn't delve into criminal matters. That's my point.

THE COURT: My point to you simply is there is a protection built into the system. In this situation where questions that could not have any possible bearing on

credibility are being asked because the person has a pending criminal case, right. This is not the first time somebody in that position is being -- is involved in a civil case. I mean, this happens.

ATTORNEY BRITO: We cited to the cases that talk about the fact that you can't utilize a civil case in order to gain information in a criminal procedure.

THE COURT: Precisely. But in those same cases though, there's a -- in other words, there's a privilege. There is a privilege. And one of the grounds for instructing a witness not to answer is on the ground of privilege. And he has a Fifth Amendment privilege, you can instruct him not to answer. You see, that's the part that I'm having a hard time understanding. Why do I need to do some kind of special rule for this plaintiff that doesn't apply to any other plaintiff, right?

ATTORNEY BRITO: And to be clear, I'm not asking for a special rule.

THE COURT: You are. You're asking for -- you're asking in advance that I declare by fiat this topic is off limits.

ATTORNEY BRITO: It's a protective order that a would limit the subject of testimony and other cases that that happens as well. You can't ask about, you know -- there's a protective orders that come into play that would --

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THE COURT: The whole deposition would be subject to protective order. ATTORNEY BRITO: Well, no, no. Protective order from the standpoint of including questions and topics being discussed as opposed to --THE COURT: I've never issued -- in 20 years of being a judge, I've never issued an order in advance that says you shall not ask that question. ATTORNEY BRITO: You should not touch upon this topic. THE COURT: Or touch upon that topic. ATTORNEY BRITO: And in other cases, the ones that we've cited to, and I'm not asking this but I'm answering the Court's questions. The courts have stayed the proceedings pending the resolution of a criminal matter to avoid this concern. And so they'll stay the civil cases, allow the criminal cases to play out. And again, I'm not asking that --THE COURT: Right. In other words like the CVS, Welling(phonetic) kind of situation. ATTORNEY BRITO: I'm not familiar with what you're --THE COURT: There was a case I remember using because I

THE COURT: There was a case I remember using because I had a client whom criminal matters. And so I remember a case called CVS versus Welling(phonetic), or something to that effect, that I cited back in 1994.

So but my -- in my recollection, that case was, see, I was representing the defendant. And so I said you can't -- you

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THE COURT:

can't use your lawsuit as a way of damaging my defendant because if -- he didn't want to invoke the Fifth Amendment. And -- but he was a defendant in the case. And so there's actual case law dealing with when a defendant can seek a stay because of Fifth Amendment concerns versus when a plaintiff can seek a stay. There's all sorts of law on this. But frankly, I wasn't prepared to deal with it. I do know there was a case. ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Your Honor, I apologize for interrupting. I have a citation that you're talking about. The rule in the Eleventh Circuit is as to when the stay should be granted to prevent unconstitutional infringement, it requires, basically, that the plaintiff show that invocation of the privilege in the instant matter will result in a certain loss by automatic summary judgment. So unless the, you know, the only entitlement would be if by raising -- invoking the Fifth Amendment, that would automatically mean that the plaintiff's case would be dismissed at summary judgment stage. There's been no showing of that here. THE COURT: Right. ATTORNEY BRITO: Your Honor, the cases that I was relying upon in our materials, one is U.S. versus Stewart. This is from 1989. It's from the Tenth circuit. But it talks about --

That's a criminal case?

ATTORNEY BRITO: It is, Your Honor. And it talks about the district court having the authority under Rule 16 prohibiting parties from abusive discovery procedures, including attempts to avoid the limitations of criminal discovery through the use of civil discovery.

THE COURT: That's clearly not relevant, right? Do you have any civil case?

ATTORNEY BRITO: I do. I was just starting with that principle.

THE COURT: Yeah.

ATTORNEY BRITO: And the other case is the Northern District of Florida. It's Obukwelu versus Tallahassee

Memorial. It's behind tab D, as in David, of our materials.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTORNEY BRITO: In that decision, the Court goes on to say the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination, shields one asserting that privilege from being incriminated by his or her own compelled testimony or consequences. A party is, quote, protected by the privilege. A party who is protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he's protected at least so the use of his compels answers and the evidence derived therefrom any subsequent criminal case of which he's a defendant. Closed quote.

It goes on to state --

THE COURT: Isn't that what I'm saying?

 ${\bf ATTORNEY\ BRITO}\colon$ It is. The last quote is what I wanted to refer the Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Information protected by the privilege against self incrimination may not be discoverable in a civil proceeding under Rule 26B.

And so what I am saying is an extension of what Your Honor's saying. I agree that there could be Fifth Amendment. They can't use that in -- his answer can't be used in a civil context whatsoever. And from that perspective, there's no point in them asking these questions that are more going to, in all likelihood or almost 100 percent certain, to receive a privileged response to his questions.

And so hence, the reason why I'm asking that the Court in essence stay examination of this -- of these topics in these cases that are presently pending in criminal courts pending resolution, dispute or resolution in this case.

THE COURT: But the problem is that in many instances, I don't know that any of that is actually relevant. You see my point? In other words, there's a rule that deals, for example, with the admission of extrinsic evidence of criminality to impeach somebody, right. That's rule 603 or 605. So it's specific issues relating to that.

So here, there's -- there's -- it's premature even to

invoke that, right, because it's requires an admission.

So on that ground, that topic, it would be premature. So for example, if he invokes some things, if he were to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, for example, to a question that he's being asked having to do with, I don't know, the -- whichever one of this -- the one in Fort Pierce, what's that about? The documents?

ATTORNEY BRITO: The documents.

THE COURT: The only way it could be prejudicial in this case, if it was relevant, if the Fort Pierce litigation was relevant to this case, they would then be able to move for for relief in this case because the plaintiffs invoked the Fifth Amendment. You see what I'm saying?

So for example, here, if he invokes the Fifth Amendment to a question having to do with Stormy Daniels, they're going to be able come in and move to dismiss on the grounds that he's basically -- he's precluded from pursuing the litigation because he's shielding them from information. Right. There's a remedy for that: Either a dismissal or a stay. Right. But what if it had nothing to do with this litigation? It has to do with something that occurred years after, years after their relationship ended. Right. In 2022, in fact. Right. Well, if it has no relevance and it would not otherwise be admissible under 603 or 605, then any request to dismiss or any request for dispositive relief based upon the invocation would be

denied. You see what I'm saying?

ATTORNEY BRITO: I wholeheartedly understand what you're saying.

THE COURT: Right.

ATTORNEY BRITO: My concern is more so to matters outside of this case, the consequence of that question and answer.

THE COURT: Well, the Government can't use his invocation against him in that case.

ATTORNEY BRITO: I don't want Mr. Cohen to be able to use that. So if I understand where the Court is headed, which it would be allotted deposition, they use that time at their peril, they ask questions at their peril.

THE COURT: Right.

ATTORNEY BRITO: The privilege could be invoked if necessary. I'd like then, if the Court is not inclined to limit the scope of the questioning --

THE COURT: Right.

ATTORNEY BRITO: -- I'd like to put some protections to preclude because I know Your Honor's still wrestling with their confidentiality and how far it's going to extend. As it relates to the deposition, whether it be transcript, video or any commentary associated with it, that this not be disclosed outside the context of this litigation, in particular in the social media or public media forum by the defendant or anyone

else. It should be for part of this case because that's what this case is about. It should be this case.

Even if the -- my -- I suspect they're going to ask him had these questions related to the topics that I've raised simply to get a privileged response from my client and then they go out the following evening on NBC and say, on MSNBC and say, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege to this question, this question, this question.

Why should that -- why should that be happening? What is my question to myself and to --

THE COURT: But doesn't that -- because what if he answers the question in a way that it could be used against him? Why isn't that issue related to the protective order issue that would apply across the board? You see my point?

ATTORNEY BRITO: I'm not following.

THE COURT: In other words, if there's a protective order having to do with depositions, for instance, well, that would include that, right?

ATTORNEY BRITO: That's what I'm asking.

THE COURT: Right. Yeah.

So the resolution of that concern is probably something that should be done in the protective order. And I guess that's what you're saying is I should deal with it there.

ATTORNEY BRITO: If you're not inclined to agree with my request that we limit the scope of the examination, then my

alternative request to the Court is that we have a restriction on who can access it, who can share or utilize the deposition testimony, whether it be by audio, video or both. It shouldn't go out.

THE COURT: Well, on that, I have no problem saying that I'll definitely hear you out on that because you may have a very leg to stand on, but I don't have to decide that for purposes of this issue. You see my point? I will take it up just so you understand. Unless I -- I will have a protective order already in place before the deposition, which you'll remind me is the 6th.

ATTORNEY PERRY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So i intend to get an order out next week. So it will be well in advanced. And if there's some dispute about, which I'm sure there will be, I can obviously try to deal with that as well if I can sneak you in.

Would this have -- I will keep it in mind because you've already requested in your proposal, my recollection of it, having to do with depositions, generally, for example, and use of the dep -- so the topic is on the table. And I do agree with you that that merits consideration. Right. So I will -- so on that, I'm deferring. And I will take it up.

On the broader question that you're asking me to basically say this is off limits, I will say to the defendant that it's a seven-hour deposition. You've got a lot to cover

on issues that are on 123 paragraphs of that factual alligation. Obviously asking questions to elicit answers that are -- cannot possibly be used in this case is a waste of your time. Right. So if the defendant understands that.

The reason I'm hesitating to grant the relief you're asking is there could theoretically be a question that would relate to this that somehow touches on it. I'm having a hard time articulating but I don't want to -- I don't want to say categorically they can't be asked because I can't think of one. You see my point?

So I'm going to let the defendant take the deposition. A protective order will be entered to protect the transcript well before. And then if this topic comes up a lot or, you know, if this issue is front and center, I'll deal with that. I'll take up your point and is either modify the protective order and deal with it.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Are you saying take those up in a deposition?

THE COURT: Right. Cause -- and again, if they're just going to spend three hours having him take the Fifth Amendment, there's case law that says when you do that and it's unreasonable to do so, there may be a remedy. And your suggestion is, well, One remedy would be is don't allow them to ever use it. Right. That's a very fair point. And so I would -- to some extent in the abstract, if they were to do that,

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take three or seven hours on things that could not possibly be
admissible in the case, well, that supports your theory, right.
What if it's ten minutes? Right. What if it's a very narrow
scope? And what if one of their questions were actually
formulated in a way that would be potentially relevant as it
relates to bias or motive or credibility? You see my point?
have to give them an opportunity to craft the relevant
questions.
        So that's a long way of saying I'm not going to grant
your relief, your request that I do some kind of order that I
have not have done in any other case. So I will agree with you
a misuse of a deposition could be grounds for relief. Right.
The defendant is aware of that. But there's plenty of fodder
here to focus on that's going to consume the deposition.
        Now, let me -- I will, however, ask you one question
because I got to get to my next case. They're going to have
issues as well.
        So you mentioned that this thing with the Pecker guy.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: Yeah. And with Ms. McDougal as well.
He had stated the record --
        THE COURT: Because I want to make sure.
        ATTORNEY PERRY: Yeah.
        THE COURT: If they ask questions relating to that, I
don't think that I ruled --
        ATTORNEY PERRY: No.
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THE COURT: -- that the topic was off limits.

ATTORNEY PERRY: No, Your Honor. You did not.

THE COURT: I ruled the opposite. I said the topic may be relevant. But I'm certainly not going to produce, force you to produce a whole slew of documents on something that may be potentially relevant. And for purposes of the deposition, that may be something that they can get into.

So I'm not going -- so on that one, for instance, I'm not sure I would agree, substantively, that has nothing to do with this case because that may very well. I know the abstract. You see my point?

ATTORNEY BRITO: I do.

THE COURT: On the documents issue, I fully agree with you. I don't see how anything having to do with misuse of classified information as to that account could possibly be used here.

Now, let me give you an example. What if, you know, there are obstruction of justice issues in that case. I mean, there's all sorts of potential things that could theoretically coincide. I don't want to do that in the abstract. So I'm just going to leave it at that and let the defendant take their seven-hour deposition and not waste time about it. And I'm sure the defendant's counsel are both very professional lawyers that are going to comply with the rules on relevant discovery because there is — there is a chattel rule that that's what

you're supposed to get into. But I'm not going to tie their hands if they actually think that they have a legitimate area that could be admissible. You can't ask questions that could not be possibly be admissible. That, I think, is the protection.

When a lawyer would ask a question of a witness that he or she knows could not possibly be admissible, well, that is a violation of Rule 26. Right. I don't want to anticipate them doing that. So that's the answer.

So I will -- I'll simply defer to the enforcement of the rule of the case. His counsel will be there to represent the defendant and be sure that the defendant doesn't answer a question he shouldn't answer. And so good luck on that.

And then counsel knows that they're supposed to only ask questions that could lead to visible evidence. And ask if I ask the restriction --

ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Apologizes, Your Honor. Is it possible that you will be available by phone during the day of the deposition to potentially resolve, as these issues come up, if they do take up a larger portion of the deposition?

THE COURT: Well, no. I don't think I need to because remember, he's entitled to -- he -- the rule's very clear as to whether the lawyer can do. You can instruct him not to answer on the grounds of privilege. Right. So.

ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Understood.

THE COURT: You instruct the witness not to answer, what's there for me to do? Right.

ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Right.

answer on the grounds of relevance, well, he knows that that he can't do that. Right. He can preserve his objection. That's what I'm saying. This case is may, from some perspective, may be extraordinary. But from the Court's perspective, the rules govern. The rules govern to protect the plaintiff and as well as the defendant. The rules govern to not allow, for example, the defendant to ask clearly inadmissible questions just to embarrass somebody. That's in the text to Rule 26. You can't do that. Right. On the other hand, the rules are there to protect a defendant who believes he could be incriminated against, and there's nothing wrong with invoking the privilege.

So that's why I'm saying the rules are there and the normal rules will apply. So I don't need to be on call.

Because, again, I don't do that for any other case. And I purposefully stay away from my phone when I know depositions are being taken. Because in federal court, we believe that we are so hung up on rules for a reason, because lawyers who practice in federal court know that we follow those rules. In state court, maybe a different standard apply. But those judges are willing to take your calls. Right. I get it. So we won't take your call, at least not in my chambers. All

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right, Maedon. Don't answer the phone. Now, you see my point? Now, as to the location of the deposition, I'm sure Mr. Brodsky and you can work it out. ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor, we've agreed to work it So we don't think it's in front of Your Honor. So to some extent, I'd be loathed to offer THE COURT: the courthouse because we have security issues then ourselves. But on the other hand, there is something to be said for that. If that was something that the parties want to consider, the West Palm courthouse. But ask me first if that -- is the parties are in agreement to that, ask me first because I have to go to Judge Altonaga. I'm not going to give you leave tickets to the courthouse for just like that because of the security issues. So as a potential issue, a potential resolution. I'll let you work it out. You still have several weeks to do it. And I'll order next week to make sure you have your protective order. I'll keep that issue in mind. And then on the protective order, say for example, something happens in the deposition that one party is quarreling over, the protective order should -- will be broad enough to not allow somebody from unilaterally doing something without the Court addressing it. Does that make sense?

So say for example, the situation you envision occurs,

and he spends three hours answering no, no, Fifth Amendment, invoked the Fifth Amendment, I should be able to deal with that in this order. And if not, I can completely modify it.

ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor.

ATTORNEY BRITO: Very well.

THE COURT: I'll be available for that purpose because I obviously know that that topic may be relevant.

ATTORNEY PERRY: Your Honor, just one quick issue with respect to the are anticipated protective order.

THE COURT: Yes.

attorney perry: I don't believe this specific -- I understand Mr. Brito's relief requested today to include protection of the fact -- of -- if Mr. Trump does end up invoking, he wants to restrain Mr. Cohen from publicizing that fact. We would like to be heard on that. We don't think that's at all appropriate. And in fact, if we do move for dismissal --

THE COURT: I'm not -- of course I will let you -- of course that topic will come up. I'll simply, just for purposes of this deposition, I'm going to include it in the protective order a protection of the deposition, which is actually pretty common. It's nothing unique to this case. Again, I'm not going to do anything to this case that isn't unique to this case because I don't believe in that. This is a civil action between a plaintiff, an aggrieved plaintiff, and a defendant,

right. Rules apply. And so I think there is a rule that deals with that issue. So I'm going to incorporate that. If you're going to request a modification of it because you think that it's tying somebody's First Amendment hands unduly, absolutely. But that way, we can litigate it. I can argue -- I can think about it. We can make agree or disagree. And then I'll deal with this. But that way, nobody is doing anything that jumps the gun.

Does that make sense?

ATTORNEY PERRY: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, yes. I'll hear you out on that. If you think that the protections that I'm going to include in the -- for depositions is too broad because it's unfair for First Amendment purposes, there's a ton of law on this, and so, yes, absolutely.

The other thing I'm going to probably do is give the defendant -- the plaintiff a little more protection at the beginning so that nobody does anything in the interim until we have an opportunity ourselves to flesh this out properly. Does that make sense?

ATTORNEY PERRY: It does, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's all I'm saying.

So it will probably be broader in that respect. But you can then come back and say, well, here's how we need to modify it.

And again, again, on that topic, what happens at the deposition may actually be very relevant to that. Right. And so that's thing another reason why I don't want to make abstract rulings that tie your hands. Because if he's right, you're going to ask a five hours worth of inadmissible questions, which shouldn't I deal with that? Right. Of course I know you're not at all going to do that. So the protection is there for everybody. And I'll enforce it. Okay. ATTORNEY PERRY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you y'all very much. ATTORNEY EICHENBLATT: Thank you, Your Honor. ATTORNEY BRITO: Thank you for your generous time. (Proceedings concluded at 6:07 p.m.). (Whereupon, this concludes the transcription of the electronic recording of the above-styled proceedings.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER

I certify that the foregoing pages represent a true and correct transcript, to the best of my ability, of the official electronic sound recording as provided to me by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, of the proceedings as taken on the date and time previously stated in the above matter.

I further certify that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was dictated, and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the above-entitled matter.

Date: Monday, August 28th, 2023

/s/Quanincia S. Hill, RPR
Quanincia S. Hill, RPR
Federal Official Court Reporter
Southern District of Florida

\$	2023 [4] - 21:24, 27:11, 27:13, 28:4	49 [1] - 61:13	75:18, 91:25, 93:11, 93:20, 99:4	9:7, 10:25, 13:24, 17:11, 17:21, 20:23,
\$500 [1] - 4:12	20th [1] - 76:20 21 [1] - 15:10	5	abusive [1] - 85:3 accept [3] - 12:25,	20:24 ahead [1] - 70:9
•	23-21377 [1] - 3:4 25 [4] - 6:7, 47:1, 47:5,	5 [2] - 13:21, 16:21 50 [1] - 63:7	13:13, 46:9 access [1] - 90:2	aimed [1] - 62:17 Alejandro [1] - 3:8
'06 [1] - 48:21	53:12	50-something [1] -	accomplish [1] -	allegation [15] - 5:24,
'07 [1] - 19:9	26 [6] - 21:8, 26:6,	11:13	70:16	45:1, 47:11, 49:6,
'17 [1] - 46:20	26:12, 26:13, 94:8,	52 [3] - 32:16, 60:6,	account [1] - 93:15	52:18, 52:24, 53:9,
'catch [1] - 61:15	95:12	63:7	accused [3] - 64:18,	56:23, 64:2, 64:17,
'catch-and-kill [1] -	26A [3] - 71:5, 71:10,	53 [1] - 63:14	66:8, 69:7	66:21, 68:15, 69:3,
61:15 'Inc [1] - 16:8	71:13 26B [1] - 86:7	54 [1] - 72:6 55 [2] - 63:14, 72:6	acted [2] - 45:3, 52:21 action [5] - 4:12,	69:25, 70:3 allegations [29] - 5:15,
'this [1] - 45:7	27 [4] - 21:8, 26:7,	59 [3] - 70:18, 70:23,	26:19, 27:8, 81:20,	15:2, 33:6, 33:19,
1110 [1] 10.1	26:12, 26:14	72:8	97:24	34:20, 38:12, 38:21,
1	28 [4] - 33:2, 33:22,		actual [4] - 14:22,	45:10, 47:23, 48:25,
_	34:8, 34:9	6	15:9, 25:12, 84:4	50:7, 51:23, 52:14,
1 [6] - 21:24, 25:20,	29 [1] - 47:7	C 40.04 40.04	additional [1] - 7:18	53:13, 54:7, 54:18,
25:21, 25:22, 27:13	2nd [1] - 73:13	6 [2] - 13:21, 16:21	address [2] - 4:5, 59:6	57:25, 60:8, 61:22,
100 [1] - 86:13 101 [2] - 64:1, 64:22		60 [2] - 70:18, 72:8 603 [2] - 86:23, 87:24	addressed [1] - 74:7	61:24, 62:11, 62:18, 63:15, 63:21, 65:14,
101 [2] - 04.1, 04.22 109 [1] - 30:13	3	605 [2] - 86:23, 87:24	addressing [2] -	66:1, 66:9, 68:10,
111 [7] - 33:23, 34:11,	3 [1] - 8:11	61 [1] - 72:8	52:23, 96:24 adjournment [1] -	74:3
44:12, 44:21, 44:23,	30 [2] - 47:7, 57:16	64 [2] - 70:18, 72:9	73:9	alleged [8] - 35:21,
47:20, 52:11	30(b)6 [1] - 81:16	65 [1] - 72:9	admissible [7] -	48:8, 49:17, 61:22,
119 [1] - 38:4	31 [6] - 33:22, 34:9,	69 [1] - 72:9	40:12, 40:21, 87:23,	70:24, 74:2, 74:4,
123 [1] - 91:1	34:10, 34:14, 47:7,	6:07 [1] - 99:13	92:2, 94:3, 94:4,	74:5
124 [1] - 38:20	50:15	6th [9] - 4:16, 4:17,	94:7	allegedly [1] - 46:20
130 [2] - 37:20, 37:25	32 [1] - 53:12	7:23, 72:17, 74:2,	admission [2] - 86:22,	alleges [1] - 32:23
16 [1] - 85:2	34 [5] - 26:9, 28:10,	75:7, 76:20, 80:1,	87:1	alleging [4] - 35:24, 47:4, 57:18
18 [1] - 17:8 18th [2] - 8:15, 10:24	28:23, 30:6, 30:7 35 [4] - 26:9, 28:10,	90:11	admonished [1] - 22:9	alligation [1] - 91:2
1989 [1] - 84:23	30:9, 32:9	7	advance [6] - 7:22, 61:24, 72:25, 73:8,	allocution [1] - 49:20
1994 [1] - 83:23	37 [6] - 32:16, 35:12,		82:20, 83:7	allotted [1] - 88:12
1st [3] - 25:21, 28:1,	39:9, 39:13, 39:21	7 [1] - 50:14	advanced [1] - 90:14	allow [4] - 83:15,
28:4	38 [4] - 39:22, 39:23,	7th [1] - 19:10	advice [4] - 45:2,	91:23, 95:10, 96:23
_	40:5, 41:5	•	52:20, 53:3, 60:17	allowed [1] - 45:17
2	39 [11] - 40:2, 40:4,	8	affair [4] - 48:8, 48:14,	allowing [1] - 3:18
2 [11] - 6:24, 7:24, 8:3,	41:5, 41:8, 46:11, 46:12, 46:13, 46:15,	8th [1] - 50:3	48:24	allows [1] - 62:14 almost [1] - 86:13
8:23, 9:6, 12:11,	50:18, 50:20, 50:21		affairs [1] - 61:22 aggrieved [1] - 97:25	alternative [1] - 90:1
13:19, 14:12, 14:15,		9	ago [2] - 18:23, 74:7	Altonaga [1] - 96:13
14:17, 25:6	4	90.504 [1] - 43:11	agree [14] - 8:11, 42:4,	ambiguous [1] - 14:5
20 [1] - 83:6	4 rol 6:05 7:05 0:0	92 [3] - 63:25, 64:20,	49:2, 71:17, 73:22,	amend [1] - 38:16
2006 [6] - 7:3, 9:7, 19:4, 48:9, 48:14,	4 [9] - 6:25, 7:25, 8:3, 13:19, 14:15, 14:17,	64:24	75:11, 75:18, 86:9,	Amendment [17] -
19.4, 46.9, 46.14, 50:14	13.19, 14.13, 14.17, 14:18, 15:6, 16:5	99 [1] - 38:24	89:24, 90:20, 92:11,	24:21, 75:4, 79:2, 79:12, 82:12, 84:2,
2007 [4] - 19:1, 19:10,	40 [5] - 32:16, 41:5,		93:9, 93:13, 98:6 agreed [1] - 96:5	84:5, 84:16, 85:16,
19:15, 19:23	50:23, 58:18	Α	agreement [28] - 4:23,	87:4, 87:13, 89:7,
2008 [1] - 47:2	44 [7] - 32:16, 51:4,	ability (4) 24:40	6:20, 7:10, 9:5, 9:17,	91:20, 97:1, 97:2,
2016 [4] - 46:19,	58:12, 58:14, 58:15,	ability [1] - 24:10 able [9] - 4:24, 20:20,	10:5, 10:7, 11:8,	98:4, 98:14
46:20, 48:13, 49:7	58:18, 59:9	20:21, 53:25, 67:21,	11:11, 11:12, 11:19,	amendment [2] - 86:9,
2018 [3] - 47:9, 47:18,	45 [6] - 51:4, 58:13,	87:11, 87:16, 88:10,	12:1, 12:2, 12:13,	87:14
49:3 2019 [5] - 26:24, 27:2,	58:15, 58:16, 58:19, 59:9	97:2	13:14, 15:24, 17:15,	American [1] - 61:19
2019 [5] - 26.24, 27.2, 27:13, 49:22, 50:9	46 [7] - 32:16, 51:4,	above-styled [2] - 3:2,	18:18, 19:7, 19:17, 19:25, 35:21, 46:22,	amount [1] - 77:21 animal [1] - 70:5
2020 [3] - 50:1, 50:3,	58:15, 58:17, 58:22,	99:15	61:20, 65:5, 65:20,	animus [1] - 68:1
50:15	59:8, 59:17	absolutely [2] - 98:4,	96:12	answer [27] - 24:12,
2021 [2] - 74:2, 75:7	48 [4] - 32:16, 60:6,	98:15 abstract [6] - 75:12,	Agreement [1] - 12:5	31:12, 31:13, 53:8,
2022 [1] - 87:22	60:10, 60:24	austract [0] - 70.12,	agreements [8] - 7:3,	58:3, 58:7, 75:21,

76:3, 76:6, 79:2, 79:8, 79:10, 79:15, 79:18, 82:11, 82:12, 85:20, 86:10, 88:7, 94:9, 94:12, 94:13, 94:23, 95:1, 95:5, 96:1 answer's [2] - 31:10, 74:13 answering [3] - 76:17, 83:12, 97:1 answers [4] - 78:19, 85:22, 89:12, 91:2 ante [1] - 42:8 anticipate [1] - 94:8 anticipated [1] - 97:9 anyway [1] - 69:4 apart [1] - 9:17 apologies [1] - 23:22 apologize [3] - 49:12, 60:2, 84:8 apologizes [1] - 94:17 appear [3] - 3:18, 73:3, 73:5 appearances [2] - 3:6, 38:6 Appearing [1] - 22:3 appearing [1] - 22:4 applies [3] - 43:10, 45:23, 45:25 apply [8] - 41:24, 43:16, 43:21, 82:15, 89:14, 95:17, 95:23, applying [1] - 43:10 appreciate [2] - 26:21, 72:13 approach [1] - 68:16 appropriate [7] -24:10, 59:9, 73:15, 73:19, 78:14, 81:7, 97:16 April [4] - 28:2, 47:2, 47:9, 47:18 area [1] - 94:2 argue [6] - 25:6, 41:6, 42:6, 42:21, 42:23, 98:5 argued [3] - 34:21, 46:3, 53:5 arguing [2] - 5:19, 65:18 argument [8] - 17:19, 44:7, 44:22, 46:2, 55:17, 56:16, 57:3, 57:17 arguments [1] - 64:6 arranged [1] - 34:23 arrangement [1] -14:22

articulate [1] - 72:2 articulated [2] - 10:21, 32:5 articulates [1] - 8:7 articulating [1] - 91:8 aspects [4] - 75:2, 75:3, 80:18, 80:25 asserting [1] - 85:17 assess [1] - 67:21 associated [1] - 88:23 **Associates** [1] - 13:25 assume [6] - 28:13, 51:12, 56:12, 56:18, 61:9, 74:13 assumes [1] - 56:15 assuming [2] - 44:23, 73:7 attacks [2] - 64:22, 64:23 attempts [1] - 85:4 attention [1] - 77:22 Attorney [5] - 21:12, 21:24, 26:14, 26:19, attorney [14] - 5:18, 7:1, 7:4, 8:24, 9:8, 9:11, 9:16, 9:21, 10:1, 10:13, 11:1, 25:13, 31:25, 33:13 ATTORNEY [341] -3:8, 3:10, 3:12, 3:15, 3:17, 4:8, 4:18, 4:20, 5:13, 6:6, 6:10, 6:15, 6:20, 6:24, 7:7, 7:9, 8:4, 8:10, 8:18, 8:22, 9:2, 10:4, 10:10, 10:16, 10:21, 11:5, 11:7, 11:10, 11:25, 12:4, 12:7, 12:19, 12:24, 13:2, 13:21, 13:23, 14:3, 14:6, 14:12, 14:23, 14:25, 15:2, 15:8, 16:1, 16:3, 16:11, 16:23, 16:25, 17:4, 17:7, 17:10, 17:17, 17:19, 18:1, 18:6, 18:8, 18:19, 19:1, 19:2, 19:4, 19:6, 19:9, 19:10, 19:12, 19:19, 19:24, 20:10, 20:13, 20:17, 21:1, 21:8, 21:10, 22:3, 22:5, 22:7, 22:15, 22:20, 22:23, 23:13, 23:15, 23:17, 23:22, 24:3, 24:5, 24:8, 24:15, 24:23, 25:5, 25:8,

25:16, 26:7, 26:9,

26:13, 26:18, 26:25,

27:4, 27:16, 27:21, 27:24, 28:10, 28:14, 28:15, 28:18, 28:25, 29:6, 29:12, 29:15, 29:19, 29:21, 29:23, 30:2, 30:6, 30:9, 30:15, 30:18, 31:2, 31:11, 31:19, 31:22, 31:25, 32:3, 32:11, 32:14, 32:18, 32:20, 32:24, 33:5, 33:11, 33:22, 34:1, 34:6, 34:7, 34:9, 34:11, 34:19, 35:10, 36:10, 36:14, 36:25, 37:3, 37:9, 37:13, 37:15, 37:25, 38:3, 38:7, 38:11, 38:18, 38:23, 39:3, 39:5, 39:9, 39:18, 39:22, 39:25, 40:2, 40:3, 40:5, 40:13, 41:1, 41:4, 41:8, 41:12, 41:18, 42:1, 42:4, 42:10, 42:12, 42:16, 42:18, 43:2, 43:5, 43:17, 43:22, 44:1, 44:6, 44:9, 44:25, 45:12, 45:20, 46:7, 46:12, 46:16, 46:21, 46:23, 47:1, 47:3, 47:5, 47:13, 47:17, 47:20, 48:4, 48:6, 48:11, 48:14, 48:16, 48:19, 49:7, 49:10, 49:19, 49:22, 49:24, 50:1, 50:3, 50:6, 50:11, 50:19, 50:20, 50:22, 50:23, 51:3, 51:6, 51:11, 51:22, 52:5, 52:8, 52:13, 52:17, 53:15, 53:18, 53:23, 54:15, 54:19, 55:9, 55:14, 55:19, 55:23, 56:2, 56:4, 56:9, 56:25, 58:6, 58:13, 58:15, 58:18, 58:22, 59:4, 59:11, 59:14, 59:24, 60:1, 60:5, 60:16, 61:8, 61:12, 61:18, 62:5, 62:8, 62:10, 62:22, 63:4, 63:9, 63:14, 63:21, 64:21, 65:3, 65:9, 65:16, 65:18, 66:4, 66:16, 66:25, 67:8, 67:23, 68:14, 69:11, 69:18, 69:21, 70:6, 70:8, 70:10, 70:22, 71:6, 71:8, 71:20,

71:25, 72:5, 72:11,

72:13, 72:15, 73:6, 73:12, 74:15, 75:23, 76:4, 76:12, 76:19, 76:23, 77:16, 78:21, 79:4, 79:7, 79:16, 79:20, 80:11, 81:18, 81:21, 82:5, 82:17, 82:22, 83:3, 83:9, 83:11, 83:19, 84:8, 84:21, 85:1, 85:8, 85:11, 85:15, 86:2, 86:5, 87:8, 88:2, 88:5, 88:10, 88:15, 88:19, 89:15, 89:19, 89:24, 90:12, 91:17, 92:19, 92:22, 92:25, 93:2, 93:12, 94:17, 94:25, 95:3, 96:5, 97:4, 97:5, 97:8, 97:11, 98:10, 98:21, 99:9, 99:11, 99:12 Attorney's [3] - 21:18, 26:13, 28:6 attorney's [1] - 35:16 attorney-client [11] -7:1, 7:4, 8:24, 9:8, 9:11, 10:1, 10:13, 11:1, 25:13, 31:25, 33:13 attracting [1] - 77:22 audio [1] - 90:3 August [1] - 73:13 authenticity [1] - 18:2 authority [1] - 85:2 automatic [1] - 84:14 automatically [1] -84:17 available [3] - 23:20, 94:18, 97:6 avoid [7] - 54:15, 67:15, 72:22, 73:9, 78:16, 83:14, 85:4 award [1] - 35:16 aware [3] - 48:23. 54:8, 92:13

В

balance [3] - 9:6, 72:8, 80:25
base [1] - 44:14
based [3] - 4:4, 53:2, 87:25
baseline [1] - 71:15
bases [1] - 28:21
basis [9] - 7:19, 15:7, 36:23, 48:7, 53:21, 57:1, 68:6, 68:18, 79:10
bearing [1] - 81:25

began [3] - 27:1, 27:2, 49:13 begin [2] - 18:25, 25:20 beginning [2] - 50:13, 98:18 begins [1] - 33:2 behalf [3] - 3:9, 3:11, 3:13 **behind** [1] - 85:13 belief [3] - 66:5, 66:12, believes [2] - 18:20, 95:14 Ben [1] - 44:6 ben [1] - 3:17 benefit [2] - 63:5, 81:14 better [2] - 6:8, 32:9 between [28] - 4:2, 8:25, 9:10, 10:2, 11:1, 12:12, 12:13, 12:16, 13:16, 13:24, 25:12, 26:12, 35:15, 36:6, 37:11, 40:9, 40:24, 41:8, 41:18, 43:15, 45:15, 47:9, 48:2, 56:15, 58:16, 58:24, 74:6, 97:25 beyond [1] - 61:3 bias [1] - 92:6 **bigot** [2] - 64:23, 66:5 bigoted [1] - 64:11 bit [2] - 15:8, 29:15 blanket [1] - 46:4 blend [1] - 44:2 board [1] - 89:14 **boil** [1] - 68:4 boils [1] - 67:17 book [10] - 5:24, 11:15, 29:4, 29:8, 29:19, 39:2, 39:5, 49:25, 50:3, 66:6 books [3] - 7:16, 28:11, 28:19 bottom [2] - 10:23, 25:2 breach [10] - 5:25, 33:9, 34:2, 46:20, 47:12, 62:18, 65:4, 65:19, 65:21

breached [7] - 5:17,

breaches [3] - 5:20,

breadth [2] - 23:11,

62:15, 63:22

65:10, 78:8

breath [1] - 6:10

bridge [1] - 4:2

69:15

33:13, 37:21, 47:4,

22:8, 22:17, 22:18,

25:18, 25:20, 32:4,

37:5, 42:10, 42:18,

brief [2] - 44:7, 45:24 briefed [2] - 3:24, 42:19 briefly [1] - 45:24 bring [3] - 21:19, 72:5, 78.15 bringing [2] - 21:15, 70:3 brings [1] - 67:12 BRITO [164] - 3:8, 8:4, 8:10, 8:18, 8:22, 9:2, 10:4, 10:10, 10:16, 10:21, 11:10, 12:4, 14:3, 14:6, 15:8, 16:1, 16:3, 16:11, 19:2, 19:10, 20:10, 22:23, 23:13, 23:15, 23:17, 23:22, 24:3, 24:5, 24:8, 24:15, 24:23, 25:5, 25:8, 27:4, 27:21, 28:14, 29:21, 29:23, 30:2, 30:6, 30:18, 31:2, 31:11, 31:19, 31:22, 31:25, 32:3, 32:11, 32:18, 35:10, 36:10, 36:14, 36:25, 37:3, 37:9, 37:13, 37:15, 37:25, 38:3, 38:7, 38:11, 38:18, 38:23, 39:3, 39:5, 39:9, 39:18, 39:25, 40:3, 40:5, 40:13, 41:1, 41:8, 41:12, 41:18, 42:10, 43:5, 43:17, 43:22, 44:1, 45:12, 45:20, 46:7, 46:12, 46:16, 47:1, 47:5, 47:13, 47:17, 50:3, 50:20, 50:22, 52:8, 52:13, 52:17, 53:15, 53:18, 53:23, 54:15, 54:19, 55:9, 55:14, 55:19, 55:23, 56:2, 56:4, 56:9, 56:25, 58:6, 58:13, 58:22, 66:4, 66:16, 66:25, 67:8, 67:23, 68:14, 69:11, 71:8, 71:25, 72:5, 72:13, 73:12, 74:15, 75:23, 76:4, 76:12, 76:19, 76:23, 77:16, 78:21, 79:7, 79:16, 79:20, 80:11, 81:18, 81:21, 82:5, 82:17, 82:22, 83:3, 83:9, 83:11, 83:19, 84:21, 85:1, 85:8, 85:11, 85:15, 86:2, 86:5, 87:8, 88:2,

88:5, 88:10, 88:15, 88:19, 89:15, 89:19, 89:24, 91:17, 93:12, 97:5, 99:12 Brito [11] - 3:9, 7:9, 14:2, 15:4, 19:8, 50:19. 69:14. 70:25. 72:18, 72:25, 73:10 Brito's [1] - 97:12 broad [17] - 4:12, 6:2, 23:8, 23:12, 35:11, 36:4, 36:7, 36:8, 46:25, 60:10, 61:5, 62:11, 68:9, 70:4, 96:22, 98:13 broader [6] - 9:25, 59:20, 61:25, 62:18, 90:23, 98:23 broadly [4] - 5:9, 57:7, 61:14, 63:9 BRODSKY [5] - 3:15, 3:17, 44:6, 44:9, 44:25 Brodsky [10] - 3:17, 8:6, 8:13, 9:14, 11:18, 31:5, 44:6, 73:13. 96:4 Brodsky's [1] - 10:22 **broke** [1] - 65:13 broken [1] - 65:13 brought [7] - 4:11, 21:12, 21:23, 22:15, 23:3, 26:19, 28:2 built [1] - 81:24

C

business [1] - 56:14

bulk [1] - 4:25

bury [1] - 45:6

calculated [1] - 71:1 campaign [5] - 7:2, 13:24, 15:3, 15:24, 16:10 Campaign [7] - 14:19, 14:22, 15:11, 15:12, 15:14, 15:17, 15:22 campaign' [1] - 45:6 candidly [1] - 57:11 candor [1] - 12:4 cannot [2] - 5:9, 91:3 capture [4] - 13:3, 15:19, 16:25, 59:17 captured [2] - 23:4, 23:6 captures [1] - 10:12 case [85] - 3:3, 3:4, 3:20, 4:4, 4:13, 5:3, 5:7, 5:16, 13:12, 13:18, 21:12, 21:18,

42:22, 48:7, 53:11, 56:7, 60:22, 62:24, 65:13, 66:10, 66:20, 67:15, 68:12, 74:20, 74:24, 75:6, 75:16, 75:19, 76:21, 76:25, 77:1, 77:2, 77:3, 77:20, 78:3, 78:13, 79:23, 80:20, 82:2, 82:3, 82:6, 83:20, 83:21, 83:24, 84:3, 84:4, 84:7, 84:17, 84:25, 85:7, 85:11, 85:23, 86:18, 87:10, 87:11, 87:12, 88:6, 88:9, 89:1, 89:2, 91:3, 91:21, 92:2, 92:11, 92:16, 93:10, 93:18, 94:11, 95:7, 95:18, 97:22, 97:23, 97:24 case-by-case [1] -48.7 cases [11] - 14:11, 67:15, 74:9, 82:5, 82:8, 82:23, 83:11, 83:15, 83:16, 84:21, 86:17 catch [1] - 61:17 categorically [1] -91:9 categorization [1] -13:14 category [1] - 66:17 catering [2] - 56:13, 56:20 caused [2] - 64:3, 70:24 caveat [1] - 26:6 center [2] - 33:19, 91:14 certain [11] - 4:25, 7:9, 7:20, 8:1, 18:9, 29:6, 35:19, 77:6, 80:21, 84:13, 86:13 certainly [3] - 18:19, 65:9, 93:4 challenge [2] - 67:3, 80:21 challenging [1] -51:21 **chambers** [1] - 95:25 chance [1] - 32:4 change [1] - 27:15 changes [1] - 80:13 charge [2] - 18:14,

charged [1] - 14:8 charges [3] - 67:12, 74:2, 77:18 chattel [1] - 93:25 check [3] - 59:15, 59:16, 60:1 check's [1] - 44:11 checking [1] - 35:19 child [1] - 48:20 chose [1] - 21:18 Circuit [1] - 84:10 circuit [1] - 84:23 circumstances [1] -4:5 circus [1] - 77:24 citation [1] - 84:9 citations [1] - 28:20 cited [4] - 30:2, 82:5, 83:12. 83:23 citizen [1] - 43:22 civil [15] - 3:4, 26:18, 43:7, 43:18, 45:25, 74:9, 81:20, 82:3, 82:6, 83:15, 85:5, 85:7, 86:6, 86:10, 97:24 claim [7] - 5:16, 33:9, 35:18, 60:16, 65:10, 79:11, 80:21 claimed [1] - 35:2 claiming [2] - 33:12, 56:6 claims [8] - 22:18, 28:21, 33:1, 37:4, 45:4, 52:22, 65:21, 72:21 clarification [1] -16:20 classified [6] - 74:8, 75:9, 77:1, 79:1, 80:1, 93:15 clear [12] - 7:14, 8:5, 16:7, 30:4, 55:12, 68:21, 72:1, 72:2, 76:24, 81:3, 82:17, 94.22 clearly [5] - 40:19, 76:21, 76:25, 85:6, 95.11 client [30] - 4:12, 7:1, 7:4, 8:24, 9:8, 9:11, 10:1, 10:13, 11:1, 11:16, 25:13, 29:9, 31:25, 33:13, 35:24, 38:9, 66:5, 66:7, 66:12, 66:13, 67:12, 67:19, 75:1, 77:6, 77:10, 78:3, 79:8, 80:19, 83:21, 89:5

client's [1] - 78:22

Clifford [30] - 32:16, 32:17, 32:23, 33:7, 33:15, 34:16, 35:15, 35:17, 36:1, 36:6, 36:21, 37:7, 37:10, 38:12, 38:13, 38:22, 39:15, 39:16, 41:10, 45:4, 52:22, 58:24, 60:8, 60:13, 60:20, 61:2, 61:6, 74:3, 74:5 clifford [1] - 40:1 clock [1] - 70:10 closed [2] - 15:11, 85:23 CNN [1] - 78:10 cocounsel [1] - 44:9 cocounsel's [1] -59:16 Cohen [62] - 3:4, 3:11, 3:13, 5:8, 5:17, 5:20, 5:22, 8:25, 9:15, 9:16, 9:21, 10:2, 10:6, 11:15, 11:22, 12:12, 12:14, 12:16, 13:25, 15:25, 17:11, 17:14, 18:4, 21:19, 22:2, 23:18, 24:1, 24:25, 26:20, 27:1, 27:10, 28:2, 30:14, 33:1, 33:7, 33:12, 37:10, 38:14, 39:24, 40:9, 40:10, 45:1, 47:23, 49:16, 50:8, 51:8, 51:14, 51:23, 51:25, 55:10, 57:4, 58:24, 61:6, 62:15, 63:16, 64:3, 64:10, 64:18, 69:24, 77:4, 88:10, 97:14 Cohen's [11] - 5:24, 6:25, 7:16, 10:11, 21:11, 21:22, 22:13, 22:16, 34:14, 34:22, 60:17 coincide [1] - 93:20 coming [1] - 78:5 commences [1] - 3:1 commentary [1] -88:23 common [1] - 97:22 communicate [1] -39:15 communicated [3] -9:14, 24:6, 30:21 communication [14] -9:10, 22:1, 24:24, 26:3, 27:9, 36:1, 40:9, 41:14, 45:5, 45:17, 49:4, 56:13,

56:19 communications [32] - 9:9, 21:21, 22:11, 22:24, 23:9, 23:24, 24:16, 25:13, 28:1, 30:19, 32:15, 35:13, 36:20, 39:14, 39:16, 39:23, 41:8, 42:14, 43:14, 43:24, 44:17, 45:15, 48:2, 48:11, 53:7, 54:13, 54:23, 56:10, 58:1, 59:18, 61:1, 61:6 company [2] - 55:24, 55:25 compel [8] - 12:22, 26:6, 50:17, 58:12, 59:8, 69:16, 71:12 compelled [9] - 36:16, 41:3, 41:22, 60:12, 60:19, 60:24, 60:25, 61:7, 85:18 compelling [4] -39:21, 39:23, 40:18, compels [1] - 85:22 complaint [30] - 29:4, 30:3, 32:21, 32:22, 33:3, 33:6, 33:20, 33:22, 34:21, 35:8, 37:8, 37:20, 38:13, 38:16, 38:21, 39:12, 46:24, 47:22, 49:17, 51:21, 52:14, 54:7, 57:18, 57:24, 63:20, 66:9, 66:21, 67:7, 69:13, 70:24 complaints [1] - 67:11 completely [1] - 97:3 comply [2] - 42:9, 93:24 complying [1] - 44:16 component [2] -31:12, 32:6 components [1] - 44:4 computer [1] - 65:13 conceive [1] - 28:1 concern [6] - 23:10, 81:1, 81:5, 83:15, 88:5, 89:21 concerned [2] - 78:21, 78:22 concerning [1] - 10:5 concerns [2] - 69:22, concluded [1] - 99:13 concludes [1] - 99:14 conclusion [1] - 68:13 conclusionary [1] -66:12

concocting [1] - 22:7 conduct [2] - 53:1, 73:19 conducted [1] - 73:21 confer [4] - 8:7, 69:21, 70:15, 72:8 conferred [2] - 4:24, 7:24 **confidence** [1] - 77:5 confidences [1] -63:16 confident [1] - 43:14 confidential [9] - 5:6, 5:9. 26:2. 30:16. 36:3, 37:22, 45:14, 45:17, 64:8 Confidentiality [1] -12:6 confidentiality [28] -4:3, 5:5, 5:17, 7:10, 9:4, 11:12, 12:2, 12:8, 16:14, 16:16, 17:11, 17:21, 26:1, 31:12, 32:6, 33:13, 34:3, 35:20, 37:22, 40:23, 46:22, 62:15, 62:19, 63:22, 65:5, 65:11, 65:19, 88:21 confirm [4] - 22:25, 24:15, 35:19, 73:1 **connection** [1] - 49:19 consent [1] - 45:16 consequence [1] -88:6 consequences [1] -85:18 consider [2] - 30:10, 96:10 consideration [2] -40:20, 90:21 considered [1] - 65:24 considering [1] - 64:6 consist [1] - 7:15 constituted [1] - 38:9 constitutes [2] - 5:25, 65:19 Consultant [1] - 63:8 Consultants [13] -51:7, 51:15, 51:17, 53:20, 55:20, 56:11, 57:2, 57:5, 57:8, 58:19, 58:20, 58:25 consume [1] - 92:14 contained [2] - 38:5, 39:1 contention [2] - 8:4, 20:4 context [11] - 6:8,

16:12, 35:11, 35:23,

43:7, 43:18, 43:19,

45:25, 86:11, 88:24 continually [2] - 78:10 continue [2] - 25:16, 27:25 continued [2] - 77:24, 78.9 continuing [1] - 25:18 contract [7] - 8:23, 9:3, 11:16, 62:19, 63:23, 65:21, 78:8 contracts [4] - 7:3, 9:7, 10:25, 13:23 contradicted [1] -52:8 contrary [1] - 11:13 control [1] - 57:21 controversial [1] -9:20 conversation [2] -40:13, 47:9 cooperate [1] - 27:1 copy [2] - 11:20, 13:9 core [1] - 65:20 corporate [2] - 22:1, 81:15 correct [8] - 22:3, 29:5, 38:7, 39:25, 43:6, 43:9, 45:22, 72:10 Correct [2] - 22:5, 27:21 corresponded [1] -31:5 correspondence [7] -21:21, 23:21, 25:11, 25:12, 30:19, 35:13, 58:20 corrupt [1] - 64:24 costello [5] - 47:10, 49:17, 53:16, 57:22, 57:23 Costello [2] - 38:15, 47:8 counsel [17] - 3:6, 4:6, 9:18, 11:13, 14:8, 30:21, 35:9, 40:10, 53:5, 53:19, 55:10, 57:3, 72:5, 74:15, 93:23, 94:11, 94:14 count [1] - 65:1 counter [2] - 45:13, 67:13 counts [5] - 34:2, 65:3, 65:5, 65:23, 65:25 couple [3] - 44:14, 70:11, 79:7 course [16] - 4:3, 6:11, 6:15, 17:11, 18:11, 30:22, 34:16, 44:19,

45:9, 56:15, 62:13, 65:22, 72:24, 97:18, 97:19, 99:6 COURT [317] - 3:14, 3:16, 3:19, 4:17, 4:19, 5:11, 6:4, 6:9, 6:13, 6:16, 6:23, 7:3, 7:8, 8:2, 8:8, 8:16, 8:19, 9:1, 9:24, 10:9, 10:15, 10:19, 11:4, 11:6, 11:24, 12:18, 12:20, 13:1, 13:4, 13:22, 14:1, 14:4, 14:14, 14:24, 15:1, 15:6, 15:23, 16:2, 16:5, 16:18, 16:24, 17:2, 17:6, 17:9, 17:13, 17:18, 17:20, 18:4, 18:7, 18:17, 18:24, 19:3, 19:5, 19:7, 19:11, 19:14, 19:21, 20:8, 20:12, 20:14, 20:19, 21:3, 21:9, 21:20, 22:4, 22:6, 22:12, 22:19, 22:21, 23:12, 23:14, 23:16, 23:18, 23:24, 24:4, 24:7, 24:14, 24:22, 24:24, 25:7, 25:10, 25:19, 26:8, 26:11, 26:16, 26:21, 27:3, 27:6, 27:19, 27:22, 28:3, 28:12, 28:16, 28:24, 29:3, 29:10, 29:14, 29:17, 29:20, 29:22, 29:25, 30:4, 30:7, 30:13, 30:16, 30:22, 31:8, 31:14, 31:20, 31:24, 32:2, 32:8, 32:13, 32:17, 32:19, 32:22, 33:4, 33:8, 33:21, 33:24, 34:4, 34:8, 34:10, 34:18, 35:9, 36:8, 36:13, 36:19, 37:2, 37:6, 37:12, 37:14, 37:19, 38:2, 38:4, 38:8, 38:16, 38:19, 38:24, 39:4, 39:7, 39:11, 39:21, 39:23, 40:1, 40:4, 40:11, 40:17, 41:2, 41:6, 41:11, 41:17, 41:20, 42:2, 42:9, 42:15, 42:17, 42:25, 43:16, 43:20, 43:24, 44:8, 44:22, 45:19, 46:1, 46:8, 46:13, 46:17, 46:22, 47:11, 47:16, 47:19, 47:25, 48:5, 48:10, 48:13,

48:15, 48:18, 49:2, 49:9, 49:16, 49:21, 49:23, 49:25, 50:5, 50:10, 50:12, 50:21, 51:1, 51:5, 51:10, 51:20, 52:4, 52:7, 52:12, 52:16, 53:12, 53:17, 53:21, 54:1, 54:17, 55:4, 55:13, 55:16, 55:22, 55:25, 56:3, 56:8, 56:12, 57:14, 58:7, 58:14, 58:16, 58:21, 59:1, 59:8, 59:12, 59:22, 59:25, 60:3, 60:10, 60:19, 61:9, 61:17, 62:2, 62:6, 62:9, 62:20, 63:1, 63:8, 63:11, 63:20, 64:16, 65:1, 65:6, 65:12, 65:17, 66:3, 66:14, 66:22, 67:6, 67:20, 68:8, 68:19, 69:12, 69:20, 69:23, 70:7, 70:9, 70:21, 71:3, 71:7, 71:10, 71:22, 72:4, 72:10, 72:12, 72:14, 73:5, 73:10, 74:13, 75:11, 76:2, 76:9, 76:18, 76:22, 77:13, 78:17, 78:23, 79:5, 79:14, 79:17, 80:9, 81:8, 81:19, 81:23, 82:8, 82:19, 83:1, 83:6, 83:10, 83:17, 83:20, 84:20, 84:25, 85:6, 85:10, 85:14, 86:1, 86:4, 86:19, 87:9, 88:4, 88:8, 88:14, 88:18, 89:11, 89:16, 89:20, 90:5, 90:13, 91:19, 92:21, 92:23, 93:1, 93:3, 93:13, 94:21, 95:1, 95:4, 96:7, 97:6, 97:10, 97:18, 98:11, 98:22, 99:10 court [4] - 85:2, 95:20, 95:22, 95:23 Court [19] - 14:10, 24:6, 27:5, 40:14, 47:6, 50:11, 56:5, 67:24, 74:21, 80:5, 80:15, 80:25, 85:15, 86:3, 86:15, 88:11, 88:16, 90:1, 96:24 Court's [3] - 25:8, 83:13, 95:8 courthouse [3] - 96:8, 96:11, 96:14

COURTROOM [1] courts [2] - 83:13, 86:17 cover [2] - 42:13, 90:25 CPLR50-4502(b [1] -45:13 craft [1] - 92:7 crafted [1] - 10:24 created [5] - 13:15, 53:4, 55:10, 55:11, 58:4 creation [2] - 10:1, credibility [9] - 75:15, 75:22, 77:8, 77:11, 80:21, 80:24, 82:1, 92:6 crime [1] - 42:12 criminal [35] - 21:12, 21:22, 23:10, 24:18, 24:19, 26:17, 28:5, 34:15, 43:8, 43:19, 45:25, 61:20, 74:9, 74:15, 74:25, 75:3, 76:1, 77:12, 77:22, 78:5, 79:10, 79:21, 79:22, 80:18, 80:24, 81:22, 82:2, 82:7, 83:14, 83:16, 83:21, 84:25, 85:4, 85:23, 86:17 criminality [1] - 86:22 cumulative [1] - 60:25 current [1] - 48:1 CVS [2] - 83:17, 83:22

D

damage [6] - 33:16, 64:3, 66:19, 67:1, 67:2, 68:3 damages [13] - 35:3, 65:7. 66:14. 66:23. 67:20, 69:13, 70:20, 70:25, 71:2, 71:4, 71:14, 71:18, 81:20 damaging [1] - 84:1 Daniels [17] - 32:18, 38:12, 38:22, 39:6, 39:8, 39:13, 44:13, 47:24, 49:10, 50:24, 51:16, 54:24, 56:11, 57:9, 57:10, 62:1, 87:15 daniels [1] - 32:23 Danya [1] - 3:10 data [1] - 57:16 date [17] - 7:17, 7:19,

77:7, 79:22 dated [1] - 8:15 dates [2] - 44:3, 44:4 David [2] - 74:4, 85:13 days [1] - 21:17 deadline [2] - 7:19, 7.21 deal [16] - 13:18, 28:16, 46:6, 61:10, 73:16, 75:7, 75:8, 79:14, 84:7, 89:23, 90:16, 91:14, 91:16, 97:2, 98:6, 99:6 dealing [8] - 60:12, 60:20, 67:2, 67:9, 74:22, 80:3, 84:4 dealings [1] - 51:18 deals [2] - 86:21, 98:1 December [1] - 50:15 decide [1] - 90:7 decides [2] - 79:15, 79:17 decision [1] - 85:15 declare [1] - 82:20 decline [1] - 76:3 declining [1] - 79:2 deem [1] - 24:10 **defamation** [1] - 35:18 defend [3] - 33:18, 62:14, 63:15 defendant [44] - 3:21, 4:7, 8:14, 35:25, 37:21, 38:5, 38:25, 47:8, 47:10, 52:24, 53:3, 53:5, 53:16, 55:8, 58:9, 60:22, 64:22, 64:25, 66:5, 66:7, 66:10, 67:11, 67:17, 75:16, 76:1, 80:20, 83:25, 84:1, 84:3, 84:4, 85:23, 88:25, 90:24, 91:4, 91:11, 92:13, 93:21, 94:12, 95:10, 95:11, 95:14, 97:25, 98:17 defendant's [8] - 4:1, 8:17, 14:8, 14:12, 28:11, 38:8, 52:20, 93:23 defendants [2] - 24:9, 52:19 defense [11] - 5:7, 5:25, 6:2, 23:3, 24:18, 37:4, 41:25, 57:5, 62:16, 65:21,

76:7

19:7, 19:25, 20:1,

25:15, 26:23, 26:24,

26:25, 27:4, 27:10,

27:18, 27:21, 27:24,

defenses [3] - 5:19, 56:22, 57:2 defer [2] - 71:23, 94:10 deferring [3] - 71:23, 72:3, 90:22 defined [2] - 14:19, 14:24 **definitely** [1] - 90:6 **definition** [2] - 15:10, 57:18 delay [1] - 72:23 delve [3] - 68:3, 80:23, 81:21 delves [1] - 47:5 demonstrate [1] - 66:7 denial [3] - 52:25, 53:10, 53:21 denied [1] - 88:1 deny [3] - 18:17, 36:9, 70:7 denying [1] - 52:14 dep [1] - 90:20 depose [2] - 13:5, 13:6 deposed [1] - 80:9 deposition [36] - 4:15, 7:22, 63:6, 69:6, 70:13, 71:24, 72:16, 73:1, 73:2, 73:17, 73:18, 73:19, 73:21, 73:23, 73:24, 74:20, 81:11, 83:1, 88:12, 88:22, 90:2, 90:10, 90:25, 91:11, 91:18, 92:12, 92:14, 93:6, 93:22, 94:19, 94:20, 96:3, 96:21, 97:20, 97:21, 99:2 depositions [5] -81:16, 89:17, 90:19, 95:19, 98:13 **DEPUTY** [1] - 3:3 derived [1] - 85:22 described [1] - 35:7 designation [1] -81:16 desire [1] - 52:21 details [1] - 55:15 determination [1] -68:5 detrimental [1] - 37:24 develops [1] - 21:2 differed [1] - 24:5 difference [2] - 26:12, 58:16 different [12] - 15:8, 17:2, 26:23, 27:20, 27:23, 27:25, 57:16, 62:3, 67:4, 67:10,

70:5, 95:23 difficult [3] - 20:7, 43:3, 62:16 directly [2] - 33:11, 65:23 disagree [1] - 98:6 disagreement [1] -6:22 disclose [3] - 43:13, 45:17, 72:24 disclosed [8] - 37:16, 37:17, 40:21, 49:3, 49:5, 49:9, 64:8, 88:23 disclosing [4] - 37:22, 41:2, 43:13, 57:22 disclosure [9] - 17:15, 18:18, 20:23, 20:24, 40:19, 47:12, 49:17, 71:4, 71:13 disclosures [6] - 38:5, 38:25, 47:23, 52:19, 70:24, 71:6 discoverable [1] -86:6 discovery [17] - 3:20, 4:9, 4:14, 4:15, 4:22, 5:2, 25:20, 38:20, 66:1, 71:9, 71:15, 74:21, 77:14, 85:3, 85:5, 93:24 discovery's [1] - 66:2 discrimination [2] -65:14, 67:12 discriminatory [1] -64:9 discuss [2] - 34:14, 66:19 discussed [7] - 5:23, 8:7, 8:13, 36:1, 40:15, 47:21, 83:5 discussing [5] - 41:9, 59:4, 59:5, 60:7, 70:19 discussion [2] - 7:11, 73:20 discussions [1] -49:19 disloyal [1] - 50:4 dismiss [3] - 34:4, 87:16, 87:24 dismissal [2] - 87:19, 97:17 dismissed [2] - 77:18, 84:17 dispositive [1] - 87:25 disproportionate [1] -68:18 dispute [6] - 9:15,

9:16, 19:21, 54:16,

86:18, 90:14 disputes [1] - 38:20 distinction [3] - 5:14, 12:15. 15:15 District [5] - 21:12, 21:18, 21:24, 26:13, 85:12 district [1] - 85:2 divulging [1] - 45:21 document [17] - 4:14, 8:3, 9:22, 12:6, 13:17, 16:8, 18:4, 26:4, 36:17, 40:16, 41:24, 42:7, 55:21, 59:16, 69:9 document's [1] - 12:5 documents [65] -4:22, 6:21, 6:25, 7:15, 7:18, 8:2, 9:7, 9:12, 9:19, 10:20, 11:3, 12:12, 12:22, 13:15, 15:5, 15:10, 20:4, 20:15, 21:10, 24:16, 25:7, 31:4, 35:12, 36:4, 36:11, 36:15, 36:19, 39:14, 39:19, 40:6, 40:18, 40:19, 46:10, 46:14, 48:22, 50:23, 51:7, 52:10, 53:18, 53:25, 54:1, 54:2, 54:5, 54:23, 58:1, 58:20, 59:2, 59:5, 59:18, 60:12, 60:19, 61:1, 61:13, 63:15, 66:18, 70:23, 74:8, 75:9, 77:1, 79:1, 80:2, 87:7, 87:8, 93:5, 93.13 Donald [3] - 3:3, 15:13, 15:16 done [4] - 18:10, 40:19, 89:22, 92:11 doubt [1] - 7:11 down [5] - 20:20, 67:17, 68:4, 78:5, 80:12 draft [2] - 19:16, 54:18 drafted [2] - 17:14, 18:5 drafter [1] - 18:9 drafting [1] - 18:14 draw [1] - 80:5 due [2] - 32:3, 71:12 during [7] - 38:15, 40:10, 43:12, 45:18, 56:20, 57:8, 94:18 duty [7] - 5:17, 33:9, 33:13, 34:3, 37:21, 65:4, 65:11

Ε

e-mail [10] - 8:6, 8:8, 8:15, 10:22, 10:23, 12:20, 25:11, 30:23, 31:16, 73:13 e-mailed [1] - 72:18 e-mails [2] - 8:12, 23:24 early [2] - 43:1, 48:17 easier [4] - 27:12, 27:14, 28:7, 29:25 echo [1] - 44:9 effect [1] - 83:23 effectively [1] - 34:21 EICHENBLATT [17] -3:12, 14:12, 33:22, 34:1, 34:6, 34:9, 34:11, 64:21, 65:3, 65:9, 65:16, 65:18, 84:8, 94:17, 94:25, 95:3, 99:11 Eichenblatt [1] - 3:13 either [12] - 28:20, 32:15, 36:3, 37:17, 56:22, 57:9, 58:8, 63:2, 72:6, 81:7, 87:19, 91:15 election [4] - 49:8, 50:2, 75:7, 79:25 **electronic** [2] - 3:2, 99:15 Eleventh [1] - 84:10 elicit [1] - 91:2 embarrass [1] - 95:12 embarrassing [1] -37:24 employee [4] - 8:24, 10:6, 13:16, 18:15 employment [14] -7:1, 7:5, 9:17, 10:13, 11:1, 11:8, 11:11, 11:19, 12:7, 17:12, 19:25, 20:1, 20:16 **Employment** [1] - 12:5 encompass [1] -66:23 encompassing [1] -36.5 end [2] - 35:23, 97:13 ended [2] - 29:1, 87:22 enforce [1] - 99:8 enforcement [2] -26:19, 94:10 engage [1] - 24:18 engaged [3] - 37:21, 53:2, 57:12 ensues [1] - 77:19 enter [2] - 4:3, 18:24

entered [3] - 17:24, 18:17, 91:12 entire [2] - 13:9, 81:11 entirely [2] - 54:8 entirety [2] - 29:8, 54:20 entities [2] - 7:2, 10:2 entitled [11] - 12:5, 20:3, 33:16, 33:17, 35:2, 35:4, 35:6, 66:1, 71:3, 71:18, 94:22 entitlement [1] - 84:15 entity [33] - 14:22, 14:24, 14:25, 15:16, 15:17, 15:24, 51:8, 51:14, 51:18, 52:2, 52:3, 53:4, 53:7, 53:8, 54:14, 54:24, 54:25, 55:5, 55:6, 55:10, 55:21, 56:13, 56:15, 56:16, 56:18, 56:19, 56:24, 57:4, 57:12, 58:2, 58:4 envision [1] - 96:25 epithets [1] - 63:17 er [1] - 14:2 essence [1] - 86:16 Essential [13] - 51:6, 51:7, 51:15, 51:17, 53:20, 55:20, 56:11, 57:2, 57:5, 57:8, 58:19, 58:20, 58:24 essentially [3] - 9:20, 51:14, 61:23 establish [4] - 8:23, 9:19, 9:22, 77:8 establishing [2] -9:12, 67:16 ethnic [1] - 63:18 evening [1] - 89:6 event [6] - 12:8, 42:1, 42:5, 64:15, 78:1, 80.1 events [7] - 74:1, 76:21, 77:6, 78:1, 79:22, 79:24, 80:22 evidence [5] - 58:1, 70:23, 85:22, 86:22, 94:15 evidencing [1] - 27:9 evidentiary [1] - 67:3 evolves [1] - 62:24 **ex** [1] - 42:8 exactly [5] - 8:7, 10:22, 19:24, 49:15, 81:4 examination [2] -86:16, 89:25 example [24] - 6:4,

21:25, 32:22, 33:2, 35:12, 38:2, 48:1, 49:5, 68:13, 68:23, 69:7, 75:13, 77:18, 78:25, 81:16, 86:21, 87:3, 87:4, 87:14, 90:19, 93:17, 95:10, 96:20, 96:25 examples [1] - 5:21 excellent [1] - 17:9 except [1] - 60:23 **exception** [1] - 42:13 executed [2] - 50:24, 52:1 exist [1] - 31:3 existed [1] - 37:11 existence [6] - 7:4, 8:24, 9:8, 10:25, 35:13, 39:14 existent [1] - 42:8 existing [1] - 69:16 exists [4] - 11:9, 32:10, 46:14, 73:17 expense [1] - 75:24 explore [4] - 5:2, 20:6, 33:18, 35:4 **exploring** [1] - 20:3 extend [1] - 88:21 extension [1] - 86:8 extent [18] - 10:12, 23:2, 28:22, 31:22, 40:7, 41:14, 66:4, 66:8, 66:13, 69:14, 70:19, 75:9, 78:20, 78:24, 79:8, 81:8, 91:25, 96:7 extraordinary [1] -95:8 extremely [3] - 23:8, 35:11, 36:7 extrinsic [1] - 86:22 eye [1] - 24:9

F

face [2] - 46:1, 52:18 facing [1] - 21:16 fact [27] - 8:6, 9:20, 23:13, 24:17, 24:19, 35:7, 35:14, 35:24, 36:17, 40:9, 43:17, 45:10, 50:13, 52:19, 55:5, 55:7, 64:10, 64:14, 67:4, 75:6, 80:12, 82:6, 87:22, 97:13, 97:15, 97:16 facts [1] - 68:6 factual [3] - 38:21, 66:1, 91:1 fail [2] - 73:3, 73:5 failed [2] - 42:23, 45:1 fair [5] - 9:2, 25:8, 75:16, 77:17, 91:24 fairness [1] - 14:1 fake [1] - 56:17 fall [1] - 25:2 false [3] - 45:4, 52:22, 64.22 falsehoods [1] - 65:19 familiar [2] - 16:12, 83:19 family [2] - 45:3, 52:21 fan [1] - 44:14 far [4] - 50:6, 53:11, 66:17, 88:21 fashioned [1] - 40:15 February [7] - 21:24, 25:21, 26:23, 27:11, 27:13, 28:4 federal [7] - 41:21, 43:8, 43:9, 43:10, 45:23, 95:20, 95:22 feed [1] - 78:13 fees [1] - 35:16 few [2] - 60:5, 74:7 fiat [1] - 82:20 fiduciary [6] - 5:18, 33:9, 34:3, 38:10, 65:4, 65:11 Fifth [17] - 24:20, 75:4, 79:2, 79:12, 82:12, 84:2, 84:5, 84:16, 85:16, 86:9, 87:4, 87:13, 87:14, 89:7, 91:20, 97:1, 97:2 fight [5] - 25:1, 25:3, 29:23. 78:16 figure [1] - 26:4 figuring [1] - 81:10 file [2] - 10:11, 18:16 filed [1] - 22:10 files [1] - 13:9 filing [6] - 21:17, 25:15, 27:8, 40:11, 67:7, 67:25 final [1] - 30:12 fine [7] - 13:19, 16:5, 16:11, 25:9, 27:6, 54:22 first [14] - 4:20, 5:5, 6:21, 7:6, 25:6, 25:7, 26:4, 44:10, 47:12, 49:16, 50:7, 82:2, 96:11, 96:12 First [2] - 98:4, 98:13

five [2] - 7:14, 99:5

Florida [8] - 43:11,

43:16, 43:20, 43:23,

fix [1] - 45:8

flesh [1] - 98:19

44:2, 44:4, 45:21, 85:12 fly [2] - 42:22, 43:3 focus [1] - 92:14 focussed [1] - 28:5 fodder [3] - 74:21, 77:24, 92:13 follow [1] - 95:22 following [5] - 34:14, 52:12, 62:20, 89:6, 89:15 follows [2] - 13:14, 45:15 force [1] - 93:4 forever [1] - 80:7 forgot [1] - 3:16 form [1] - 29:16 formal [2] - 13:17, 14:6 formally [2] - 14:4, 71:22 formats [1] - 18:9 former [1] - 38:9 formulate [1] - 75:20 formulated [1] - 92:5 Fort [2] - 87:6, 87:10 forth [1] - 35:22 forum [3] - 32:7, 78:7, 88:25 forwarded [1] - 14:10 four [3] - 5:2, 9:7, 34:17 framed [2] - 35:11, 66.2 frankly [1] - 84:6 fraud [1] - 42:12 fro [1] - 61:1 front [6] - 11:20, 19:6, 43:4, 72:22, 91:14, 96:6 **fully** [2] - 71:1, 93:13 function [2] - 66:25, 67:1 fundamentally [2] -17:3, 17:4 future [1] - 79:11

G

gag [1] - 22:9 gain [1] - 82:6 game [6] - 9:2, 19:20, 71:13, 72:23, 75:16, 77:18 gap [1] - 4:2 Gayles [1] - 3:5 General [2] - 26:19, 28:6 general [4] - 45:19, 45:20, 64:2, 76:13

General's [2] - 26:14, 27.1 generally [6] - 5:2, 47:22, 63:14, 75:11, 75:18, 90:19 generated [1] - 36:15 generous [1] - 99:12 gentleman [1] - 68:5 get-go [1] - 67:7 given [10] - 7:19, 22:8, 30:20, 37:7, 39:12, 52:2, 57:25, 73:17, 77:21, 80:16 glossed [1] - 71:9 gotcha [1] - 70:22 govern [4] - 4:4, 95:9, 95:10 Government [1] - 88:8 governs [1] - 43:7 grade [1] - 25:5 grant [3] - 68:10, 91:5, 92:9 granted [1] - 84:11 great [1] - 46:23 gripe [1] - 22:17 ground [2] - 82:11, 87:2 grounds [7] - 37:1, 79:3, 82:10, 87:16, 92:12, 94:24, 95:5 group [1] - 6:21 guess [19] - 14:15, 14:18, 15:6, 19:14, 23:20, 24:2, 27:7, 27:10, 30:14, 36:13, 46:2, 47:25, 64:5, 64:16, 66:15, 68:19, 78:17, 78:24, 89:22 quilty [1] - 50:9 gun [1] - 98:8 guy [2] - 19:15, 92:18

Н

half [1] - 59:12 hand [2] - 95:13, 96:9 handle [1] - 48:7 handling [1] - 74:7 hands [3] - 94:2, 98:4, 99:4 hang [1] - 57:4 happy [3] - 11:20, 24:11, 31:3 hard [6] - 42:21, 79:24, 80:14, 81:10, 82:13, 91:7 harm [1] - 78:9 hat [1] - 57:5 head [2] - 49:14, 61:19 headed [1] - 88:11

heart [1] - 34:20 held [1] - 35:25 help [2] - 13:12, 18:5 hence [3] - 15:19, 16:14, 86:15 hesitating [1] - 91:5 hiding [1] - 79:1 highest [1] - 20:25 highly [2] - 41:15, 51:19 himself [5] - 19:17, 23:19, 34:23, 64:8, 76:11 Hold [1] - 30:13 hold [1] - 6:14 Honor [105] - 3:8, 3:10, 3:12, 3:15, 4:8, 4:11, 4:18, 4:20, 5:3, 5:13, 6:6, 7:7, 7:21, 8:4, 8:10, 8:18, 11:7, 12:24, 14:3, 14:13, 15:21, 16:1, 16:11, 16:12, 16:23, 19:4, 20:17, 22:20, 22:23, 26:7, 26:18, 26:25, 27:4. 27:16. 28:14. 30:6, 30:18, 32:3, 34:7, 34:11, 34:19, 35:10, 39:10, 39:22, 40:6, 40:14, 41:4, 42:1, 42:11, 42:12, 43:5, 44:6, 45:12, 45:22, 45:24, 46:16, 47:1, 49:12, 50:20, 51:11, 52:8, 52:13, 54:15, 58:6, 58:13, 59:11, 59:15, 60:2, 61:12, 62:5, 62:22, 63:4, 64:21, 65:16, 66:4, 69:11, 69:18, 69:22, 70:6, 70:16, 71:8, 71:20, 72:3, 72:11, 72:15, 72:22, 73:4, 73:12, 74:5, 74:7, 74:24, 84:8, 84:21, 85:1, 90:12, 93:2, 94:17, 96:5, 96:6, 97:4, 97:8, 98:10, 98:21, 99:9, 99.11 Honor's [7] - 43:9, 50:24, 53:8, 64:6, 81:1, 86:9, 88:20

hear [4] - 5:3, 30:24,

31:17. 53:19. 55:9.

66:10, 66:11, 97:15

90:6, 98:11

heard [7] - 15:9,

hearing [2] - 3:20,

57:3

hopefully [1] - 70:14 hour [3] - 59:12, 90:25, 93:22 hours [5] - 78:18, 91:20, 92:1, 97:1, 99.5 House [1] - 74:8 house [1] - 79:1 HR [1] - 13:7 hundred [2] - 35:18, 38:20 hung [1] - 95:21 hurt [1] - 64:12 husband [6] - 41:13. 41:18, 42:15, 43:6, 43:15, 45:15 husband-wife [1] -41:13

I

ice [1] - 21:2 idea [7] - 34:23, 51:25, 52:1, 53:13, 57:22, 57:24, 65:8 identification [1] -40:18 identified [4] - 10:2, 24:1, 74:18, 77:16 identify [4] - 11:15, 20:22, 25:7, 68:11 identifying [1] - 30:11 ignore [1] - 79:18 ignoring [2] - 52:19, 80:12 imagine [1] - 50:25 impeach [8] - 53:17, 53:24, 54:6, 54:12, 55:8, 58:8, 58:9, 86:23 impeaching [2] -56:22 impeachment [2] -25:24, 72:21 implicate [2] - 77:11, 80:24 implicates [1] - 80:18 implications [1] -74:25 important [1] - 12:14 **improper** [1] - 38:8 in-the-weeds [1] -51.12 inadmissible [2] -95:11, 99:5 Inc [2] - 15:13, 15:16 incident [1] - 47:3 incidents [1] - 5:22 inclined [3] - 80:15, 88:16, 89:24

include [7] - 14:2, 25:10, 25:11, 89:18, 97:12, 97:20, 98:12 included [2] - 14:7, 14:10 including [4] - 36:20, 39:15, 83:4, 85:4 incorporate [1] - 98:2 incorporated [4] -34:1, 65:4, 65:23, 65:25 incorrect [1] - 13:8 incriminate [1] - 76:11 incriminated [2] -85:17, 95:14 incrimination [2] -85:16, 86:6 incumbent [1] - 42:5 indictment [3] - 21:17, 61:20, 78:12 indictments [4] - 78:5, 79:10, 79:21, 79:22 individual [3] - 34:20, 67:4, 67:13 information [14] -13:3, 30:16, 36:3, 37:16, 37:17, 37:22, 45:22, 64:7, 71:18, 82:7, 86:5, 87:18, 93:15 information's [1] - 5:5 informed [1] - 72:20 infringement [1] -84:11 initial [1] - 19:24 injected [1] - 55:21 instance [4] - 64:21, 69:6, 89:17, 93:8 instances [2] - 70:2, 86:19 instant [1] - 84:13 instruct [4] - 82:12, 94:23, 95:1, 95:4 instructing [1] - 82:10 insults [1] - 64:24 insurrection [1] - 75:8 intend [3] - 72:20, 73:25, 90:13 intended [2] - 43:14, 72:19 interest [2] - 16:4, 72.7 interests [1] - 73:17 interim [1] - 98:18 internal [8] - 22:1, 23:21, 23:24, 24:8, 24:16, 24:24, 25:11, 49:4 interpret [1] - 14:16

interrogatories [1] -

29:11 interrogatory [2] -28:13, 29:13 interrupt [1] - 23:23 interrupting [1] - 84:9 interview [1] - 30:20 intimidating [1] -22:10 investigation [3] -26:14, 26:15, 34:15 invocation [3] - 84:12, 87:25. 88:9 invoke [7] - 31:23, 31:25, 42:7, 75:4, 84:2, 87:1, 87:3 invoked [6] - 41:13, 76:18, 87:12, 88:15, 89:7, 97:2 invokes [3] - 76:16, 87:3, 87:14 invoking [6] - 42:2, 43:18, 76:14, 84:16, 95:15, 97:14 involve [2] - 34:16, 61:1 involved [4] - 74:4, 74:16, 74:18, 82:3 involvement [5] -21:11, 21:22, 22:13, 22:16, 23:9 involving [5] - 18:7, 33:7, 54:21, 74:4, 74:10 iPhone [1] - 7:16 irrelevant [2] - 37:7, 57:7 irrespective [1] - 68:2 issue [59] - 3:22, 3:24, 4:7, 4:20, 5:12, 8:21, 8:22, 10:20, 10:23, 11:6, 13:20, 15:23, 16:14, 23:15, 23:17, 31:4, 33:17, 39:12, 40:3, 40:5, 40:12, 42:20, 44:12, 44:19, 44:21, 48:3, 48:8, 52:6, 52:23, 53:10, 53:11, 54:10, 62:10, 63:1, 63:13, 65:17, 66:23, 67:6, 67:16, 68:3, 69:2, 69:5, 70:18, 71:24, 73:6, 73:11, 73:12, 73:16, 77:1, 81:9, 89:13, 89:14, 90:8, 91:14, 93:13, 96:16, 96:19, 97:8, 98:2 issued [3] - 22:8, 83:6, 83:7 issues [20] - 5:3,

13:18, 20:3, 21:15, 40:23, 54:11, 61:14, 68:15, 70:13, 74:9, 76:24, 76:25, 77:1, 86:24, 91:1, 92:17, 93:18, 94:19, 96:8, 96:15 issuing [2] - 3:24, 29:13

J

itself [2] - 13:18, 35:21

janitor [2] - 20:25, 24:25 January [6] - 19:9, 74:2, 75:7, 76:20, 80:1 jibe [1] - 55:16 job [1] - 18:21 **Judge** [3] - 3:4, 57:11, 96.13 judge [3] - 12:5, 22:8, 83:7 judges [1] - 95:24 judgment [2] - 84:14, 84:18 July [2] - 8:15, 10:24 jump [1] - 17:7 jumped [1] - 71:9 **jumps** [1] - 98:7 June [5] - 19:10, 25:20, 25:21, 25:22, 28:1 jurors [1] - 76:13 jury [1] - 67:21 justice [1] - 93:18

K

Karen [1] - 74:6 keep [3] - 34:24, 90:17, 96:19 keeping [1] - 35:14 key [1] - 5:3 kill [1] - 61:15 kind [12] - 15:25, 33:5, 51:9, 51:17, 51:23, 52:5, 61:25, 62:23, 72:18, 82:14, 83:18, 92:10 knowing [1] - 67:21 knowledge [3] - 13:6, 51:12, 59:19 knowledgeable [1] -68:12 known [4] - 5:10, 5:21, 6:2, 51:15 knows [6] - 65:7, 68:9, 69:7, 94:7, 94:14,

95:5

L

labelling [1] - 11:25 lack [1] - 37:11 laid [1] - 81:4 landscape [1] - 80:13 larger [1] - 94:20 last [4] - 3:22, 40:14, 73:9, 86:2 latest [1] - 78:11 law [13] - 42:18, 42:22, 43:7, 43:8, 43:9, 43:10, 43:16, 43:21, 54:10, 84:4, 84:6, 91:21, 98:14 laws [1] - 45:13 lawsuit [9] - 21:15, 21:19, 22:10, 22:15, 25:15, 28:2, 40:11, 55:20, 84:1 lawsuits [3] - 67:23, 67:25, 68:1 lawyer [4] - 19:18, 57:21, 94:6, 94:23 lawyers [3] - 19:22, 93:23. 95:21

lay [1] - 76:15 lead [1] - 94:15 least [9] - 11:13, 25:2, 27:17, 42:23, 61:20,

95:25 leave [3] - 32:4, 93:21, 96:13 left [4] - 29:1, 29:7, 40:20, 74:8 leg [1] - 90:7

69:14, 70:1, 85:21,

60:17 legitimate [2] - 22:17, 94:2 legs [1] - 57:17

legal [3] - 45:2, 52:20,

less [1] - 34:12 letter [2] - 10:5, 10:7 level [1] - 20:25 lie [2] - 37:17, 48:25 lied [2] - 33:1, 33:14 lies [1] - 37:12 light [2] - 24:19, 50:24

likelihood [1] - 86:13 likely [1] - 37:23 limit [8] - 56:4, 56:5,

56:10, 76:24, 76:25, 82:23, 88:17, 89:25 **limitation** [3] - 46:18,

limitations [3] - 50:14,

77:14, 85:4

limited [11] - 15:20, 23:14, 38:11, 55:1, 55:2, 55:17, 56:8, 56:9, 57:15, 57:18 limits [7] - 25:14, 68:21, 68:25, 81:11, 82:21, 90:24, 93:1 line [6] - 8:5, 24:19, 25:2, 30:3, 79:24, 80.4 link [1] - 28:8 listed [1] - 65:25

litigate [1] - 98:5 litigation [7] - 35:15, 35:21, 54:21, 87:10, 87:17, 87:20, 88:24 live [2] - 42:19, 63:22 living [1] - 45:17

loathed [1] - 96:7 location [2] - 73:16, 96:3

log [7] - 42:6, 42:20, 42:24, 44:11, 44:17, 44:20, 46:7

logged [2] - 46:14, 50:16

logic [2] - 27:7 logically [1] - 25:16 look [5] - 8:16, 8:20, 39:13, 44:3, 48:12

looking [5] - 6:18, 23:20, 37:20, 47:6, 54:22

loss [1] - 84:14 lost [1] - 51:10 loud [1] - 67:25 luck [1] - 94:13

lying [1] - 63:16

М

machinations [1] -57:21 Maedon [1] - 96:1 magnitude [1] - 42:21 mail [10] - 8:6, 8:8, 8:15. 10:22. 10:23. 12:20, 25:11, 30:23, 31:16, 73:13 mailed [1] - 72:18 mails [2] - 8:12, 23:24 maintaining [1] - 36:6 malicious [3] - 38:9, 45:4, 52:21 man [1] - 51:18 Manhattan [6] - 21:13, 21:18, 21:23, 24:1, 24:25, 28:5 marital [1] - 43:12 marriage [1] - 45:18

material [2] - 8:16, 65:24 materials [9] - 6:5, 8:14. 8:17. 14:2. 14:8, 14:10, 14:13, 84:22. 85:13 matter [11] - 13:13, 28:5, 35:19, 37:18, 43:7, 69:15, 75:10, 75:25, 80:3, 83:14, 84:13 matters [7] - 47:21, 74:17, 76:19, 77:22,

81:22, 83:21, 88:5 Max [1] - 3:12 McDougal [5] - 61:16, 62:7, 74:6, 75:8, 92:19

mean [29] - 5:22, 12:19, 14:21, 17:1, 17:2, 19:12, 20:20, 20:21, 20:22, 23:22, 25:16, 27:25, 28:18, 28:22, 33:12, 33:16, 42:23, 47:22, 54:4, 57:16, 59:4, 60:16, 62:23. 67:24. 68:9. 81:8, 82:3, 84:17,

meant [1] - 16:25 media [13] - 23:1, 23:4, 23:5, 23:19, 38:6, 61:19, 74:22, 76:13, 77:24, 77:25, 78:4, 88:25

93:18

meet [2] - 69:21, 70:15 memorial [1] - 85:13 memory [2] - 18:22, 43:5

mention [1] - 34:12 mentioned [2] - 72:1, 92:18 merely [1] - 44:13 merits [1] - 90:21 met [3] - 4:24, 7:24,

Michael [1] - 3:4 middle [2] - 51:18, 52:5

47:8

middle-man [1] -51:18 might [5] - 6:6, 20:21, 20:22, 27:8, 75:14 mildly [1] - 35:8 million [1] - 4:12 mind [6] - 27:17,

35:14, 44:5, 68:18, 90:17, 96:19

mindful [3] - 18:21, 24:23, 70:10

minimum [1] - 44:3 minor [1] - 69:5 minute [1] - 73:9 minutes [2] - 74:7, 92:3

misconduct [1] -37:21 misrepresentations

[1] - 37:23 misstate [1] - 7:25 misstatements [1] -37:23

misuse [2] - 92:12, 93:14

mitigate [1] - 73:1 modification [5] -10:1, 10:9, 10:11, 27:15, 98:3

modifications [1] -26:22

modified [1] - 4:4 modify [4] - 13:15, 91:15, 97:3, 98:25 moment [1] - 59:11 money [1] - 61:23

months [3] - 48:20, 77:7, 78:6

morning [6] - 3:8, 3:10, 3:12, 3:14, 3:15, 3:19

most [2] - 7:15, 13:6 motion [2] - 34:4, 70:7 motions [1] - 3:23 motivations [1] -45:10

motive [4] - 21:14, 22:20, 72:21, 92:6 motives [2] - 22:11,

27:9

mount [1] - 62:16 move [4] - 16:19, 87:11, 87:16, 97:16 moving [1] - 63:5

MSNBC [2] - 78:10, 89:6 multiple [1] - 57:12

Ν

name [3] - 34:13, 38:22, 39:1 narrow [5] - 21:5, 25:22, 27:12, 69:24, 92:3 narrowed [2] - 63:3, 68:24 narrower [1] - 69:8 narrowing [1] - 63:3 national [1] - 63:19 nature [6] - 7:25, 8:12, 23:19, 25:11, 25:13,

42:19, 57:17, 60:20,

61:2, 69:24, 73:14,

78:18, 90:15, 91:2,

97:7

26:1, 27:24, 41:3,

8:20, 23:25, 31:7, 31:15 NBC [1] - 89:6 NDA [10] - 7:10, 18:2, 20:2, 20:5, 31:17, 50:23, 58:23, 59:7, 59:19, 59:23 NDAs [1] - 18:9 necessarily [6] - 8:11, 37:10, 37:15, 54:4, 54:20, 77:11 necessary [2] - 80:10, 88:16 need [15] - 9:19, 9:21, 17:25, 20:6, 24:23, 31:23, 44:18, 46:2, 61:10, 64:4, 71:15, 82:14, 94:21, 95:17, needed [1] - 31:22 needs [1] - 16:5 negative [1] - 20:7 never [6] - 45:7, 66:10, 66:11, 83:6, 83:7 nevertheless [1] - 9:4 New [9] - 26:15, 26:19, 42:13, 42:22, 43:21, 44:2, 45:13, 45:21, 74:2 new [1] - 69:23 next [19] - 13:20, 13:21, 16:21, 17:6, 17:7, 21:7, 21:8, 28:9, 30:8, 32:13, 41:4, 51:3, 59:10, 61:11, 63:13, 66:17, 90:13, 92:16, 96:18 ninety [1] - 64:1 nobody [2] - 98:7, 98.18 non [13] - 9:20, 11:12, 17:15, 18:18, 20:23, 20:24, 21:20, 23:25, 24:17, 25:12, 31:1, 42:8, 59:5 non-confidentiality [1] - 11:12 non-controversial [1] - 9:20 non-disclosure [4] -17:15, 18:18, 20:23, non-existent [1] - 42:8 non-privilege [1] -21:20 non-privileged [4] -23:25, 25:12, 31:1, 59:5 nondisclosure [1] -17:21

none [7] - 24:13, 30:23, 31:10, 32:11, 58:4, 78:19 nonparty [1] - 77:24 normal [2] - 81:18, 95:17 Northern [1] - 85:11 noted [1] - 72:18 nothing [17] - 5:19, 12:18, 12:20, 26:5, 34:22, 48:25, 56:23, 57:19, 58:23, 76:20, 76:21, 78:4, 87:20, 93:9, 95:15, 97:22 notice [1] - 44:16 noticed [1] - 73:18 notorious [1] - 50:8 number [31] - 3:4, 4:9, 4:13, 4:23, 6:21, 8:11, 8:23, 9:6, 12:11, 13:5, 13:21, 14:18, 15:6, 15:10, 16:5, 25:6, 29:8, 35:12, 44:19, 46:11, 47:21, 68:24, 73:16, 74:1, 74:18, 74:19, 74:23, 74:24, 79:7 **numbers** [1] - 72:6 numerous [1] - 63:21

0

object [7] - 10:17, 10:24, 11:2, 16:6, 36:16, 68:18 objected [4] - 15:6, 30:10, 36:25, 41:12 objection [22] - 7:8, 7:25, 8:5, 8:12, 9:5, 14:16, 14:18, 15:20, 16:7, 16:15, 17:1, 21:3, 21:5, 25:25, 31:9, 31:11, 36:23, 58:12, 63:2, 63:11, 68:23, 95:6 objections [3] - 16:6, 36:23, 44:15 obligation [2] - 19:16, 75:2 obligations [5] - 5:18, 5:20, 38:10, 44:16, 63:23 obstruction [1] -93:18 obtain [1] - 24:10 obtaining [1] - 10:17 Obukwelu [1] - 85:12 obviate [1] - 48:24

obviously [21] - 12:21,

13:17, 14:21, 22:25,

occurred [1] - 87:21 occurs [1] - 96:25 **odd** [2] - 11:14, 29:15 oddly [1] - 34:25 offer [2] - 44:7, 96:7 office [1] - 73:18 Office [1] - 27:2 old [1] - 48:20 once [4] - 4:3, 21:4, 71:15, 77:20 one [81] - 5:19, 6:2, 6:14, 7:6, 7:14, 8:3, 10:4, 10:23, 11:14, 11:21, 13:5, 13:21, 14:16, 16:3, 16:21, 16:22, 17:6, 17:7, 17:23, 18:22, 19:16, 20:3, 21:1, 22:21, 25:10, 26:23, 27:13, 27:25, 28:9, 30:8, 30:20, 31:4, 32:13, 38:2, 45:18, 50:17, 51:3, 52:1, 54:3, 54:11, 54:18, 57:12, 58:18, 59:10, 59:11, 59:19, 59:20, 60:6, 61:6, 61:11, 62:23, 62:25, 63:25, 64:17, 65:22, 68:24, 69:25, 70:4, 71:3, 73:16, 74:1, 74:18, 74:23, 75:13, 75:19, 79:7, 79:11, 82:10, 84:22, 85:17, 87:6, 91:9, 91:23, 92:4, 92:15, 93:8, 96:21, 97:8 ones [4] - 21:7, 21:8, 61:7, 83:11 ongoing [3] - 35:25, 56:14, 78:8 open [3] - 29:1, 29:7, 50:8 opening [1] - 57:11 opinion [1] - 64:11 opportunities [1] -77:9 opportunity [5] -71:16, 78:1, 78:3, 92:7, 98:19 opposed [12] - 17:23, 24:9, 29:11, 43:7, 43:18, 43:21, 45:7,

45:10, 49:3, 76:17,

81:14, 83:5

opposite [1] - 93:3 oral [1] - 30:20 order [29] - 3:23, 3:24, 4:3, 5:12, 22:9, 40:23, 51:8, 51:15, 74:16, 82:6, 82:22, 83:2, 83:3, 83:7, 89:13, 89:17, 89:22, 90:10, 90:13, 91:12, 91:16, 92:10, 96:18, 96:19, 96:20, 96:22, 97:3, 97:9, 97:21 ordered [1] - 35:17 orders [1] - 82:25 organization [7] - 7:2, 13:7, 16:9, 23:21, 23:25, 55:7, 55:11 Organization [7] -5:23, 12:14, 13:24, 18:25, 22:2, 70:3, 74:10 origin [2] - 63:18, 63:19 original [1] - 20:11 otherwise [6] - 11:17, 23:5, 25:23, 36:3, 68:3, 87:23 ought [1] - 9:15 ourselves [5] - 33:18, 62:14, 63:15, 96:8, 98:19 out-of-control [1] -57:21 outlets [1] - 23:4 outside [4] - 27:17, 27:18, 88:6, 88:24 overall [1] - 31:9 overbreadth [2] -36:23, 36:24 overbroad [6] - 11:3, 12:23, 36:21, 39:17, 55:17, 68:22 overrule [2] - 16:7, 58:12 overruled [1] - 25:25 overstep [1] - 24:19 overview [1] - 6:11 own [4] - 18:12, 34:25, 51:24, 85:18

Ρ

p.m.) [1] - 99:13 packer [2] - 61:18, 75:8 packet [1] - 14:9 page [3] - 10:23, 42:7 pages [12] - 7:15, 11:14, 11:17, 28:18, 29:3, 29:7, 29:8,

29:19, 30:1, 30:2, 34:17 paid [3] - 35:17, 44:13, 61:23 Palm [1] - 96:11 paragraph [22] -30:13, 32:25, 33:2, 33:10, 33:21, 33:23, 34:11, 37:20, 38:4, 38:24, 44:12, 44:21, 47:1, 47:5, 47:7, 47:20, 52:11, 63:25, 64:1, 64:22, 64:24 paragraphs [3] -34:14, 53:12, 91:1 parcel [1] - 51:22 part [14] - 12:22, 18:20, 19:13, 45:13, 46:25, 51:22, 61:15, 62:1, 62:10, 64:2, 67:9, 74:14, 82:13, participated [3] -30:14, 54:3, 54:8 particular [10] - 14:20, 20:22, 28:21, 36:16, 53:14, 56:7, 68:11, 69:8, 69:25, 88:24 particularly [1] - 47:23 parties [12] - 3:24, 9:5, 11:2, 13:16, 40:25, 41:2, 54:21, 66:9, 71:8, 85:3, 96:10, 96:12 partly [1] - 68:19 parts [1] - 25:25 party [6] - 26:2, 81:12, 81:14, 85:18, 85:19, 96:21 past [2] - 78:6, 80:2 pay [2] - 25:5, 45:5 payment [9] - 52:15, 52:17, 52:23, 52:25, 53:10, 53:13, 55:3, 56:2, 57:9 payments [16] - 33:2, 34:22, 34:23, 34:24, 35:6, 35:22, 49:13, 51:9, 51:15, 51:16, 51:21, 58:1, 58:19, 60:8, 62:3, 74:3 payoff [1] - 49:6 pecker [3] - 61:21, 74:4, 92:18 pending [8] - 3:22, 34:4, 54:11, 77:21, 82:1, 83:14, 86:17 people [6] - 20:25,

64:10, 76:13, 76:14,

76:15

per [2] - 22:9, 27:4 percent [2] - 35:18, 86:13 perhaps [5] - 22:7, 42:8, 48:16, 69:18, 70.11 peril [2] - 88:13 period [9] - 25:14, 25:20, 25:22, 50:16, 54:25, 56:20, 57:8, 57:10, 58:2 permissive [1] - 4:1 PERRY [155] - 3:10, 4:8, 4:18, 4:20, 5:13, 6:6, 6:10, 6:15, 6:20, 6:24, 7:7, 7:9, 11:5, 11:7, 11:25, 12:7, 12:19, 12:24, 13:2, 13:21, 13:23, 14:23, 14:25, 15:2, 16:23, 16:25, 17:4, 17:7, 17:10, 17:17, 17:19, 18:1, 18:6, 18:8, 18:19, 19:1, 19:4, 19:6, 19:9, 19:12, 19:19, 19:24, 20:13, 20:17, 21:1, 21:8, 21:10, 22:3, 22:5, 22:7, 22:15, 22:20, 25:16, 26:7, 26:9, 26:13, 26:18, 26:25, 27:16, 27:24, 28:10, 28:15, 28:18, 28:25, 29:6, 29:12, 29:15, 29:19, 30:9, 30:15, 32:14, 32:20, 32:24, 33:5, 33:11, 34:7, 34:19, 39:22, 40:2, 41:4, 42:1, 42:4, 42:12, 42:16, 42:18, 43:2, 46:21, 46:23, 47:3, 47:20, 48:4, 48:6, 48:11, 48:14, 48:16, 48:19, 49:7, 49:10, 49:19, 49:22, 49:24, 50:1, 50:6, 50:11, 50:19, 50:23, 51:3, 51:6, 51:11, 51:22, 52:5, 58:15, 58:18, 59:4, 59:11, 59:14, 59:24, 60:1, 60:5, 60:16, 61:8, 61:12, 61:18, 62:5, 62:8, 62:10, 62:22, 63:4, 63:9, 63:14, 63:21, 69:18, 69:21, 70:6, 70:8, 70:10, 70:22, 71:6, 71:20, 72:11, 72:15, 73:6, 79:4, 90:12, 92:19,

92:22, 92:25, 93:2, 96:5, 97:4, 97:8, 97:11, 98:10, 98:21, Perry [1] - 3:10 person [8] - 13:6, 18:7, 18:10, 18:12, 62:3, 62:6, 69:8, 82:1 person's [1] - 63:18 personal [2] - 36:20, 39:15 personnel [2] - 10:11, 13:9 perspective [4] -22:14, 86:11, 95:7, 95.8 phone [3] - 94:18, 95:19, 96:1 photos [1] - 7:16 picked [1] - 74:24 picking [1] - 38:2 Pierce [2] - 87:6, 87:10 pin [4] - 62:24, 70:15, 71:3, 71:17 pinpoint [1] - 28:10 pinpointed [1] - 62:12 place [4] - 25:6, 77:23, 79:24, 90:10 placing [1] - 50:14 plain [1] - 45:1 plaintiff [52] - 3:7, 3:9, 3:21, 4:13, 10:24,11:4, 12:17, 17:22, 18:2, 21:18, 30:9, 32:21, 32:25, 34:19, 34:21, 37:24, 38:4, 38:24, 52:17, 52:20, 53:2, 55:8, 56:23, 57:19, 57:20, 57:23, 58:9, 60:23, 61:21, 61:23, 64:23, 64:25, 68:20, 71:16, 75:16, 75:17, 75:24, 77:20, 81:12, 81:18, 82:15, 84:5, 84:12, 95:9, 97:25, 98:17 plaintiff's [7] - 3:25, 21:14, 33:12, 58:3, 70:25, 75:21, 84:17 plaintiffs [1] - 87:12 plan [2] - 7:12, 71:14 platforms [2] - 23:1, 23:5 play [2] - 82:25, 83:16 playing [1] - 72:23 plea [1] - 49:20 pleadings [2] - 57:7,

66:2

pled [1] - 50:8 plenty [3] - 60:11, 60:12, 92:13 podcast [13] - 28:11, 28:21, 30:11, 30:14, 30:20, 30:25, 31:4, 31:17, 35:25, 38:6, 38:15, 64:19 podcasts [3] - 33:7, 36:2, 47:21 point [34] - 5:1, 9:25, 10:19, 19:20, 20:6, 23:7, 28:4, 28:17, 40:23, 46:4, 54:6, 55:9, 56:12, 56:21, 56:25, 57:6, 58:3, 58:5, 69:15, 70:25, 81:22, 81:23, 86:12, 86:21, 89:14, 90:8, 91:10, 91:15, 91:24, 92:6, 93:11, 96:2 portion [1] - 94:20 portions [1] - 30:11 posed [1] - 79:21 position [4] - 18:12, 30:18, 80:12, 82:3 **positions** [1] - 16:4 possesses [1] - 53:19 possibility [2] - 75:24, 80:13 possible [2] - 81:25, 94:18 possibly [5] - 91:3, 92:1, 93:15, 94:4, 94:7 post [2] - 77:7, 79:22 potential [3] - 93:19, 96:16 potentially [8] - 25:23, 40:12, 55:5, 58:11, 80:19, 92:5, 93:6, 94:19 PR [1] - 59:6 practical [2] - 68:16, 69:15 practice [1] - 95:22 precisely [1] - 82:8 preclude [1] - 88:20 precluded [1] - 87:17 prejudice [1] - 70:7 prejudicial [2] - 80:19, 87:9 premature [2] - 86:25, 87:2 premise [1] - 78:17 prepared [4] - 17:11, 20:15, 21:1, 84:7 preparing [1] - 73:2 prescreening [1] -

72:19

present [3] - 7:4, 9:8, 21:24 presented [1] - 18:21 presently [1] - 86:17 preserve [2] - 39:20, 95.6 president [2] - 3:3, 73:25 President [5] - 15:12, 15:13, 15:14, 15:16, 15:17 presidential [3] -16:10, 49:8, 50:2 press [1] - 62:25 pressing [1] - 25:17 presumably [1] -53:19 pretty [3] - 18:21, 42:21, 97:21 prevent [3] - 43:13, 54:12, 84:11 previous [2] - 35:14, 52:9 principle [1] - 85:9 privilege [45] - 5:25, 21:20, 25:1, 31:25, 32:5, 33:14, 39:20, 40:11, 41:14, 41:17, 41:21, 41:22, 42:2, 42:5, 42:6, 42:8, 42:15, 42:20, 42:24, 43:6, 43:12, 43:18, 45:19. 45:20. 46:5. 46:7, 46:9, 76:16, 76:18, 77:5, 82:9, 82:10, 82:11, 82:12, 84:13, 85:16, 85:17, 85:19, 85:20, 86:5, 87:4, 88:15, 89:7, 94:24, 95:15 privileged [18] - 23:25, 24:17, 25:4, 25:12, 31:1, 31:15, 31:18, 31:21, 36:3, 40:7, 40:8, 44:10, 44:18, 45:14, 46:10, 59:5, 86:14, 89:5 privileges [1] - 25:6 privy [1] - 57:20 probative [1] - 80:19 problem [10] - 12:1, 23:6, 46:25, 75:12, 78:20, 78:22, 79:6, 86:19, 90:5 problematic [1] -80:18 problems [1] - 44:15 procedural [1] - 44:15 procedure [1] - 82:7 procedures [1] - 85:3

proceed [1] - 72:17 proceeding [5] - 24:1, 24:25, 26:17, 72:7, 86:7 Proceedings [1] -99:13 proceedings [9] - 3:2, 21:23, 23:3, 23:10, 24:20, 28:6, 34:15, 83:13, 99:15 process [1] - 10:17 produce [12] - 7:10, 7:13, 11:23, 17:25, 20:24, 24:16, 28:17, 28:19, 42:6, 53:22, 93:4, 93:5 produced [20] - 7:12, 8:2, 9:3, 9:4, 9:18, 10:3, 10:15, 10:16, 11:10, 11:12, 18:2, 20:12, 20:13, 29:17, 29:20, 30:5, 42:20, 42:24, 44:20, 46:13 producible [1] - 50:25 producing [7] - 30:10, 40:24, 60:21, 60:22, 65:14, 69:1, 69:3 production [15] - 6:19, 7:14, 15:10, 28:12, 28:16, 29:11, 29:16, 32:9, 41:24, 57:15, 59:23, 60:4, 66:18, 68:22, 69:9 professional [2] -59:6, 93:23 proffer [2] - 46:9, 68:8 program [4] - 61:15, 61:17, 61:25, 63:10 **prohibiting** [1] - 85:3 promote [1] - 64:14 **proof** [1] - 62:22 properly [1] - 98:19 proportional [2] -37:4, 69:2 proportionality [1] -41:13 proportionate [3] -37:6, 69:2, 69:4 proportionment [1] -4:22 proposal [3] - 3:25, 4:1, 90:18 prosecute [1] - 25:18 prosecutors [1] -79:11 protect [6] - 44:13, 45:3, 52:21, 91:12, 95:9, 95:14 protected [4] - 85:19, 85:20, 85:21, 86:5

protection [6] - 81:24, 94:5, 97:13, 97:21, 98:17, 99:7 protections [2] -88:19, 98:12 protective [18] - 3:23, 5:12, 74:16, 82:22, 82:25, 83:2, 83:3, 89:13, 89:16, 89:22, 90:9, 91:12, 91:15, 96:19, 96:20, 96:22, 97:9, 97:20 protects [1] - 41:22 prove [1] - 20:7 provided [1] - 29:6 provides [2] - 43:11, 45:14 providing [2] - 10:25, 18:14 proving [1] - 65:20 public [8] - 21:16, 23:1, 23:2, 24:9, 32:7, 49:24, 67:4, 88:25 publication [2] -49:25, 50:7 publicize [1] - 61:24 publicizing [1] - 97:14 publicly [8] - 5:9, 5:21, 6:1, 23:20, 49:3, 49:5, 49:9, 64:10 published [2] - 50:4, 66:6 **pull** [3] - 6:4, 6:13, 33:24 **purported** [2] - 7:1, 7:10 purportedly [1] - 20:2 purpose [3] - 52:2, 53:6, 97:6 purposefully [1] -95:19 purposes [21] - 12:4, 16:12, 25:24, 28:7, 40:17, 48:1, 50:12, 53:5, 55:7, 56:14, 57:14, 59:13, 67:15, 68:21, 69:1, 77:7, 77:14, 90:8, 93:6, 97:19, 98:14 pursue [2] - 72:19, 72:20 pursuing [1] - 87:17 put [14] - 4:13, 21:1, 33:17, 34:20, 35:7, 35:23, 44:11, 62:24, 70:15, 71:3, 71:17, 71:21, 75:5, 88:19 putting [2] - 18:15,

44:21

Q

quarreling [1] - 96:22 questioned [1] - 78:12 questioning [2] - 18:1, questions [25] - 6:12, 72:3, 72:24, 73:14, 73:25, 74:23, 76:5, 76:6, 77:6, 80:17, 81:25, 83:4, 83:13, 86:12, 86:14, 88:13, 89:4, 91:2, 92:4, 92:8, 92:23, 94:3, 94:15, 95:11, 99:6 quick [1] - 97:8 quickly [5] - 59:15, 70:12, 70:14, 70:17, 71:9 quite [1] - 58:25 quote [12] - 11:2, 15:11, 34:24, 45:15, 51:25, 61:15, 63:23, 64:7, 85:19, 85:24, 86:2 quotes [1] - 30:3

R

58:4, 59:15

reality [1] - 67:10

really [25] - 5:5, 5:8,

race [2] - 63:18, 64:18 racial [4] - 63:17, 65:14, 67:11, 68:1 racism [4] - 68:10, 69:4, 69:7, 70:3 racist [10] - 63:24, 64:9, 64:11, 64:18, 37:9, 41:9 64:23, 64:25, 65:7, referencing [4] -66:5, 67:14, 70:1 raise [1] - 4:7 58:20 raised [3] - 37:4, 69:3, Referencing [1] -89:4 22:13 raising [3] - 48:3, referred [1] - 16:9 81:9, 84:16 ran [1] - 16:10 64:19 re [1] - 80:9 refers [4] - 15:12, re-deposed [1] - 80:9 reaction [2] - 76:12, refine [1] - 55:1 76:16 read [6] - 9:9, 15:9, 25:8 17:14, 24:5, 37:19, 38:13 reading [2] - 34:12, 37:8 39:14 real [7] - 48:24, 56:15, 56:16, 56:18, 56:19,

6:12, 7:17, 19:12, 38:25 20:6, 21:14, 32:5, regard [2] - 18:5, 40:5 38:14, 42:17, 46:24, regarding [5] - 35:21, 51:9, 51:24, 54:16, 36:5, 38:13, 67:11, 59:17, 62:12, 62:16, 75:2 62:17, 65:1, 66:13, relate [18] - 5:12, 5:16, 67:17, 68:4, 68:17, 13:23, 21:11, 32:15, 74:19, 77:23 38:14, 38:21, 51:6, reason [10] - 15:19, 57:2, 60:8, 61:13, 16:14, 45:8, 57:6, 62:12, 63:14, 65:7, 78:9, 86:15, 91:5, 65:15, 70:18, 71:18, 95:21, 99:3 91:7 reasonable [3] - 4:21, related [15] - 24:25, 50:15, 80:11 30:20, 38:3, 40:22, reasons [2] - 69:25, 52:10, 54:2, 54:24, 81.9 56:20, 66:10, 74:1, rebut [1] - 64:4 74:9, 74:23, 77:6, receive [3] - 7:20, 89:4, 89:13 11:8, 86:13 relates [26] - 4:21, received [1] - 16:16 8:22, 9:6, 9:22, recently [1] - 72:18 15:24, 16:8, 17:10, reciting [1] - 38:14 26:13, 26:14, 28:15, recollection [3] - 43:9, 30:13, 39:9, 43:6, 55:2, 56:11, 57:9, 83:24, 90:18 58:19, 61:13, 61:20, record [4] - 3:6, 71:23, 61:25, 63:9, 65:2, 72:2, 92:20 79:9, 79:21, 88:22, recording [2] - 3:2, 92:6 99:15 relating [9] - 21:10, records [1] - 69:4 21:21, 22:18, 40:1, recycles [1] - 64:22 41:9, 51:7, 59:23, redacted [1] - 29:10 86:24, 92:23 refer [2] - 15:19, 86:3 relation [7] - 47:6, reference [7] - 21:11, 52:10, 56:10, 57:9, 23:9, 23:18, 34:2, 76:20, 77:5, 79:23 55:19, 63:18, 65:25 relationship [28] - 7:5, referenced [1] - 29:4 8:24, 9:9, 9:12, 9:13, references [3] - 37:7, 10:2, 10:13, 11:1, 12:12, 12:16, 13:16, 18:25, 33:1, 33:14, 21:22, 54:23, 56:11, 35:6, 35:14, 36:6, 36:9, 36:11, 36:20, 37:11, 39:15, 43:12, 50:13, 56:14, 74:6, 74:19, 87:22 referring [2] - 59:2, relationships [1] - 7:1 relatively [1] - 48:23 relevance[11] - 20:19, 29:3, 64:17, 64:20 33:9, 37:1, 41:12, 53:7, 55:23, 57:3, refining [2] - 24:11, 65:22, 66:13, 87:23, 95.5 reflecting [8] - 6:25, relevant [36] - 5:2, 7:4, 9:8, 10:25, 17:18, 25:23, 33:11, 22:11, 35:13, 36:19, 37:3, 45:9, 46:19, 51:19, 53:6, 55:5, reflects [3] - 12:16, 56:6. 56:21. 58:8. 20:1, 53:15 58:11, 62:9, 63:2, refuse [2] - 43:13, 65:24, 66:14, 69:1, 85:20 69:2, 69:4, 69:12, refutes [2] - 38:4,

72:21, 75:21, 78:14, 85:6, 86:20, 87:10, 87:11, 92:5, 92:7, 93:4, 93:6, 93:24, 97:7, 99:2 reliable [1] - 17:20 reliance [1] - 66:6 relied [7] - 14:11, 45:2, 52:20, 60:17, 66:11, 67:17, 68:5 relief [8] - 7:21, 74:16, 87:12, 87:25, 91:5, 92:10, 92:12, 97:12 rely [1] - 68:7 relying [2] - 52:25, 84:22 remain [3] - 4:8, 40:6, 40:8 remedy [3] - 87:19, 91:22, 91:23 remember [6] - 18:19, 40:22, 75:15, 83:20, 83:21, 94:22 Remember [1] - 27:19 remind [1] - 90:11 remotely [1] - 3:18 repeated [1] - 38:10 repeatedly [2] - 64:25, 65:25 reported [1] - 6:1 reporters [1] - 58:23 represent [1] - 94:11 representation [4] -12:25, 13:13, 13:19, 17:5 representing [1] -83:25 reproduce [1] - 30:19 reputation [3] - 64:12, 64:13, 64:14 reputational [5] -33:15, 64:3, 67:1, 67:2, 68:3 request [57] - 3:23, 6:18, 6:19, 9:6, 10:14, 10:18, 11:2, 12:11, 12:15, 14:19, 14:20, 15:10, 15:20, 15:23, 21:6, 21:20, 23:9, 24:5, 24:11, 24:12, 25:9, 28:12, 28:23, 29:10, 29:16, 35:11, 35:12, 36:16, 39:7, 41:4, 52:9, 53:22, 54:13, 55:21, 57:10, 57:14, 59:9, 59:22, 60:3, 61:5, 63:7, 68:9, 68:21, 69:16, 69:23, 69:24, 72:6, 72:8, 72:18,

87:24, 89:25, 90:1, 92:10, 98:3 requested [6] - 3:21, 15:3, 20:11, 26:10, 90:18, 97:12 Requesting [1] -20:10 requesting [3] - 17:14, 20:8. 36:5 requests [23] - 4:10, 4:22, 5:4, 6:3, 6:7, 6:24, 7:24, 9:22, 11:14, 13:3, 13:15, 13:18, 15:21, 20:17, 23:7, 28:10, 32:14, 59:16, 60:11, 62:23, 66:18, 70:11, 70:16 require [3] - 32:9, 36:4, 56:5 required [3] - 45:16, 76:6, 76:7 requires [4] - 23:18, 54:20, 84:12, 87:1 resigned [1] - 10:6 resistance [1] - 4:21 resisted [1] - 18:23 resolution [5] - 83:14, 86:18, 89:21, 96:16 **Resolution** [1] - 63:8 resolve[1] - 94:19 resolved [4] - 37:18, 68:2, 68:15, 68:16 respect [30] - 4:14, 4:15, 4:23, 4:25, 6:3, 9:2, 12:12, 15:3, 16:15, 21:10, 22:24, 26:1, 32:15, 35:5, 36:2, 37:18, 42:11, 43:9, 45:21, 47:24, 49:2, 50:17, 50:18, 50:23, 59:19, 61:14, 72:15, 76:15, 97:9, 98:23 respond [5] - 14:4, 24:11, 28:7, 60:15, 62:18 responding [1] - 61:3 response [18] - 14:2, 14:5, 14:7, 14:11, 14:13, 16:13, 22:22, 28:22, 29:16, 32:1, 32:9, 35:9, 38:19, 39:18, 66:3, 77:6, 86:14, 89:5 responsibilities [1] -19:13 responsibility [1] responsible [3] -18:10, 18:13, 79:12

responsive [11] - 15:5, 25:14, 46:10, 46:14, 48:3, 48:22, 48:23, 54:5, 55:24, 59:7, 60:24 restrain [1] - 97:14 restriction [2] - 90:1, 94:16 restrictive [1] - 4:1 resubmitted [1] - 55:2 result [3] - 33:16, 35:3, 84:13 resulted [1] - 35:16 results [1] - 40:15 retaliation [1] - 22:16 retaliatory [1] - 27:9 retention [1] - 10:5 retribution [1] - 22:16 reveal [2] - 60:14, 77:4 revealed [2] - 30:16, 77:4 revealing [2] - 36:2, 63:16 Revenge [2] - 39:1 reviewing [1] - 16:13 revisited [1] - 21:5 rife [1] - 47:22 rightfully [1] - 85:20 rights [2] - 11:16, 77:12 rise [1] - 39:12 risk [1] - 73:2 road [2] - 20:21, 80:13 roadblocks [1] - 4:13 rolling [1] - 7:19 room [1] - 76:15 Rule [3] - 86:7, 94:8, 95:12 rule [12] - 41:21, 45:23, 46:8, 82:14, 82:18, 84:10, 85:2, 86:21, 86:23, 93:25, 94:11, 98:1 rule's [1] - 94:22 ruled [3] - 74:5, 92:24, rules [10] - 93:24, 95:8, 95:9, 95:10, 95:13, 95:16, 95:17, 95:21, 95:22, 98:1

S

rulings [2] - 50:25,

99:4

saw [3] - 6:13, 66:10 scattered [1] - 33:5 scheduled [4] - 4:16, 7:22, 7:23, 72:17 scheme [2] - 54:9,

51:14

setting [1] - 51:23

57:19 scope [11] - 20:16, 27:20, 27:22, 36:4, 55:2, 55:18, 73:1, 73:24, 88:17, 89:25, 92:4 se [1] - 22:9 seated [1] - 4:8 second [1] - 6:14 secret [1] - 34:24 security [3] - 73:17, 96:8, 96:15 see [30] - 6:20, 6:24, 14:14, 16:15, 21:2, 25:2, 31:3, 33:25, 52:24, 53:1, 54:5, 58:2, 58:5, 58:21, 62:24, 68:14, 70:16, 73:7, 82:13, 83:24, 86:20, 87:13, 88:1, 89:14, 90:8, 91:10, 92:6, 93:11, 93:14, seek [3] - 7:21, 84:4, 84:6 seeking [4] - 6:25, 12:22, 67:20, 78:9 seeks [2] - 64:14, 75:21 segregate [1] - 76:23 self [3] - 38:8, 85:16, 86:6 sending [1] - 14:9 sensationalize [1] -74:22 sense [7] - 27:11, 27:17, 41:17, 69:10, 96:24, 98:9, 98:20 sensitive [3] - 24:17, 67:10, 77:12 sensitivities [1] - 32:3 **sensitivity** [1] - 80:16 sent [3] - 11:17, 24:24, 73:12 separate [4] - 9:17, 10:5, 10:14, 76:19 September [5] - 4:16, 4:17, 7:23, 50:3, 72:17 series [3] - 32:14, 51:3. 67:13 seriously [1] - 20:23 served [1] - 14:7 serves [2] - 43:5, 79:10 serving [3] - 9:18, 38:8, 40:10 set [3] - 23:5, 51:8,

settled [1] - 35:20 seven [4] - 78:18, 90:25, 92:1, 93:22 seven-hour [2] -90:25, 93:22 several [4] - 29:19, 76:19, 78:6, 96:17 shall [1] - 83:8 share [1] - 90:2 sharing [3] - 51:24, 64:10, 65:18 shielding [1] - 87:18 shields [1] - 85:17 short [2] - 32:5, 53:8 **shortly** [1] - 49:7 show [6] - 18:8, 20:20, 22:12, 22:13, 35:6, 84:12 showing [4] - 21:4, 63:3, 70:23, 84:18 **shows** [1] - 19:13 side [2] - 41:25, 71:21 sign [2] - 18:12, 18:22 signature [1] - 20:9 signe [1] - 20:7 signed [4] - 9:5, 18:11, 18:15, 20:5 similar [3] - 26:7, 54:1, 62:3 **simple** [1] - 6:6 simply [7] - 24:8, 76:17, 78:2, 81:23, 89:5, 94:10, 97:19 sit [1] - 58:10 situation [5] - 70:5, 75:5, 81:24, 83:18, 96:25 six [1] - 74:1 slew [1] - 93:5 slog [1] - 4:9 sly [1] - 51:24 sneak [1] - 90:16 snippets [1] - 28:20 so.. [1] - 8:1 So.. [1] - 27:23 social [4] - 23:1, 23:5, 23:19, 88:25 sole [1] - 52:2 someone [2] - 22:25, 76:14 sometimes [1] - 51:11 sons [1] - 30:23 soon [2] - 3:25, 71:1 **sorry** [16] - 6:14, 10:8, 11:22, 31:2, 32:17, 33:21, 38:12, 45:7, 49:11, 51:10, 51:11, 52:12, 58:14, 58:18, 62:20, 64:1 sort [5] - 21:25, 22:8,

43:2, 61:13, 74:16 sorts [2] - 84:6, 93:19 source [2] - 31:1, 68:12 speaking [4] - 5:2, 12:6, 67:25, 79:23 special [2] - 82:14, 82:18 specific [20] - 5:4, 5:21, 5:22, 6:3, 6:7, 11:17, 23:18, 24:2, 28:18, 28:19, 43:4, 44:4, 58:22, 58:25, 59:20, 60:14, 62:13, 64:5, 86:24, 97:11 specifically [4] - 29:1, 32:24, 54:22, 63:24 specifics [2] - 9:23, specified [2] - 46:24, 64:4 spend [1] - 91:20 spends [1] - 97:1 **spoken** [1] - 78:2 spouse [3] - 41:22, 41:23, 43:12 spouses [2] - 43:15, 45:15 square [1] - 44:21 **squarely** [3] - 33:17, 44:11, 52:5 stage [2] - 43:1, 84:18 stand [3] - 10:18, 12:15. 90:7 standard [1] - 95:23 standpoint [5] - 23:2, 43:8, 67:3, 77:2, 83:4 start [1] - 20:1 starting [5] - 3:7, 23:7, 27:21, 27:24, 85:8 starts [1] - 19:15 state [8] - 3:6, 43:7, 43:23, 45:13, 53:19, 74:2, 85:25, 95:23 statement [6] - 47:14, 58:22, 59:2, 66:6, 66:12, 67:18 statements [5] -11:15, 23:1, 25:17, 38:9, 65:20 states [1] - 52:25 **States** [3] - 15:13, 15:15, 15:18 statute [1] - 43:11 stay [8] - 70:21, 83:15, 84:4, 84:6, 84:10, 86:16, 87:19, 95:19 stayed [1] - 83:13 stem [1] - 9:11

step [2] - 10:14, 14:15 Stephanie [3] - 32:16, 32:17, 41:10 Stewart [1] - 84:22 still [8] - 31:3, 34:4, 34:12, 64:4, 73:20, 77:25, 88:20, 96:17 Stormy [4] - 32:18, 38:12, 44:13, 87:15 strained [1] - 57:6 strike [1] - 81:1 strong [1] - 74:19 structure [2] - 77:13, 77:15 stuff [1] - 51:12 styled [2] - 3:2, 99:15 subject [8] - 7:11, 13:11, 35:20, 63:2, 75:25, 82:23, 83:1 **submitted** [1] - 8:14 subsequent [2] -77:19, 85:23 subset [1] - 69:9 **substance** [1] - 31:9 substantial [1] - 38:10 substantiating [1] -60:18 substantively [1] -93.9 subsumed [1] - 61:2 suffered [1] - 33:15 suggested [1] - 73:21 suggestion [1] - 91:23 suing [1] - 81:19 summarizing [1] - 8:6 **summary** [2] - 84:14, 84:18 support [2] - 20:4, 57:24 supports [1] - 92:2 suppose [1] - 29:12 **supposed** [3] - 28:17, 94:1, 94:14 surmise [1] - 22:25 surrounding [1] - 74:1 suspect [1] - 89:3 suspenders [1] -29:12 sustain [4] - 21:3, 63:2, 63:11, 68:23 sweeping [1] - 4:12 system [1] - 81:24

Т

tab [1] - 85:13 table [3] - 72:7, 81:6, 90:20 talks [4] - 23:8, 39:5, 84:23, 85:1 Tallahassee [1] -85:12 tangentially [1] - 79:9 tax [1] - 54:10 technically [1] - 30:22 teed [1] - 16:16 telephone [1] - 3:17 temporal [4] - 27:19, 27:20, 27:22, 77:2 ten [2] - 21:17, 92:3 tend [2] - 22:12, 22:13 tends [1] - 18:8 Tenth [1] - 84:23 term [2] - 15:11, 15:15 terminate [1] - 13:15 termination [4] - 10:1, 10:6, 10:7, 10:8 terms [9] - 4:24, 12:7, 12:8, 20:1, 40:24, 47:12, 49:18, 63:17, 73:20 terrible [1] - 30:24 testify [5] - 41:22, 67:13, 75:2, 75:25, 76:7 testimony [3] - 82:23, 85:18, 90:3 testing [1] - 45:9 text [1] - 95:12 th [1] - 20:1 that.. [1] - 49:9 **THE** [318] - 3:3, 3:14, 3:16, 3:19, 4:17, 4:19, 5:11, 6:4, 6:9, 6:13, 6:16, 6:23, 7:3, 7:8, 8:2, 8:8, 8:16, 8:19, 9:1, 9:24, 10:9, 10:15, 10:19, 11:4, 11:6, 11:24, 12:18, 12:20, 13:1, 13:4, 13:22, 14:1, 14:4, 14:14, 14:24, 15:1, 15:6, 15:23, 16:2, 16:5, 16:18, 16:24, 17:2, 17:6, 17:9, 17:13, 17:18, 17:20, 18:4, 18:7, 18:17, 18:24, 19:3, 19:5, 19:7, 19:11, 19:14, 19:21, 20:8, 20:12, 20:14, 20:19, 21:3, 21:9, 21:20, 22:4, 22:6, 22:12, 22:19, 22:21, 23:12, 23:14, 23:16, 23:18, 23:24, 24:4, 24:7, 24:14, 24:22, 24:24, 25:7, 25:10, 25:19, 26:8, 26:11, 26:16, 26:21,

27:3, 27:6, 27:19,

27:22, 28:3, 28:12, 28:16, 28:24, 29:3, 29:10, 29:14, 29:17, 29:20, 29:22, 29:25, 30:4, 30:7, 30:13, 30:16, 30:22, 31:8, 31:14, 31:20, 31:24, 32:2, 32:8, 32:13, 32:17, 32:19, 32:22, 33:4, 33:8, 33:21, 33:24, 34:4, 34:8, 34:10, 34:18, 35:9, 36:8, 36:13, 36:19, 37:2, 37:6, 37:12, 37:14, 37:19, 38:2, 38:4, 38:8, 38:16, 38:19, 38:24, 39:4, 39:7, 39:11, 39:21, 39:23, 40:1, 40:4, 40:11, 40:17, 41:2, 41:6, 41:11, 41:17, 41:20, 42:2, 42:9, 42:15, 42:17, 42:25, 43:16, 43:20, 43:24, 44:8, 44:22, 45:19, 46:1, 46:8, 46:13, 46:17, 46:22, 47:11, 47:16, 47:19, 47:25, 48:5, 48:10, 48:13, 48:15, 48:18, 49:2, 49:9, 49:16, 49:21, 49:23, 49:25, 50:5, 50:10, 50:12, 50:21, 51:1, 51:5, 51:10, 51:20, 52:4, 52:7, 52:12, 52:16, 53:12, 53:17, 53:21, 54:1, 54:17, 55:4, 55:13, 55:16, 55:22, 55:25, 56:3, 56:8, 56:12, 57:14, 58:7, 58:14, 58:16, 58:21, 59:1, 59:8, 59:12, 59:22, 59:25, 60:3, 60:10, 60:19, 61:9, 61:17, 62:2, 62:6, 62:9, 62:20, 63:1, 63:8, 63:11, 63:20, 64:16, 65:1, 65:6, 65:12, 65:17, 66:3, 66:14, 66:22, 67:6, 67:20, 68:8, 68:19, 69:12, 69:20, 69:23, 70:7, 70:9, 70:21, 71:3, 71:7, 71:10, 71:22, 72:4, 72:10, 72:12, 72:14, 73:5, 73:10, 74:13, 75:11, 76:2, 76:9, 76:18, 76:22, 77:13, 78:17, 78:23, 79:5, 79:14, 79:17,

80:9, 81:8, 81:19, 81:23, 82:8, 82:19, 83:1, 83:6, 83:10, 83:17, 83:20, 84:20, 84:25, 85:6, 85:10, 85:14, 86:1, 86:4, 86:19, 87:9, 88:4, 88:8, 88:14, 88:18, 89:11, 89:16, 89:20, 90:5, 90:13, 91:19, 92:21, 92:23, 93:1, 93:3, 93:13, 94:21, 95:1, 95:4, 96:7, 97:6, 97:10, 97:18, 98:11, 98:22, 99:10 themselves [2] - 66:2, 68:1 theoretically [2] -91:6, 93:19 theory [5] - 5:7, 28:3, 66:19, 92:2 therefore [3] - 46:10, 55:16, 62:16 therefrom [1] - 85:22 thereof [1] - 37:11 they've [5] - 7:12, 8:23, 9:3, 20:12, 29:15 thinking [1] - 66:22 third [2] - 26:2, 41:2 third-party [1] - 26:2 thousand [3] - 20:22, 20:24, 29:12 three [8] - 4:19, 8:13, 10:2, 34:16, 74:3, 91:20, 92:1, 97:1 throughout [2] - 33:6, 39:4 tickets [1] - 96:14 tie [2] - 94:1, 99:4 timely [1] - 14:7 timing [2] - 48:1, 59:12 today [8] - 3:18, 4:7, 4:11, 4:19, 4:21, 58:10, 78:4, 97:12 tomorrow [1] - 71:12 ton [1] - 98:14 tons [1] - 60:19 top [2] - 44:5, 49:14 topic [20] - 47:12, 55:18, 68:19, 68:20, 68:25, 69:12, 74:1, 81:11, 82:20, 83:9, 83:10, 87:2, 90:20, 91:13, 93:1, 93:3, 97:7, 97:19, 99:1 topics [10] - 72:19,

73:4, 75:14, 77:16,

79:9, 80:6, 81:3,

83:4, 86:16, 89:4 totality [1] - 8:11 touch [3] - 75:14, 83:9, 83:10 touches [1] - 91:7 touching [1] - 80:5 towards [1] - 27:10 town [1] - 19:20 transaction [1] - 57:12 transactions [3] -57:12, 57:13, 74:4 transcript [3] - 59:2, 88:22. 91:12 transcription [2] - 3:1, 99:14 transpired [1] - 55:15 trial [1] - 77:19 tried [2] - 76:23, 77:17 true [2] - 71:16, 78:25 Trump [46] - 3:4, 5:23, 7:2, 8:25, 12:13, 12:14, 12:17, 13:5, 13:24, 14:19, 14:21, 14:22, 15:11, 15:12, 15:13, 15:14, 15:17, 15:21, 16:10, 18:25, 19:18, 19:22, 22:1, 22:25, 35:5, 35:15, 35:17, 36:7, 40:9, 41:9, 43:22, 45:3, 45:4, 45:5, 48:2, 48:23, 48:25, 51:16, 52:11. 56:13. 63:23. 70:2, 74:10 trump [18] - 15:16, 45:2, 54:8, 54:13, 58:23, 62:11, 63:17, 63:22, 64:8, 64:11, 65:19, 69:7, 73:3, 74:6, 74:8, 74:10, 80:23, 97:13 trump's [3] - 59:18, 64:12, 78:11 Trump's [7] - 5:16, 9:21, 27:9, 34:25, 44:15, 45:2, 48:20 trust [1] - 17:4 truth [4] - 35:4, 38:4, 38:25, 65:20 try [4] - 25:1, 54:6, 72:25, 90:15 trying [14] - 4:2, 42:10, 52:11, 54:12, 54:15, 54:21, 59:17, 62:17, 67:15, 76:24, 76:25, 77:8, 80:11 tune [1] - 54:22 turn [1] - 73:10 turning [2] - 4:6, 11:4 turns [1] - 13:8

Twitter [1] - 23:19 **two** [12] - 4:2, 7:2, 9:11, 13:5, 28:19, 40:24, 44:19, 68:24, 73:15, 74:18, 74:19, 74:24

tying [1] - 98:4 type [1] - 66:23 types [1] - 25:17

U.S[1] - 84:22

U

ultimately [3] - 18:13,

35:20, 40:21 unconstitutional [1] -84:11 under [5] - 16:9, 41:21, 85:2, 86:7, 87:24 understood [6] - 15:4, 69:11, 69:18, 81:4, 94:25, 98:10 undisputed [1] - 9:20 unduly [1] - 98:4 unfair [1] - 98:13 unilaterally [1] - 96:23 unique [2] - 97:22, 97:23 United [3] - 15:12, 15:14, 15:18 unless [3] - 84:15, 85:21, 90:9 unlikely [1] - 41:15 unquote [4] - 51:25, 61:15, 63:24, 64:7 unreasonable [1] -91:22 unresolved [1] - 73:6 **up** [26] - 4:13, 6:4, 6:13, 8:20, 16:16, 20:25, 33:24, 51:8, 51:14, 51:23, 57:11, 71:13, 72:5, 74:24, 75:13, 78:2, 90:8, 90:22, 91:13, 91:15, 91:17, 94:19, 94:20, 95:21, 97:13, 97:19 upcoming [3] - 4:15, 70:13, 72:16 useful [2] - 58:10, 62:13 utilize [3] - 24:10,

V

82:6, 90:2

vacuum [2] - 81:2 value [2] - 46:1, 80:20 vanilla [1] - 77:17 vantage [1] - 10:19 vast [2] - 33:15, 35:2 vein [1] - 60:6 veracity[1] - 45:9 verification [2] -13:11, 28:25 verify [2] - 12:21, 13:4 verse[1] - 30:3 versus [5] - 3:4, 83:22, 84:5, 84:22, 85:12 video [2] - 88:22, 90:3 view [5] - 28:4, 28:17, 58:3, 64:11, 69:15 viewed [1] - 64:9 views [2] - 64:9 violates [1] - 31:17 violation [3] - 11:16, 54:10, 94:8 violations [1] - 38:10 virtually [1] - 44:20 virtue [9] - 35:24, 36:15, 36:17, 40:8, 43:17, 44:12, 67:3, 74:22, 75:6 vis [2] - 32:23 vis-a-vis [1] - 32:23 visceral [1] - 76:12 visible [1] - 94:15 vocal [1] - 23:3

W

wait [2] - 44:22, 62:24

waive [1] - 16:4

waived [4] - 42:23, 44:20, 44:23, 63:1 waiver [3] - 24:20, 44:12, 79:11 wall [1] - 44:11 wants [4] - 45:24, 78:19, 79:18, 97:14 waste [3] - 78:19, 91:3, 93:22 wasting [1] - 6:10 ways [1] - 22:7 weeds [3] - 6:12, 51:12, 55:14 week [3] - 21:16, 90:13, 96:18 weeks [2] - 4:19, 96:17 welcome [1] - 67:8 Welling(phonetic [2] -83:18, 83:22 West [1] - 96:11 whatever's [1] - 40:20 whatsoever [5] - 36:6, 36:12, 36:18, 80:20, 86:11 whereas [1] - 5:25

whichever [1] - 87:6 White [1] - 74:8 whole [4] - 52:6, 57:19, 83:1, 93:5 wholeheartedly [2] -11:10, 88:2 widely [1] - 5:21 wife [8] - 34:25, 41:13, 41:19, 42:15, 43:6, 43:15, 45:16 willing [1] - 95:24 wish [3] - 4:7, 4:14, 72:19 withdraw [1] - 60:2 witness [8] - 22:3, 22:4, 22:17, 26:20, 82:10, 94:6, 95:1, 95:4

woman [1] - 61:14 women [1] - 61:22 worded [4] - 9:10, 24:3, 57:7, 68:22 words [21] - 19:21, 31:16, 36:8, 36:22, 37:20, 39:11, 43:20, 59:1, 60:21, 62:2, 62:21, 67:6, 69:23, 76:9, 76:10, 79:15, 81:13, 82:9, 83:17, 86:21, 89:16 works [1] - 12:3

witnesses [2] - 22:10,

67:13

worry [1] - 14:20 worth [3] - 29:23, 57:16, 99:5 worthwhile [1] - 72:25 wrestling [1] - 88:20 written [3] - 9:17, 23:8, 60:11 wrongfully [2] - 64:18,

64:25 **wrote** [3] - 8:6, 30:23, 31:16

Χ

XYZ [1] - 45:8

Υ

y'all [1] - 99:10 yada [3] - 8:19 years [6] - 21:16, 57:16, 77:7, 83:6, 87:21 York [9] - 26:15, 26:19, 42:13, 42:22, 43:21, 44:2, 45:13, 45:21, 74:2 yourselves[1] - 71:14

Ζ

ZOOM [2] - 73:22, 73:23